













This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
 
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 












A Thesis submitted to 
University of Edinburgh Business School 
University of Edinburgh 






“This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognise that its rests with the author and that no question from the thesis, 




Papers adapted from this thesis 
2016 Sun, Y., and Ibikunle, G. (2016). Informed trading and the price impact of 
block trading: A high frequency trading analysis. International Review of 
Financial Analysis forthcoming 
 
2016 Sun, Y., and Ibikunle, G. (2016). A Decade in the Life of a Market: Aggregate 
Market Fragmentation, Adverse Selection and Market Efficiency. 
Conference Paper and Presentation at British Accounting & Finance 
Association (BAFA) Annual Conference, 21th – 23th March 2016, University 
of Bath. 
 
2016 Sun, Y., and Ibikunle, G. (2016). A Decade in the Life of a Market: Aggregate 
Market Fragmentation, Adverse Selection and Market Efficiency. 
Conference Paper and Presentation at IFABS 2016 Conference, 1st – 3rd June 
2016, Barcelona. 
 
2016 Sun, Y., and Ibikunle, G. (2016). A Decade in the Life of a Market: Aggregate 
Market Fragmentation, Adverse Selection and Market Efficiency. 
Conference Paper and Presentation at EFMA Annual Meetings, 29th June – 
2nd July 2016, Basel. 
 
2016 Sun, Y., and Ibikunle, G. (2016). A Decade in the Life of a Market: Aggregate 
Market Fragmentation, Adverse Selection and Market Efficiency. 
Conference Paper and Presentation at FMA Annual Meeting, 19th – 22nd 
October 2016, Las Vegas. 
 
2016 Sun, Y., and Ibikunle, G. (2016). A Decade in the Life of a Market: Aggregate 
Market Fragmentation, Adverse Selection and Market Efficiency. 
Conference Paper and Presentation at 29th Australasian Finance and Banking 
Conference (AFBC), 14th – 16th December 2016, Sydney. 
 
2017 Sun, Y., Ibikunle, G and Mare, D. (2017). Light versus Dark: Liquidity 
Commonality in Lit and Dark Venues. Conference Paper and Presentation at 
4th Young Finance Scholar Conference, 12th June– 13th June 2017, University 
of Sussex. 
 
2017 Sun, Y., Ibikunle, G and Mare, D. (2017). Light versus Dark: Liquidity 
Commonality in Lit and Dark Venues. Conference Paper and Presentation at 





2017 Sun, Y., Ibikunle, G and Mare, D. (2017). Light versus Dark: Liquidity 
Commonality in Lit and Dark Venues. Conference Paper and Presentation at 
1st European Capital Markets Workshop, 6th – 7th July 2017, Chieti. 
 
2016 Sun, Y., , D. (2017). Light versus Dark: Liquidity Commonality in Lit and Dark Venues. Conference Paper and Presentation at 1st European Capital Markets Workshop, 6th – 7th July, 2017, Chieti. 
2017 Sun, Y., Ibikunle, G and Mare, D. (2017). Light versus Dark: Liquidity 
Commonality in Lit and Dark Venues. Conference Paper and Presentation at 





I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my PhD supervisors, Dr Gbenga Ibikunle 
and Dr Davide Mare, for their invaluable guidance, insightful feedback and constant 
support and contribution. GB accepted me to be his first PhD student. I have learned 
so much from him in interesting discussions about financial markets microstructure. 
Without his abiding inspiration and his willingness to challenge, this thesis would not 
have attained its current level. I also thank Davide who has contributed so much to the 
thesis. GB and Davide support me more than one can expect a doctoral supervisor to, 
and I could not have imagined a better supervision team for my doctoral research.  
I would also like to thank my examiners – Professor Andrew Lepone and Dr Angelica 
Gonzalez – for their extremely helpful feedback on the thesis. 
Among others, special thanks go to Professor Wenxuan Hou, Dr Ufuk Gucbilmez and 
Dr Lucy Liu for their help at various stages of my job hunting. I am also grateful to 
the support staff in our school, especially Ms Susan Keatinge for their help throughout 
my PhD. I would also like to thank the University of Edinburgh - Business School and 
the Accounting and Finance group for their generous financial support. 
I would also like to thank all my friends and fellow colleagues in Edinburgh for 
making this whole PhD journey so meaningful.  I would like to thank the brilliant 
programmers Tomas Ó Briain and Xiao Yao. I have learnt so much from you in SAS 
coding. I also thank Tinghua Duan, Louis Nguyen, Ben Sila, Ivan Lim, Tom Steffen, 
Khaladdin Rzayev and Hang Zhou. I enjoyed the time studying with your all.  
To my friends Yuchen Li, Shiyun Song, Boocheong Toh at the District of Columbia 
(US), Warwick (UK) and Birmingham (UK). 
Finally, and most importantly, I thank my parents for their support and encouragement. 







Acknowledgement: ........................................................................................................................ 1 
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 5 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... 6 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. 7 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... 8 
1. Introduction and Literature Review ............................................................................... 10 
2. Background ....................................................................................................................... 24 
2.1. Stock Exchange Trading Service .................................................................................... 24 
2.1.1. Upstairs and Downstairs Markets .............................................................................. 25 
2.2. MiFID ............................................................................................................................. 27 
2.2.1. Pre- and Post-trade Transparency .............................................................................. 28 
2.2.2. Market Fragmentation ................................................................................................ 29 
2.2.3. Dark Trading .............................................................................................................. 31 
2.3. Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II ................................................................ 32 
3. Informed Trading and the Price Impact of Block Trades: A high frequency trading 
analysis. ...................................................................................................................................... 35 
3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 35 
3.2. Data and Methodology ................................................................................................... 44 
3.2.1. Data ............................................................................................................................ 44 
3.2.1.1. Sample selection ........................................................................................................ 44 
3.2.1.2. Sample Description .................................................................................................... 45 
3.2.2. Methodology .............................................................................................................. 51 
3.2.2.1. The Price Impact Model ............................................................................................. 51 
3.2.2.2. The PIN Model .......................................................................................................... 56 
3.3. Regression Results and Discussion ................................................................................ 60 
3.3.1. Preliminary Predictive Analysis ................................................................................. 60 
3 
 
3.3.2. Trading on Information with Block Trades................................................................ 62 
3.3.3. Intraday Patterns ........................................................................................................ 71 
3.3.4. Inter-day patterns (long-lived information) ................................................................ 78 
3.3.5. Stock opacity and the incorporation of information ................................................... 82 
3.4. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 89 
4. Aggregate Market Fragmentation, Adverse Selection and Market Efficiency ........... 91 
4.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 91 
4.2. Data and Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................... 103 
4.2.1. Data .......................................................................................................................... 103 
4.2.2. Descriptive statistics ................................................................................................ 104 
4.3. Measures of Information Asymmetry and Fragmentation ............................................ 112 
4.3.1. PIN, an inverse proxy for market transparency ........................................................ 112 
4.3.2. Absolute value of autocorrelation in mid-quote return ............................................ 114 
4.3.3. Measures of Market Fragmentation ......................................................................... 115 
4.4. Impact of Fragmentation on Market Transparency ...................................................... 120 
4.4.1. Stock Day Panel Regressions ................................................................................... 120 
4.4.2. Instrumental Variable Approach .............................................................................. 121 
4.4.3. Main results .............................................................................................................. 126 
4.5. Fragmentation and Market Efficiency .......................................................................... 137 
4.5.1. Predictive Regressions ............................................................................................. 137 
4.5.2. Results ...................................................................................................................... 138 
4.6. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 142 
5. Commonality in Lit and Dark liquidity ........................................................................ 145 
5.1. Introduction: ................................................................................................................. 145 
5.2. Related Literature ......................................................................................................... 149 
5.3. Data and Methodology ................................................................................................. 152 
4 
 
5.3.1. Data .......................................................................................................................... 152 
5.3.2. Methodology ............................................................................................................ 153 
5.3.2.1. Main liquidity measures ........................................................................................... 153 
5.3.2.2. Descriptive statistics ................................................................................................ 155 
5.3.2.3. The baseline model .................................................................................................. 161 
5.3.2.4. What drives dark pool trading activities .................................................................. 163 
5.3.2.5. Extended Model with Informed trading Factors ...................................................... 164 
5.3.2.6. Drivers of elasticity of liquidity commonality ......................................................... 167 
5.4. Empirical Results and Discussion ................................................................................ 168 
5.4.1. Liquidity commonality in lit and dark venues ......................................................... 168 
5.4.2. What drives dark pool trading activities .................................................................. 179 
5.4.3. Liquidity and informed trading activities ................................................................. 184 
5.4.4. Determinants of elasticity of liquidity commonality ................................................ 190 
5.5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 194 
6. Summary ......................................................................................................................... 196 
6.1. Summary of findings .................................................................................................... 196 
6.1.1. Informed trading and the Price Impact of Block Trades .......................................... 196 
6.1.2. Aggregate market fragmentation, adverse selection and market efficiency ............. 197 
6.1.3. Liquidity commonality in lit and dark venues ......................................................... 199 








List of Abbreviations   
 
 
AT                        Algorithm Trading 
ATs                      Algorithm Traders 
CAPM                 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
DMM                   Designate Market Maker(s) 
HFT                     High-Frequency Trading 
HFTs                   High-Frequency Traders 
IPOs                    Initial Public Offerings 
LSE                      London Stock Exchange 
MiFID                  Markets in Financial Instrument Directives 
MTFs                   Multilateral Trading Facilities  
NBBO                  National Best Bid and Offer 
NYSE                  New York Stock Exchange 
PIN                      Probability of Informed Trading 
Reg NMS             Regulation National Market System 
RMs                     Regulated Markets 
SEAQ                  Stock Exchange Automated Quotation 
SETS                   Electronic Trading Service 
SIs                        Systematic Internalisations              







List of Figures 
 
Figure 3.1 LSE Block Volume and Dark Volume……………..………………….37 
Figure 3.2 Log daily Traded Pound Volume per minute………………………….46 
Figure 3.3 Log Mean Trade size per minute………………………………………47 
Figure 3.4 Distribution chart of block size on LSE…..…………………....………50 
Figure 3.5 Tree diagram of the trading process…………………………....………58 
Figure 4.1. Percentage share of trading volume by venue…………………...……108 
Figure 4.2. Total number of trades by venue before and after the implementation of 
MiFID………………………………………………………………………….….110 
Figure 4.3. Effective bid ask spread by venue……………………………………111 
Figure 4.4. Daily average level of fragmentation and off-exchange 
fragmentation………………………………………………………………….…119 
Figure 4.5. Effects of visible fragmentation on market transparency……………129 










List of Tables 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for Block Trades…………………………….…………....…50 
Table 3.2 Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables……………………………….…51 
Table 3.3 Predictive Analysis Test……………………………………………………….…62 
Table 3.4 Incorporation of Private Information via Block Trading in FTSE 100 
stocks......................................................................................................................................65 
Table 3.5 Incorporation of Private Information via Purchase Block Trading in Stocks across 
Trading Hours……………………………………………………………………..………..73 
Table 3.6 Incorporation of Private Information via Sale Block Trading in FTSE 100 Stocks 
across Trading Hours………………………………………………………………….....…75 
Table 3.7 Inter-day relationship between PIN and Block Trades………………………..…81 
Table 3.8 Stock Transparency and Incorporation of Private Information via Purchase Block 
Trading in FTSE 100 Stocks………………………………………………………….….…85 
Table 3.9 Stock Transparency and Incorporation of Private Information via Sale Block 
Trading in FTSE 100 Stock …………………………………………..........................……87 
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics……………………………………………………….......106 
Table 4.2. Correlations matrix for independent variables ………………………...…....…107 
Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics: Market fragmentation and PIN …………………….…..118 
Table 4.4. First stage regression and weak IV test………………….……….…………….124 
Table 4.5. Market fragmentation and market transparency………………………….….…127 
Table 4.6. Market fragmentation and adverse selection risk………………………….…...133 
Table 4.7. Off-exchange market fragmentation and market transparency …..………...….134 
Table 4.8. Off-exchange market fragmentation and adverse selection risk………….........136 
Table 4.9. Market quality test: short term predictive test………………………..……...…141 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics …………………………………………….………….….160 
Table 5.2. Baseline results: liquidity commonality in lit and dark venues…………….…..171 
Table 5.3. Baseline results in each year……………………………………….……….......173 
Table 5.4. Asymmetry in liquidity commonality in lit and dark venues under different 
market conditions…………………………………………….……………..…………..….176 
Table 5.5. What drive dark pool trading activity………………………………..................181 
Table 5.6. Liquidity commonality and informed trading …………………………….....…187 





Financial markets perform two major functions. The first is the provision of liquidity 
in order to facilitate direct investment, hedging and diversification; the second is to 
ensure the efficient price discovery required in order to direct resources to where they 
can be best utilised within an economy. How well financial markets perform these 
functions is critical to the financial welfare of every individual in modern economies.  
As an example, retirement savings across the world are mostly invested in capital 
markets. Hence, the functioning of financial markets is linked to the standard of living 
of individuals. Technological advancements and new market regulations have in 
recent times significantly impacted how financial markets function, with no period in 
history having witnessed a more rapid pace of change than the last decade. Financial 
markets have become very complex, with most of the order execution now done by 
computer algorithms. New high-tech trading venues, such as dark pools, also now play 
outsized roles in financial markets. A lot of the impacts of these developments are 
poorly understood. In the EU particularly, the introduction of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID) and advancements in technology have combined to 
unleash a dramatic transformation of European capital markets. In order to better 
understand the role of high-tech trading venues in the modern financial markets’ 
trading environment generally and in the UK in particular, I conduct three studies 
investigating questions linked to the three major developments in financial markets 
over the past decade; these are algorithmic/high-frequency trading, market 
fragmentation and dark trading. In the first study, I examine the changing relationship 
between the price impact of block trades and informed trading, by considering this 
phenomenon within a high-frequency trading environment on intraday and inter-day 
bases. I find that the price impact of block trades is stronger during the first hour of 
trading; this is consistent with the hypothesis that information accumulates overnight 
during non-trading hours. Furthermore, private information is gradually incorporated 
into prices despite heightened trading frequency. Evidence suggests that informed 
traders exploit superior information across trading days, and stocks with lower 
transparency exhibit stronger information diffusion effects when traded in blocks, thus 
informed block trading facilitates price discovery. The second study exploits the 
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regulatory differences between the US and the EU to examine the impact of market 
fragmentation on dimensions of market quality. Unlike the US’s Regulation National 
Market System, the EU’s MiFID does not impose a formal exchange trading linkage 
or guarantee a best execution price. This has raised concerns about consolidated 
market quality in increasingly fragmented European markets. The second study 
therefore investigates the impact of visible trading fragmentation on the quality of the 
London equity market and find a quadratic relationship between fragmentation and 
adverse selection costs. At low levels of fragmentation, order flow competition 
reduces adverse selection costs, improves market transparency and enhances market 
efficiency by reducing arbitrage opportunities. However, high levels of fragmentation 
increase adverse selection costs. The final study compares the impact of lit and dark 
venues’ liquidity on market liquidity. I find that compared with lit venues, dark venues 
proportionally contribute more liquidity to the aggregate market. This is because dark 
pools facilitate trades that otherwise might not easily have occurred in lit venues when 
the spread widens and the limit order queue builds up. I also find that informed and 
algorithmic trading hinder liquidity creation in lit and dark venues, while evidence 
also suggests that stocks exhibiting low levels of informed trading across the aggregate 
market drive dark venues’ liquidity contribution.  
 
Keyword: Probability of informed trading (PIN), Block trades, Opacity, Price impact, 
Price discovery, Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs), Market transparency, 
Adverse selection costs, Market efficiency, Dark pools, MiFID, Liquidity 










1. Introduction and Literature Review 
1.1. Introduction 
The modern financial markets have changed quickly because of the development of 
computer science and technology. Advanced technology has provided a high 
frequency and computer-based trading platform for investors. Automated high-
frequency trading (HFT) has grown tremendously in the past 20 years and is 
responsible for about half of all trading activities at stock exchanges worldwide (Zook 
and Grote, 2017). At the same time, the market landscape has also altered and new 
trading rules have been adopted to promote competition and support better price 
formation. New regimes such as the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID) was implemented in Europe to ensure a high degree of harmonised protection 
for market participants and financial instruments. Technological advancements and 
new market regulations have in recent times significantly impacted how financial 
markets function. Financial markets have become very complex, with most of the 
order execution now done by computer algorithms. New high-tech trading venues, 
such as dark pools, also now play outsized roles in financial markets.  
To better understand the role of high-tech trading venues in the modern financial 
markets’ trading environment generally and in the UK in particular, I conduct three 
studies investigating questions linked to the three major developments in financial 
markets over the past decade; these are algorithmic/high-frequency trading, market 
fragmentation and dark trading. My investigations in this thesis directly contribute to 
filling the gap in the existing literature. The following paragraphs briefly introduce the 
contents of the remaining chapters of this thesis.  
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Chapter 2 provides an institutional background to the subsequent chapters by 
conducting an analysis of the LSE’s Stock Exchange Electronic Trading Service 
(SETS) and MiFID. The launch of SETS in 1997 led to the transformation of the LSE 
from a purely quote-driven exchange to a hybrid one, incorporating a quote-drive 
segment (broker-dealer market) and an order-driven limit order book (SETS). This 
hardware upgrade provides a centralised electronic order book for participants to 
compete for order flow. SETS can execute millions of trades a day at sub-second 
latencies, thereby fostering HFT activities in the UK equity market. About a decade 
after SETS was launched, MiFID further altered the market landscape by inducing the 
introduction of more trading venues, leading to even more competition for order flow.  
In Chapter 3, I investigate the relationship between informed trading and the price 
impact of block trades of FTSE100 stocks on the LSE. I aim to answer the question of 
how informed trading activity facilitates the price discovery process in the HFT era. 
My contributions here are threefold. First, I present evidence on the information 
diffusion process in the UK equity market in the HFT era. Existing empirical studies 
focus on corporate events such as earnings announcement (see for example Vega, 2006) 
and merger and acquisition (see for example Barclay and Warner, 1993) to control for 
informed trading activities. This research expands observations of block trades to 
normal trading hours since informed trading activities occur across trading hours. 
Second, I find intraday and inter-day patterns of this information diffusion process. 
The results show that the impounding of information into stock prices is more 
predominant during the first trading hour than any other time period. Moreover, block 
trading activity is positively correlated with informed trading activity and informed 
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trading at dayt-1 can still affect informed traders’ block transactions at dayt, supporting 
Foster and Viswanathan (1994) and Hong and Stein (1999) who suggest that private 
information is gradually incorporated into the price discovery prices. Third, in this 
chapter, the probability of informed trading (PIN) is constructed to proxy the level of 
informed trading and firms’ financial transparency. The results based on portfolio 
analysis indicate that informed trading aids price discovery for stocks with less 
financial transparency. This provides empirical support to Vega’s (2006) finding on 
the high-frequency trading level.  
In Chapter 4, I expand the research scope from the LSE to other MTFs to study the 
policy implications of trading fragmentation under MiFID. This chapter answers the 
research question regarding how visible trading fragmentation affects market 
transparency and efficiency. In 2007, MiFID led to an unprecedented increase in the 
number of trading venues in Europe. Consequently, the market became fragmented 
since trading venues had to compete with each other to attract order flow. Unlike the 
US Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS), MiFID does not mandate a 
formal exchange linkage to guarantee that orders are always executed at the best 
available price. Some researchers, such as Hoffmann (2010) and O'Hara and Ye (2011), 
have expressed concern about this potentially sub-optimal trading rule. In this chapter, 
I present first-order evidence of whether or not visible trading fragmentation induces 
adverse selection costs and informational inefficiency in the aggregate market. My 
analysis is conducted on an aggregate market by creating a consolidated order book of 
FTSE100 stocks traded on the three largest MTFs and the LSE. My dataset covers a 
ten-year period ending in 2014. This is the first study to assess the impact of 
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fragmentation on the aggregate market for trading Europe’s highest volume stocks 
over such a long period. A quadratic relationship is found between fragmentation and 
adverse selection risk.  
On one hand, visible fragmentation helps to both reduce adverse selection costs and 
increase market transparency at low levels of fragmentation. On the other hand, 
however, when fragmentation is high, the implied adverse selection cost and market 
opacity potentially increase with the level of fragmentation. The results reveal that the 
negative impact of fragmentation on transparency is very limited. In the second part 
of the empirical analysis, a short-term return predictability model is employed to test 
the effect of fragmentation on market efficiency. Results also indicate that order flow 
competition tends to reduce short-term return predictability, thus enhancing market 
efficiency. This chapter has important policy implications for the debate surrounding 
trading fragmentation in European equity markets. Based on the empirical results, 
market fragmentation should be viewed as a value-creating competition phenomenon 
that benefits market transparency and price efficiency.  
Chapter 5 continues to expand the research scope to MTFs’ new type of trading venue, 
dark pools, which are exempt from publicly displayed bid and offer quotes. The 
development of dark pools is intended to reduce the transaction costs for wholesale 
trades based on liquidity reasons. A computer algorithm in dark pools matches dark 
buy and sell orders without revealing traders’ identities and sets execution at the mid-
quote of the best bid and ask price derived from the primary market. However, dark 
pools are criticised for not providing price discovery. Many regulators are concerned 
that the growth of dark pools may at some point affect the quality of price discovery 
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in lit markets. In Europe, regulators intend to put more restrictions on dark pool trading. 
MiFID II proposes the introduction of a volume cap for dark pool trading. This 
restriction is scheduled for implementation at the beginning of 2018. Thus, it is 
beneficial for regulators and researchers to know more about the implications of dark 
pool trading. However, it seems that the effects of dark trading on market liquidity 
remain obscure. Brugler (2015) and Gresse (2017) suggest that dark trading improves 
the liquidity of FTSE100 stocks. However, based on data from the Toronto Stock 
Exchange, Foley and Putniņš (2016) do not find evidence that midpoint dark trading 
consistently benefits market liquidity. In contrast, Degryse et al. (2015) find that dark 
fragmentation has a detrimental effect on global liquidity. In this chapter, I aim to 
disentangle the effects of dark trading on aggregate market liquidity by employing an 
established liquidity commonality model. The results suggest that, compared with lit 
venues, dark pools proportionally contribute more liquidity when the market-wide 
liquidity starts to increase. This is because dark venues can facilitate trades that 
otherwise cannot be traded easily in lit venues. Further tests also show that informed 
trading activity exerts a stronger negative impact on dark pool liquidity. This finding 
is in line with Zhu’s (2014) study that informed investors face low execution 
probabilities in dark pools because informed traders typically trade at the same side of 
the dark pools. This research provides first-order evidence that midpoint dark trading 
potentially contributes liquidity to the aggregate market.  
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 focus on one issue as a stand-alone study. I use FTSE100 stocks 
as sample data for empirical tests across the three chapters. The next part in this section 
discusses the literature related to my studies. 
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1.2. Literature Review 
According to Fama’s (1970) efficient market hypothesis, if new information about a 
given stock is released into the public domain, perhaps via an earnings announcement, 
that information will be incorporated into the stock’s price rapidly and rationally; and 
the trading process should have no effect on the price discovery process. However, in 
the real world, trading is a complex process. This is because: (1) trades do not arrive 
simultaneously in the market; and (2) trading information is not symmetric. Based on 
these factors, market microstructure research has been developed as a branch of 
finance and economics to explain how trading occurs. Microstructure theories such as 
inventory-based models and information-based models were developed to explain 
how market makers set bid-ask spread to compensate for their inventory risk and 
adverse selection risk.  
In relatively more recent literature, O'Hara (2003) suggests that the two main functions 
of a market are to provide liquidity and encourage price discovery. Liquidity is a 
measure of traders’ possibility to trade. In a liquid market, instruments are traded at 
the price close to their fundamental value. Conversely, in an illiquid market, buy and 
sell orders appear to push transaction price up and down. Price discovery is the process 
by which new information is incorporated to security prices. Effective price discovery 
is critical as it facilitates pricing quantity and quality of an asset at a specified time 
and place. Liquidity provision, price discovery and information flow are interrelated 
and closely linked to the execution system of a financial market. On the micro level, 
a functional financial market will attract investors to trade fairly-priced stocks. 
Companies will also rely on stock exchange to launch their initial public offerings 
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(IPOs), raise capital and manage shareholders’ wealth. On the macro level, the depth 
of security markets links the functioning of the financial system and long-term 
economic growth. For these reasons, conducting microstructure research has 
important implications for market design and regulation, especially when technologies 
have a profound impact on trading regulations. This thesis is motivated by the need to 
investigate liquidity, price discovery and other market quality issues in the context of 
modern technology-driven markets. In the next paragraphs, I review the 
microstructure literature for price discovery and liquidity in financial markets by 
linking them together with the evolution of the market infrastructure. 
Liquidity is the degree to which a larger order can be executed within a short period 
of time with little or no price impact. According to Harris (1990), liquidity measures 
have several dimensions including width, depth, immediacy and resiliency. Width is 
represented by the bid-ask spread, which is the difference between bid and offer prices. 
Bid-ask spread reflects the cost borne by the traders and the economic gain for market 
makers. Depth refers to the maximum size of a trade for any given bid-ask spread. 
Immediacy captures how quickly a given number of shares can be traded at a given 
cost, and resiliency is a measure of the ability to trade at a minimal price impact (given 
non-informative trades).  
Early theoretical papers find that transaction cost has little impact on security prices 
because liquidity cost is small compared to equilibrium risk premium (see for example 
Constantinides, 1986, Aiyagari and Gertler, 1991, Heaton and Lucas, 1996, Vayanos 
and Vila, 1999). However, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that the short-term 
movement of asset prices can reflect liquidity cost. Several studies show a link 
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between asset prices and a variety of liquidity measures such as spreads, depths and 
volumes (see for example Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996, Easley et al., 2002). In 
this context liquidity studies should be based on a theory of information asymmetry, 
which assumes that one group of sophisticated traders possess more information than 
other traders in the market. Well-informed traders tend to exploit the information and 
then profit at the expense of less-informed traders (Harris, 2003). Easley and O'Hara 
(1987) and Karpoff (1987) suggest that informed traders are more likely to trade 
aggressively with their private information rather than exploit it gradually. Blau et al. 
(2009) hold that informed traders do indeed still prefer block trades for informed 
trading. Studies also indicate that in the case of private information events, market 
makers will trade against informed traders in order to reduce the exposure of adverse 
selection costs by widening the spreads and lowering the market depth. This also 
implies a negative relationship between informed trading activities and market 
liquidity.  
Beyond the theoretical and empirical studies on the impact of information on liquidity, 
researchers also seek to answer whether liquidity affects risk diversification. Literature 
documents the liquidity commonality effect. Chordia et al. (2000), Hasbrouck and 
Seppi (2001) and Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) find that liquidity commonality exists 
in the US stock market. This indicates that the liquidity of individual stocks co-vary 
with market-wide liquidity. Such liquidity commonality forms a systemic component 
of the risk of individual assets that cannot be diversified away. Karolyi et al. (2012) 
show that liquidity commonality is stronger in countries with high market volatility 
and more international investors. This can be explained by the fact that liquidity 
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providers tend to re-evaluate the optimal level of their inventory by buying (selling) 
and re-setting the bid-ask spread when market-wide liquidity is increasing 
(decreasing). More recent studies reveal that liquidity commonality also exists in 
various asset classes, such as bonds (Chordia et al., 2005), options (Cao and Wei, 2010) 
and commodity markets (Marshall et al., 2012). Chordia et al. (2002b) suggest that, 
even if such commonality exists, it may still be diversifiable across different asset 
classes. If an exogenous shock causes a liquidity problem in one market, it may induce 
a corresponding liquidity inflow in another market. This would suggest only a 
secondary role for liquidity in affecting the risk of holding an asset (O'Hara, 2003). 
However, this is not the case for the other main function of financial markets, i.e. price 
discovery, which refers to the ability of the market to find an efficient price (O'Hara, 
2003). In multiple venues/market settings, the concept of price discovery implies that 
prices for the same security in different markets should converge in the long run, even 
if they do deviate from the equilibrium in the short run. Lintner (2009) asserts that 
price formation shows that financial markets aggregate the beliefs of individual traders, 
and the market equilibrium price is weighted average of these beliefs.  
The evolution of asset price also requires a consideration of the nature of 
the participants (i.e. whether traders are informed or uninformed, see for example 
Grossman, 1976). Informed traders know the true value of assets and trade based on 
their superior information. Uninformed traders have no resources to collect (superior) 
information, but they know that prices and transaction volume will reflect the 
information harboured by informed traders. Thus, when they trade against informed 
traders, uninformed traders will seek compensation for trading under information 
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asymmetry. It is difficult for uninformed traders to diversify information risk as 
uninformed traders could face an information disadvantage in every asset they hold. 
In this scenario, simply adding assets will not lead to diversification but increase the 
potential loss against informed traders. Consequently, conditions for the capital market 
pricing model (CAPM) will not hold. Under this framework, when informed traders 
trade, the asset price will reflect all the information to the market and private 
information will be transmitted from the informed to the uninformed traders. However, 
uninformed traders tend to trade against informed traders by widening spreads in order 
to be compensated, thereby undermining market liquidity. In order to minimise 
transaction costs and illiquidity, informed traders are incentivised to hide their 
intention by deploying dynamic trading techniques, such as breaking up trades (see 
for example Kyle, 1985, Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). As a result, information is 
gradually incorporated into prices via continuous order flows. Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1981) show that private information is valuable and the aggregation of 
this information plays a prominent role in the price discovery process. The literature 
holds wide ranging views on how market efficiency is connected to liquidity and price 
discovery. The next two paragraphs will attempt to reconcile these views. 
Contrary to the popular view, market efficiency does not require the market price to 
be equal to asset’s true value at every point of the trading time (Damodaran, 2012). 
All it requires is the deviation part to be unbiased and random. With the advent of 
granular data sets and powerful computing options, researchers are now able to study 
information and market efficiency across trading hours and find out where 
inefficiencies may lie. Chordia et al. (2008) are among the first to analyse return 
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predictability in connection with liquidity and interpret their findings from a market 
efficiency perspective. In particular, they examine changes in liquidity across three 
tick size regimes over a 10-year period and document a substantial decline in short-
horizon return predictability. More importantly, they show that the short-horizon 
predictability of stock returns from past order flows can be interpreted as an inverse 
indicator of market efficiency. 
Chordia et al.’s (2008) approach provides a feasible basis for estimating the degree of 
informational efficiency over time in a security market. Research utilising this 
methodology is also beginning to appear in the literature. For instance, Aktas et al. 
(2008) use the predictability relationship between order imbalance and return to 
examine the effects of insider trading on market efficiency. Others, such as 
Visaltanachoti and Yang (2010), investigate the speed of convergence to market 
efficiency for foreign stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). My 
study in Chapter 4 is a continuation of the line of research that relates order flow to 
return predictability. Fama (1970) emphasises a lack of return predictability over a 
daily horizon as a criterion for market efficiency, whereas market microstructure 
research defines informational efficiency as the degree to which market prices 
correctly and quickly reflect new information over shorter periods. Chordia et al. 
(2005) also analyse return variance ratios and return autocorrelations, and conclude 
that new information is more effectively incorporated into prices when the market is 
comparatively more liquid. Thus, when the market is liquid, asset prices are more 
likely to reflect the true value of assets across trading hours, since short-term arbitrage 
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opportunities are reduced. This view is consistent with the findings of Chordia et al. 
(2008), who find that return predictability diminishes when the market is liquid. 
Both the evolution of the characteristics of market participants (e.g. traders are 
increasingly using high-frequency trading strategies) and market infrastructure (e.g. 
the emergence of new market platforms, such as dark pools) have impacted financial 
markets. High-frequency traders (HFTs) are a subset of algorithm traders (ATs) and 
could be described as traders who use algorithms to buy and sell stocks at very fast 
speed (Brogaard et al., 2014). Negative media coverage of HFTs and the “flash crash” 
on May 6, 2010 raised significant concerns about the role of HFTs in the stability and 
price efficiency of markets. Recent studies aim to show the role of HFTs in liquidity 
provision and price discovery. Cao et al. (2009) indicate that HFTs trading is related 
to two sources of public information: macroeconomic news announcements and 
imbalances in the limit order book. Boehmer et al. (2015) apply co-location data as a 
proxy of AT from over 40 stock markets globally. They find that ATs offer market 
liquidity and improve informational efficiency. Based on proprietary data, Carrion 
(2013) finds that HFTs are more likely to provide liquidity when it is scarce and 
consume liquidity when it is ample. Hagströmer and Nordén (2013) classify HFTs into 
market making HFTs and opportunistic HFTs on NASDAQ-OMX Stockholm. They 
indicate that HFTs concentrate on either liquidity demanding or liquidity supplying. 
They also suggest that market making HFTs tend to mitigate intraday price volatility. 
Brogaard et al. (2014) examine the impact of high-frequency trading (HFT) on 
NASDAQ and find that HFT improves market efficiency and reduces transitory 
pricing errors. Subsequently Brogaard et al. (2015) and Brogaard et al. (2017) assert 
22 
 
that market liquidity benefits from faster trading speed and that HFT absorbs order 
imbalance during extreme price movements. The rise of algorithmic trading (AT) has 
introduced new sources of short-term market behaviour. HFT research is of growing 
importance in academic finance research and to practitioners in financial markets. 
Both policy makers and regulators have sought to respond to the technology-induced 
structural changes in the markets by introducing new policy initiatives and regulations. 
For example, the EU’s Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) was 
enacted with a view to encourage order flow competition and technological innovation. 
Under this reform, trades could be executed away from the listing exchange such as 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) within a fragmented market environment, which 
consists of Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) and Systematic Internalisers (SIs). 
MTFs generally operate lit venues that are mandated to provide both pre- and post- 
trade transparency regime and dark venues that are exempt from providing pre-trade 
transparency. 
MiFID has generated a heated debate among regulators about issues related to market 
fragmentation and concentration. One benefit of fragmentation is increased 
competition resulting in greater market quality, for example, bid–ask spreads become 
narrower because of increased order flow competition across venues (see Chapter 4). 
The introduction of an additional market leads to competitive pressures on market 
makers and brokers. Also, even though the depth of the main market may decrease, 
the joint depth of the aggregate market, comprising of all the competing exchanges 
and the listing exchange may increase (Glosten, 1998). O'Hara and Ye (2011) study 
market fragmentation in the US equity market and find that increased levels of off-
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exchange fragmentation are associated with improved market quality in terms of lower 
transaction cost and faster trading speed.  
Based on the Dutch market, Degryse et al. (2015) suggest that visible fragmentation 
generally benefits market liquidity while dark trading may harm market liquidity in 
terms of increasing adverse selection cost on the lit markets. Gresse’s (2017) study 
includes FTSE100, CAC40 and SBF 80 stocks in European equity markets. She uses 
the implementation of MiFID as a natural experiment affecting fragmentation and 
finds that the marginal benefits of visible fragmentation become lower when an 
equilibrium level of fragmentation is reached, and that increased visible fragmentation 
may harm the market depth of smaller company stocks. However, she does not find 
any detrimental effect of dark trading on market quality.  
The foregoing discussion sets the background for the interrelated issues of price 
discovery and liquidity examined in this thesis. There is a gap in the existing literature 
regarding how recent market developments on the London equity market, one of the 
largest markets in the world in terms of market capitalisation, affect market quality. 
My investigations in this thesis directly contribute to filling this gap. The next chapter 
discusses key institutional background issues related to the London equity market 







2. Background  
In this section, I discuss key concepts, developments and regulations that should be 
understood in advance of reading the empirical chapters (3 – 5) in this thesis. 
2.1. Stock Exchange Trading Service 
Although the transformation of the financial market architecture in Europe started in 
the late 1980s, it accelerated throughout the 1990s in preparation for the advent of 
monetary union. In London, the equity market had operated for about ten years as a 
pure dealership system. These trading arrangements were criticised for their opacity 
and the high trading costs incurred by smaller investors. In October 1997, the LSE 
introduced the Stock Exchange Trading Service in response to increased competition. 
The launch of SETS represents a transformation in trading regime from a quote-driven 
market structure, the Stock Exchange Automated Quotation (SEAQ), to an order-
driven market structure for all FTSE 100 stocks. This system update allows market 
participants to compete with dealers and designated market makers (DMMs) in order 
flow by posting the optimal level of bid and ask prices. Trading runs from 8:00 hours 
to 16:30 hours, subject to a ten-minute opening call auction from 7:50 to 8:00 hours 
and a five-minute closing call auction from 16:30 to 16:35. During the pre-open 
auction, limit and market orders can be entered and deleted at will and all order book 
data are communicated to the market. Once orders are crossed, indicative uncrossing 
prices for each instrument are displayed as the opening prices. During the closing 
auction, limit and market orders can be submitted. If orders are crossed during this 
period, the uncrossing price is released to the market as the closing price. SETS is 
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among the most transparent of limit order books in major equity markets as every 
outstanding limit order is displayed. There is also a requirement for immediate 
publication of details of all trades to participants. 
2.1.1. Upstairs and Downstairs Markets 
On the LSE, the co-existence of downstairs and upstairs markets offers investors two 
fundamental trading methods. First, when trading on the downstairs market, investors 
can contact their dealer to submit a limit or market order to the SETS order book. 
Second, when trading on the upstairs market, investors can contact a broker-dealer to 
negotiate a trade with the dealer as a counterparty. Note that the supply of broker-
dealer services on the upstairs market is entirely voluntary and unconstrained. There 
is no registration process and no public display of broker-dealer quotes. The upstairs 
market is designed to reduce the execution costs, especially for low-volume and 
illiquid stocks. By negotiating directly with potential counterparties, block traders 
attempt to achieve a lower execution on the upstairs than on the downstairs market. 
The downstairs market is independent of the upstairs market, implying that the dealers 
have no obligation to offer quotes on the order book. In addition, trades in the LSE’s 
upstairs market are privately negotiated and hence have no minimum tick restrictions. 
However, as dictated by the post-trade transparency regime, dealers on the upstairs 
market must report the trade information within three minutes of its occurrence. 
Several papers study the effects of the electronic limit order book system on the 
downstairs markets. Barclay et al. (1999) document an increasing trend of liquidity on 
the NASDAQ following the introduction of the electronic trading system. Naik and 
Yadav (1999) examine changes in the cost of trading before and after introduction of 
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SETS. They suggest that SETS has reduced the trading cost because limit orders 
posting improves public investors’ bargaining power in negotiating with dealer firms. 
They also document the negative externalities across almost all trade sizes for stocks 
not undergoing the reform. Domowitz et al. (2001) find that a screen system increases 
market liquidity by reducing trading costs and increasing trading volume in a sample 
of 42 countries. Anand et al. (2009) report that designated market makers enhance the 
liquidity of electronic limit order markets in the Stockholm Stock Exchange. 
However, other studies suggest that the electronic limit order book system might not 
be the optimal trading mechanism for thinly traded illiquid stocks due to information 
asymmetry. Theissen (2002) investigates moderately less liquid stocks on the German 
stock market and discovers that floor trading’s liquidity is less sensitive to return 
volatility than order book’s liquidity. This is because market makers on electronic 
trading systems are more likely to be exposed to information asymmetry. When they 
detect information asymmetry, market makers post a wider spread to compensate for 
the potential information disadvantage. Similarly, Lai (2007) reports that the liquidity 
of FTSE250 stocks dropped substantially following introduction of the limit order 
book. 
Turning to empirical studies of upstairs markets, Seppi (1990) shows that upstairs 
markets’ lack of anonymity benefits investors who can credibly claim to be trading for 
liquidity reasons. Madhavan and Cheng (1997) suggest that upstairs dealers can screen 
out information-based trades. Block traders must convince upstairs dealers that they 
are uninformed with respect to executing trades in the upstairs market. Later research 
finds similar results suggesting that upstairs trades are less informative than 
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downstairs trades. Smith et al. (2001), Booth et al. (2002), Jain et al. (2003) and 
Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) study the Toronto, Helsinki, London and 
Paris Bourse stock exchanges, respectively, and find that upstairs trades tend to have 
a lower permanent price impact than downstairs trades, which they ascribe to the 
difference in requirement for anonymity among venues. Booth et al. (2002) study the 
difference of price discovery between the upstairs and downstairs market using the 
vector error correction model. They suggest that most stock price discovery occurs on 
the anonymous order book. Armitage and Ibikunle (2015) conduct an intraday study 
on price discovery between the upstairs and downstairs markets on the LSE. Their 
results suggest that the upstairs market accounts for about one fifth of the total price 
discovery and the price discovery on the upstairs markets is higher in the first and last 
half hours of the trading day. 
2.2. MiFID 
The implementation of SETS allows market participants to access electronic order 
books via remote access without the need for a physical presence on an exchange floor. 
Since the start of the millennium, fast technology iteration has reduced the cost of 
accessing electronic order books, allowing more participants to join the trading service 
to provide liquidity. In Europe, entrepreneurially driven trading venues have started to 
operate at a much higher speed but at much lower cost than the traditional stock 
exchanges. To foster competition in European financial markets, the European 
Parliament and Council implemented the Markets in Financial Instruments Directives 
in August 2006. MiFID allows the following three types of trading services: (1) 
regulated markets (RMs), including national stock exchanges like LSE and Deutsche 
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Börse, (2) MTFs, such as BATS, Chi-X and Turquoise, which are newly established 
venues competing with RMs. Some MTFs operate two separate order books, a lit order 
book which is subject to the pre-and post-trade transparency regime and a dark order 
book complying only with the post-trade transparency regime, (3) systematic 
internalisers (SIs), which are firms that execute client orders by dealing on their own 
account outside RMs or MTFs on an organised, systematic and frequent basis. 
MTFs are multilateral systems that bring together multiple third-party buying and 
selling interests in financial instruments. However, they may have differing 
organisational requirements from those of RMs because most MTFs do not offer 
listings. MiFID removes the concentration rule under which member states required 
institutions to route orders to RMs only. This implies that RMs are now exposed to 
competition from other trading venues, allowing traders to choose the trading systems 
that best meet their needs. 
2.2.1. Pre- and Post-trade Transparency  
MiFID mandates pre- and post-trade transparency regimes to maintain market 
integrity. Pre-trade information gives the market participants the opportunity to 
continuously observe the market’s development and execute transactions at known bid 
and ask prices and depths for all equity instruments. The post-trade regime dictates 
that post-trade information must be reported as close to real time as possible and in 
any case within three minutes of the relevant transaction.  
However, the pre-trade transparency does not apply to dark venues operated by MTFs 
and RMs (e.g. Deutsche Börse). To be specific, a limit order submitted to a lit (or 
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visible) exchange is immediately visible to all market participants and thus has an 
immediate market impact as market participants revise their beliefs about the 
fundamental value. In contrast, if the limit order is submitted to a dark venue, 
participants know nothing about the order until it has been executed. The dark order 
book enjoys a waiver designed to accommodate the need of wholesale participants to 
execute large orders at the midpoint of the best bid and offer quotes as the “reference 
price” derived at RMs. The growth of dark pool trading can be justified by the need to 
strategically hide trading intentions in an HFT environment. Virtually, all venues 
allow traders to “hide” all or a portion of their orders on the book, resulting in market 
liquidity having both displayed and non-displayed components. 
2.2.2. Market Fragmentation 
MiFID allows trading venues to compete for order flows. This competition also leads 
to fragmentation of trading among these venues. Such fragmentation may potentially 
detract from other important Exchange Act objectives, including efficient execution 
of transactions, best execution of investor orders, price transparency and opportunities 
for investor orders to interact with each other. Certain rules were set up to maintain 
market fairness. In the US, the Reg NMS Order Protection Rule requires orders to be 
executed at the best bids and best offers displayed on the National Best Bid Offer 
(NBBO) across all lit trading venues. In contrast, MiFID does not require trading 
centres to be responsible for the best execution. Under MiFID, investment firms are 
required to take all reasonable steps to obtain the best possible result for their clients, 
taking into account factors such as costs, speed and likelihood of execution. 
Simultaneous access to multiple venues would normally require the smart order 
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routing system technology (SORT). Only the biggest brokers can afford to connect to 
all venues. Although retail investors may be unable to access multiple venues at once, 
they are still able to trade at individual venues in real time. Consequently, orders might 
not always be executed at the best available price across trading venues. This lack of 
trade through protections led O'Hara and Ye (2011, p.472) to remark that “it is hard 
to see how a single virtual market can emerge in Europe”. 
Recent literature has attempted to investigate whether trading fragmentation impairs 
market efficiency. In an HFT environment, informed algorithmic and high-frequency 
traders prefer to trade across high-tech markets (in Europe, these are mainly MTF-
type platforms), presumably because they value the higher speed of execution and seek 
to prevent information leakage (Hoffmann, 2010). Informed order flow is 
conditionally and positively autocorrelated and can give an indication of instrument 
return during short-term intervals (Froot et al., 2001). According to Madhavan (1995) 
and Nimalendran and Ray (2014), experienced traders can profit from market 
inefficiency and obtain better execution through dynamic trading in fragmented 
markets. Their trading strategies include short-term fundamental information (for 
example, imminent earnings release) and short-term technical analysis (front-running 
strategies and short-term momentum strategies). There is a concern among the 
regulators that these experienced traders may identify potential arbitrage opportunities 
because quotes across RMs and MTFs are not closely linked due to the absence of 
trade-through protection. In response to this concern, Chapter 4 investigates the impact 
of market fragmentation on market quality under MiFID. 
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2.2.3. Dark Trading 
The development of high-frequency electronic trading has facilitated the generation of 
dark liquidity and the use of dark orders to minimise market impact costs. Although 
dark pools can meet the needs of wholesale traders by hiding trade intentions, many 
regulators are concerned that the growth of dark pools may affect the quality of price 
discovery and liquidity in lit markets. The impact of dark trading on market quality is 
a complex issue because it simultaneously affects the level of transparency and the 
fragmentation of informed/uninformed order flow across multiple trading venues. 
Ye (2011) and Zhu (2014) provide theoretical frameworks to study the impact of dark 
trades on market quality. Zhu (2014) develops a model in which dark trades prove to 
be more attractive to the uninformed. According to his model, dark trading should 
increase price informativeness but at the expense of greater adverse selection costs in 
the main market. This is because informed traders are likely to cluster on one side of 
the dark order book and therefore face low execution probability. In contrast to Zhu 
(2014), Ye (2012) assumes that the informed trader does not face the problem of low 
execution probability in dark pools. Hence, when more informed traders migrate to 
dark venues, the price impact and spread on lit markets are reduced. Based on the 
sample from the Australian Stock Exchange, Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) find 
that low levels of dark trading can improve price discovery and decrease spreads, but 
when the dark volume exceeds 10% of the total trading volume, informational 
efficiency deteriorates. Ibikunle et al. (2017) study dark trading of FTSE350 stocks 
from 2010 to 2015 and find results similar to those of Comerton-Forde and Putniņš 
(2015). Two industry reports, Brandes and Domowitz (2010) and Buchanan et al. 
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(2011) find that increased participation of dark pools enhances the price discovery 
process in European markets. 
Another stream of literature studies the impact of dark trades on market liquidity. 
Rindi (2008) models the effects of pre-trade transparency of trader identities. Informed 
traders are effective liquidity suppliers because they face little or no adverse selection 
costs. When information acquisition is endogenous and costly, transparency reduces 
the number of informed traders, which harms the liquidity. Ready (2010) studies 
monthly volume by stock in three dark pools, Liquidnet, POSIT, and Pipeline, from 
June 2005 to September 2007. He finds that the market share of these dark pools is 
less than 1% of the consolidated volume and that the dark pool volume is concentrated 
in liquid stocks (low spreads, high share volume). Buti et al. (2011) use data from 11 
US dark pools and conclude that dark pool activity improves spreads, depth and short-
term volatility. Brugler (2015) and Gresse (2017) employ 3-month and 6-month data 
and find that dark trading and dark fragmentation improve the liquidity of FTSE100 
stocks. However, Degryse et al. (2015) report that dark fragmentation has a 
detrimental effect on the overall market liquidity. 
2.3. Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II 
Since its implementation in November 2007, MiFID has been the cornerstone of 
capital markets regulation in Europe. However, since its inception, not all benefits 
have been fed down to the investors and regulators as envisaged. MiFID II aims to 
address the shortcomings of the original MiFID release, which has been amended with 
measures as a result of the lessons learned from the financial crisis. MiFID II will be 
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applied starting 3 January 2018 and trading venues are required to comply with the 
new requirements from that date. MiFID II seeks to herald further investor protection 
initiatives by addressing three important reforms in regards to HFT/AT, dark pools 
and trade transparency regimes.  
One goal of MiFID II is to tackle the potential instability caused by ATs and HFTs. 
To avoid “flash crashes” and ensure a stable market, ATs and HFTs will be required 
to register as investment firms, disclose their algorithms to the regulator and test them 
in an approved environment. The algorithms are required to have built-in circuit 
breakers that “exit” once certain market-relevant criteria are met. Investment firms 
providing direct market access will also be required to have measures and controls in 
place to mitigate the risk of markets becoming disorderly due to HFT algorithms. 
Moreover, cancellation fees will be introduced to mitigate the detrimental effect of 
HFT strategies such as spoofing and quote stuffing. At the moment, HFTs still play an 
important role in providing liquidity, especially to the equities market, while MiFID 
II intends to propose technical rulemakings to encourage HFT liquidity without 
compromising market fairness and stability. Furthermore, regulators also have 
confirmed a double volume cap for equity and equity-like products traded in the dark 
pools. Under this mechanism, the trading volume in a given stock on any venue 
operating under a dark venue cannot exceed 4% of the total market volume, and the 
total trading volume under these waivers (across all venues) for a given stock cannot 
exceed 8% of total market volume. The dark volumes for each venue and the total 
market volume will be calculated on a stock-specific basis over a rolling 12-month 
window. If the cap has been breached, dark trading for that stock will be halted for the 
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next 6 months, either in specific trading venues or for all dark pools. It remains to be 
researched how the market will react to the introduction of such a volume cap. 
Finally, MiFID II will expand the trade transparency regimes from only equity 
instruments to all non-equity instruments, such as fixed income, exchange-traded 
funds, bonds and structured products on all MTFs’ visible order books. MTFs will 
have to report on a continuous basis the current bid/offer spread, as along with the 
depth of interest of both equity and non-equity instruments. A requirement to trade 
certain derivatives on RMs will also be imposed. The trading on a regulated market 
obligation will apply to financial counterparties and non-financial counterparties. 
MiFID II aims to strengthen investor protection by establishing a stronger corporate 
governance regime, especially for HFTs and dark pool traders. MiFID II will stimulate 
a high degree of trading process changes over the next five years with a significant 











3. Informed Trading and the Price Impact of Block Trades: 
A high frequency trading analysis. 
3.1. Introduction 
The role played by information in the price discovery process is well documented. 
Early informed trading studies suggest that informed traders prefer using large trades 
in order to minimise transaction costs and to maximise the profit gained from their 
informed trading activities. This is because they face competition from other informed 
traders and their private information could be short-lived (Easley and O'Hara, 1987, 
Karpoff, 1987). In contrast with this paper, most existing studies on the way private 
information is incorporated into stock prices through block trades focus mainly on 
trading evolution around corporate events in order to control for private information. 
This is because evidence suggests that corporate events can stimulate the pre-
announcement drive for acquiring private information (Daley et al., 1995). Permanent 
price impact measures are usually employed as proxies for the informativeness of 
block trades, since they reflect observable price adjustment for information. 
Despite the large volume of existing literature on informed trading, there are several 
unresolved questions about how and when informed traders choose to employ private 
information. For example, a stream of literature which includes Kyle (1985), Holden 
and Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1994) and Hong and Stein 
(1999), argues that informed traders would employ their private information gradually 
rather than quickly. However, Easley and O'Hara (1987) and Karpoff (1987) differ, 
suggesting that informed traders are more likely to aggressively trade with their private 
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information rather than gradually exploit it. Also, Barclay and Warner (1993) and 
Chakravarty (2001) argue that informed traders are more likely to exploit their 
information using medium-sized trades, while Blau et al. (2009) hold that informed 
traders do indeed still prefer block trades for informed trading. 
Based on trading data from LSE, this chapter extends the existing literature on the 
informativeness of block trades and how their execution relates to the incorporation 
of information in stock prices. It should be noted that although in recent years off-
exchange trading such as dark pools has attracted an increasingly portion of order flow 
from traditional stock exchanges, traditional exchanges still play a dominant role in 
facilitating block trades. LSE operates both downstairs and upstairs markets. The 
downstairs market is a consolidated electronic order book where anonymous trading 
takes place. Compared to dark venues, LSE’s downstairs market can offer trading 
immediacy required by traders in today’s markets (Menkveld et al., 2017). By contrast, 
LSE’s upstairs market is a broker-dealer market where brokers/dealers play a search 
role by locating counterparties for large institutional block trades. Upstairs dealers are 
obligated to expose negotiated trades to the downstairs floor and to the order book. 
The upstairs block trades tend to have a lower price impact than down stairs trades 
because the identity of the counterparties is revealed to upstairs dealers (Booth et al., 
2002, Jain et al., 2003, Bessembinder and Venkataraman, 2004). Recent study 
suggests that the upstairs market plays a more important role in price discovery 
(Armitage and Ibikunle, 2015). Taken together, LSE is still attractive for institutional 
block trades. To obtain a better price, the large trader still prefers to send block trades 
to the upstairs market. I compare the volume of block trades on LSE and dark volume 
in FTSE100 stocks, using data from October 2012 to September 2013. Figure 3.1 
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 FIGURE 3.1. LSE Block Volume and Dark Volume 
The total block trade volume is the sum of daily block trade volume (defined as the largest 1% trade) of FTSE 100 stocks on LSE.  
The dark volume is the aggregated dark volume from three largest MTFs, BATS, Chi-X and Turquoise. The time span covered is from 8:00hrs to 






















illustrates that block volume on LSE is far larger than the aggregated dark volume of 
the three largest MTFs in Europe.  
In this Chapter, I answer questions such as whether informed traders exploit private 
information across days rather than immediately, as well as how they alter information 
use across the trading day. My contributions are three-fold: first, the models employed 
in this chapter present new empirical evidence on the diffusion process of private 
information in the UK equity market and in a high-frequency trading environment. 
Instead of focusing trades around short-term corporate events and insider trading 
sample, I expand observations of block trades to normal trading periods. This is 
because informed trading activities occur not only around corporate events but also 
across regular trading hours.  
Second, I find intraday and inter-day patterns within this information diffusion process. 
The results suggest that the impounding of information into stock prices is stronger in 
the first trading hour than at other time periods during the normal trading day. Further, 
informed trading at day t-1 could still affect informed traders’ block transaction at day 
t. These results support the theoretical frameworks of Kyle (1985), Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1994) and Hong and Stein (1999) 
that suggest that private information is gradually impounded into instrument prices 
because informed traders slowly exploit the private information across trading days. 
The results, however, run contrary to the expectation that informed traders quickly 
take advantage of their private information by trading quickly and aggressively, as 
suggested by Easley and O'Hara (1987) and Karpoff (1987). It is interesting that high-
frequency data from an era that is characterised by short-termism in trading terms 
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could validate theoretical propositions (such as that of Kyle, 1985) from an era in 
which buy and hold strategies were more orthodox. Third, since PIN also reflects the 
level of firms’ financial transparency (Vega, 2006), I stratify my sample stocks into 
four portfolios according to the mean value of their daily PINs, and show that the 
information incorporation process can vary across stocks with different levels of 
financial transparency. The results imply that the larger the levels of informed trading 
in a stock, the higher the permanent price impact of block trades. There are several 
implications of this, including that informed trading aids the price discovery process 
for less transparent stocks.  
Permanent price impact reflects the lasting price changes in a stock as a result of a 
trade; this implies that such trade contains information. Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b) 
utilises the vector autoregression (VAR) model to examine the informativeness of 
trades leading to permanent price impact. Seppi (1992) finds that the permanent price 
impacts of block trades prior to earnings announcements correlate with quarter 
earnings surprise. Daley et al. (1995) focus on block trades around the earning 
announcement periods. They suggest that the permanent price impact of block trades 
during the five days prior to the earning announcement is larger than during the post-
earning announcement period of the same duration. However, Barclay and Warner’s 
(1993) stealth trading hypothesis indicates that, in order to hide information, informed 
trades are concentrated on the medium size transactions during the pre-tender offer 
announcement period. Based on three-month audit trail data for a sample of NYSE 
firms, Chakravarty (2001) finds that institutional traders are more informed, and 
medium-sized institutional trades are the driving factors in the movement of prices, 
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thus supporting Barclay and Warner’s (1993) findings on the informativeness of 
medium sized trades. 
Other studies including Huang and Masulis (2003), and Alexander and Peterson (2007) 
also offer evidence on order-splitting strategies from informed traders. Blau et al. 
(2009) provide a comprehensive explanation of the association between informed 
trades and block trades. Their results show that informed traders still prefer block 
trades during the periods of high trading activities because a deep market can provide 
natural camouflage to hide information. Yang (2009) suggests that informed traders 
focus on medium sized trades from six to ten days prior to the quarterly earnings 
announcements. However, informed traders aggressively increase their order size five 
days before the announcement. Frino and Romano (2010) employ a theoretical model 
to show that market conditions could determine the size of informed trades. They 
suggest that information effect plays a role in weak bull and bear markets rather than 
strong bull and bear markets. Informed traders are likely to trade large orders when 
informational profit outweighs the transaction cost in weak bull and bear markets. Saar 
(2001) suggests that portfolio managers search for block trades based on favourable 
private information, and rebalance portfolios by selling stocks that have less 
favourable prospects. Using permanent price impact as an adjustment to private 
information around corporate events, this research implies that block trade is a 
powerful indicator for information asymmetry. If a stock is traded based on liquidity 
reasons rather than information motives, then the price impact of block trade should 
be relatively small. Hence, the more informative trading is, the bigger its permanent 
price impact should be (Aktas et al., 2007).  
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Besides examining trades around corporate events, researchers also investigate the 
impact of informed trades by looking into insider trading activities. John and Lang 
(1991) find evidence of signalling theory of dividends by looking at how the 
information content of dividends may be ‘nuanced’ by inside trading prior to the 
dividend announcement. Their results reveal that for firms with good growth 
expectations, the market reacts positively to dividend initiations even when insiders 
are net sellers. Meulbroek (1992) illustrates that price responds rapidly to illegal 
insider trading. Lin and Rozeff (1995) examine the speed of price adjustment to private 
information and find that more than 85% of private information is absorbed within one 
day. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) examine net purchases and sales from insider trading 
activities, and their results show statistically significant but economically insignificant 
market movement around the insider trading activities.    
 
Most informed trading studies mainly focus on the periods around corporate events 
and insider trading activities, which account for a very small fraction of stocks’ normal 
trading hours. This chapter is motivated by the need to examine the evolution and 
impact of informed trading throughout normal trading hours. I also investigate the 
characterisations of the information diffusion process by testing intraday effects, long-
lived information and firms’ various levels of financial transparency. My empirical 
models are based on the assumption that informed traders prefer to execute block 
trades.  Kyle (1985) and Hong and Stein (1999) explain the gradual information 
diffusion process using theoretical equilibrium frameworks. These findings are 
supported by Hong et al.’s (2000) analysis, in which analyst coverage is used to proxy 
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firm-specific information flow. Hong et al. (2000) provide some empirical evidence 
that stock momentum reflects the gradual diffusion of firm specific information. 
However, Vega (2006) argues that the analyst coverage is not a good proxy for 
information flow across traders.  
This chapter employs probability of information-based trading (PIN) to proxy the 
proportion of the unobservable informed trades across normal trading hours. PIN has 
been elaborated in previous work (see for example Easley et al., 1996a, 1996b, 1997a). 
Easley et al. (2002) find that a difference of 10% in PIN between two stocks leads to 
a difference in the excessive returns of 2.5% per annum. This implies that uninformed 
investors demand a premium to hold stocks with higher information risk. PIN has been 
extensively used to capture information asymmetry. Easley et al. (2010) use the returns 
of high and low-PIN portfolios to construct a risk factor which explains portfolio 
returns. Vega (2006) constructs PIN to test market efficiency, suggesting that the more 
information investors have about the true value of an asset, the smaller the abnormal 
return drift. Chung et al. (2005), using a sample of NYSE stocks, examine the 
relationship between price impacts of all trades, serial correlation in trade direction, 
and PIN. They find that there is a positive relationship between PIN and permanent 
price impacts of all trades, and stocks with higher PIN exhibit higher correlations in 
the trade direction. Their result is consistent with information hypothesis that strategic 
trading of informed trades results in serially correlated trades.  
Based on three months-worth of NYSE and NASDAQ transactions data, Lee and 
Chung (2009) find a negative relationship between price improvement in NYSE stocks 
and PIN. This suggests that liquidity providers on the NYSE offer greater price 
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improvements for stocks with a lower PIN.  However, Lai et al. (2014) deconstruct 
PIN into risk component and liquidity component and they find that only the liquidity 
component is priced. In a recent study, Lai et al. (2014) construct stock-level PINs 
over a 15-year period in 47 stock markets worldwide. Their results show the variations 
of PIN between emerging and developed markets. However, they do not find that PIN 
exhibits explanatory power to expected stock returns in global stock markets.  
Consistent with the existing market microstructure literature, I use PIN to proxy 
informed trades in my analysis of the permanent price impact1 of block trades. Given 
the assumption that informed traders execute block trades to exploit superior 
information, I focus on the association between unobservable informed trading and 
observable permanent price impact of block trades, in order to determine the 
informativeness of block trades. My central hypothesis is that, if private information 
does diffuse into price via block trades, a higher fraction of informed trades will lead 
to more information being revealed through block trading activity. Hence, the 
relationship between PIN and the permanent price impact of block purchases (sales) 
should be positive (negative). The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: 
section 2 discusses the data and my econometric methodology; in section 3 I provide 
analysis of my results and provide extensions to the main analysis; and Section 4 
concludes.  
                                                     
1 I also examine the temporary price impact and the total price impact in this paper. Relevant analyses 
are presented in subsequent sections. 
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3.2. Data and Methodology 
3.2.1. Data 
3.2.1.1. Sample selection 
Our data consists of FTSE 100 stocks, which account for about 80% of total market 
capitalisation on the LSE. The intraday transaction data for this research comes from 
the Thomson Reuter Tick History (TRTH) Database. My dataset contains 253 trading 
days from 1st October 2012 to 30th September 2013 and includes variables such as 
Reuters Identification Code (RIC), date, timestamp, price, volume, bid price, ask price, 
bid volume and ask volume. Each trade has been allocated corresponding prevailing 
best bid and ask quotes. Since I only focus on normal trading hours, I delete the 
opening auction period (7:50hrs – 8:00hrs) and the closing auction period (16:30hrs – 
16:35hrs). However, I also spot anomalous observations that are the results of data 
input errors. In order to minimise data errors, I follow standard practice to exclude 
observations satisfying the criteria below (see for example Chordia et al., 2001, 
Ibikunle, 2015a): 
1. Transaction price is greater than the prevailing best ask price; 
2. The quoted bid price exceeds the quoted ask price; 
3. The quoted bid-ask spread exceeds £4; 
4. The value of quoted bid-ask spread over transaction price is greater than 
0.35; 
5. Any of following variables is missing for that observation: price, volume, 
quoted, bid and ask prices; 
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6. Transaction is for FTSE 100 stock added to or substituted from the index 
during the sample period.  
After applying these conditions, the final dataset comprises of 44,742,693 transactions, 
which are restricted to regular trades with eligible best bid and ask prices. I define 
block trades in line with Frino et al. (2007) as the largest 1% of the trades in each stock. 
I also classify trades into purchase or sale by using the established Lee and Ready 
(1991a) tick rule algorithm. Specifically, when the transaction price is higher than the 
prevailing quote mid-point, I classify the transaction as a buyer-initiated (purchase) 
trade. If price is the execution price lower than quote mid-point, then I classify it as 
seller-initiated (sale) trade. If the current and the previous trades are the same price, I 
classify using the next previous trade. Aitken and Frino (1996) and Lee and Ready 
(1991a) suggest that the tick rule has an accuracy in excess of 90%. These two 
classification conditions yield 206,002 block purchases and 246,867 block sales in my 
final sample.   
 
3.2.1.2. Sample Description 
In order to examine trading activity patterns in the sample, I plot the daily volume per 
minute for the entire trading day from 8:00hrs to 16:30hrs.  The log daily volume curve 
exhibited is U-shaped, which is consistent with previous literature (see as an example, 
Barclay and Hendershott, 2003). Figure 3.3 shows the average and median trade sizes 
per minute from 8:00hrs to 16:30hrs. The Figure suggests a higher level of trading 






Log daily Traded Pound Volume per minute 
The average value and median of daily pound volume are computed for each minute for entire sample stocks. I take the log value for the quintile due to the large variability of 






Log Mean Trade size per minute 
The average trade sizes per minute are calculated for entire sample stocks. I take the log value for the quintile due to the large variability of trading volumes across the trading 




Table 3.1 shows the descriptive data of block trades based on midpoint classification. 
The average number of shares and average traded values of block sales are greater 
than those of block purchases. However, the average value of price impact of block 
purchases is 0.020%, which is more pronounced than the absolute value of the 
permanent price impact of block sales, at -0.011%. This is significant given that the 
average price impact is computed from trades occurring at very short intervals of less 
than 50 seconds in all cases. The impact asymmetry is expected given that prices 
usually fall after a seller-initiated trade and appreciate after a buyer-initiated trade (see 
Kraus and Stoll, 1972).  The phenomenon is also attributable to the fact that block 
sales are usually initiated on the basis of a number of factors, one of which is the search 
for liquidity, while block purchases are more likely to contain firm specific 
information. This price impact asymmetry is also documented in Keim and Madhavan 
(1996) and Saar (2001). The BAS average for block sales is larger than that for block 
purchases. This is surprising given that the literature suggests that spreads are larger 
for informed trades. Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of the actual size of block trades. 
The average size of block trades in the sample data is 24111 shares/trades. To capture 
the block trades for FTSE 100 constituents, I follow Frino et al. (2007) and define 
block trades as the largest 1% of the transaction for each stock over the sample period. 
Table 3.2 continue to show more descriptive data of block trades based on midpoint 
classification. The average number of shares and average traded values of block sales 
are greater than those of block purchases. However, the average value of price impact 
of block purchases is 0.020%, which is more pronounced than the absolute value of 
the permanent price impact of block sales, at -0.011%. This is significant given that 
the average price impact is computed from trades occurring at very short intervals of 
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less than 50 seconds in all cases. The impact asymmetry is expected given that prices 
usually fall after a seller-initiated trade and appreciate after a buyer-initiated trade (see 
Kraus and Stoll, 1972).  The phenomenon is also attributable to the fact that block 
sales are usually initiated on the basis of a number of factors, one of which is the search 
for liquidity, while block purchases are more likely to contain firm specific 
information. This price impact asymmetry is also documented in Keim and Madhavan 
(1996) and Saar (2001). The BAS average for block sales is larger than that for block 
purchases. This is surprising given that the literature suggests that spreads are larger 
for informed trades. It is important to point out, however, that the difference between 
both estimates is small and is not statistically significant at any conventional level. 
Table 3.3 shows the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables. I observe that 
there are no econometric multicolinearity issues within the secondary model for the 















Distribution chart of block size on LSE. 






Summary Statistics for Block Trades 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for purchase block, sale block and all block trades between 
October 2012 and September 2013. 








Price Impact  
  
Block 
Trades   453,012 0.028 0.000 0.000035 
              
  
Buy 
(45.47%)   206,002 0.028 0.020 0.000917 
              
  
Sell 
(54.53%)   
             

























Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables 
This table plots the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables employed in the price impact model in 
Table 3.4. PIN is the probability of an informed trade, lnSize is the natural logarithm of the number of shares 
per trade, volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day before the block trade takes 
place, lnTurnover is the natural logarithm of the total stock turnover on the trading day prior to the block trade 
and OIB represents the order imbalance. BAS corresponds to the bid-ask spread at the time of the block trade, 
Market return is the daily FTSE100 index return on the day of the block trade, while Momentum is the 
cumulative return of the stock in the five days preceding the block trade. 
  PIN Ln(size) Volatility Ln(turnover) Market Return Momentum OIB BAS 
                  
PIN 




1             
Volatility -0.011 -0.0088 1           
ln(turnover) 0.1478 -0.1112 -0.0073 1         
Market Return 0.0067 0.0062 0.0444 0.0217 1       
Momentum 0.0218 -0.0369 0.0148 0.0253 0.0114 1     
OIB 0.3191 -0.0321 0.0009 0.0669 0.0039 0.0156 1   
BAS 0.2846 0.0883 -0.0093 0.1225 -0.0018 -0.0343 0.1 1 
                 
 
3.2.2. Methodology 
3.2.2.1. The Price Impact Model 
I start by constructing three types of price impact that are generally accepted in the 
literature. These include temporary, permanent and total price impact measures. In the 
microstructure literature, the permanent price impacts as trading effects on price 
caused by informed trading, while temporary price impacts usually result from noise 
or liquidity trading, thus leading to price reversal (see for example Glosten and Harris, 
1988, Chan and Lakonishok, 1995, Easley et al., 2002). Block trades demand more 
liquidity than is likely to be available at current quoted prices. Therefore in order to 
ensure the execution of such trades against the expressed level of liquidity, it will have 
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to ‘walk’ through the order book. This will result in the move of prices in the trade 
direction; specifically, purchase trades will force an upward swing and sales will force 
a downward swing. The temporary impact on the other hand captures the market’s 
frictional price reaction to the execution of a block trade, which should be reversed 
soon after the block trade. Equation (3.1) expresses how I measure the temporary price 
impact as the liquidity effect of executing a block trade. The price deviation on account 
of an un-informed block trade execution occurs because counterparties at the best 
expressed corresponding quote are not readily available. The temporary effect is 
therefore compensation to the counterparties providing the liquidity needed for an un-
informed block trade execution. Block purchasers (sellers) offer a price premium 
(discount) as compensation in order to ensure trade execution.  
 
The permanent impact captures the lasting impact of a block trade execution, that is, 
the price change that is not reversed within a reasonable timeframe after the block 
trade execution. The information element of a block trade execution is therefore 
captured by the permanent impact. The lack of price reversal in this case suggests a 
learning event in the market, which ultimately results in the discovery of a new price 
for the traded instrument. Consistent with Holthausen et al. (1990), Gemmill (1996), 
Frino et al. (2007) and Alzahrani et al. (2013), I employ the five-trade benchmark to 
calculate the price impact measures. Thus, for temporary price impact (Equation 3.1), 
I measure the percentage of price reversal after five trades after a block trade execution, 
and for permanent price impact Equation (3.2) captures the percentage change in price 
from five trades before the block trade to five trades following the block trade. The 
third price impact measure, total impact, captures the total percentage price impact, 
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which includes both the liquidity and the information component. Computing all three 
measures as percentage returns ensures comparability with existing studies: 









impactPermanent                                                                    (3.2) 
                                                                               (3.3) 
I modify the model of Frino et al. (2007), thereafter employed by Alzahrani et al. 
(2013), in order to investigate my research questions. I thus estimate the following 











                  
(3.4) 
where Price impact refers to one of three measures: temporary, permanent and total 
price impacts.  PIN is a daily approximation of informed trading in every stock as 
obtained by the maximum likelihood estimation of Equation (3.6) as discussed in 
Section 2.2.2. This is the most important variable I study in this chapter. I expect to 
see a positive (negative) relation between PIN and the permanent price impact of 
purchase (sale) block trades. This is because price shifts should follow the direction 
of an informed trade; hence I expect that an informed block purchase (sale) will lead 
to appreciation (depreciation). lnSize is the natural logarithm of the number of shares 
traded and reported to the nearest millisecond. Based on the established premise that 



















1972, Chan and Lakonishok, 1997), I also proxy information content using block trade 
size.  
Volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day prior to the block 
trade. It shows the intraday trading fluctuations in stock prices and therefore reflects 
the dispersion of beliefs about stock valuation in the market. An increase in volatility 
of a stock will increase its market risk, leading to larger spreads as well as larger price 
impact. Since prior contributions also suggest that investor demand for compensation 
corresponds to stock riskiness (Chan and Lakonishok, 1997, Alzahrani et al., 2013, 
Frino et al., 2007), I therefore expect a positive relationship between price impact and 
Volatility. lnTurnover is the natural logarithm of the total pound value of stocks traded 
divided by the pound value of shares outstanding on the trading day prior to the block 
trade. Turnover is employed by many researchers to measure liquidity in the market 
(see as examples Lakonishok and Lev, 1987). Investors are expected to demand higher 
premium to trade illiquid stocks (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1996), hence I expect an inverse relationship to exist between price 
impact and Turnover. This means that when liquidity is higher, there should be lower 
price impact and vice versa. 
Market return is the daily return on the FTSE 100 index. It is included in the regression 
model because literature has found that most stocks have positive beta (Aitken and 
Frino, 1996, Chiyachantana et al., 2004, Frino et al., 2007). Thus, a positive 
relationship is expected to exist between market return and price impact. Momentum 
is calculated as the lagged cumulative daily return for each stock on the five trading 
days prior to the block trades. Momentum captures the trading trend for each stock. 
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Thus, higher returns indicate a purchasing trend, and lower returns indicate a selling 
trend. Saar (2001) argues that the historical performance of stocks is related to their 
expected price impact asymmetry. Specifically, block trades that are executed 
following a depreciating price trend will exhibit higher positive asymmetry, and block 
trades executed following a run of price appreciation should display less price impact, 
or perhaps negative asymmetry. Specifically, historical cumulative lagged returns 
correspond to the magnitude of price impact. A positive relationship is therefore 
expected between momentum and price impact due to the herding effect. BAS is the 
relative bid-ask spread prior to the block trades. I calculate relative bid-ask spread as 
the ask price prior to the block trade minus the bid price before the block trade, divided 
by the midpoint of both prices. This measure is a proxy for liquidity, and when 
liquidity is high, BAS tends to be narrow. Hence, I expect lower price impact when 
spreads are narrow and larger price impact when they are wide.  
OIB corresponds to daily order imbalance. This variable and PIN are new additions to 
the Frino et al. (2007) price impact model. I compute OIB as shown in Equation (3.5) 
for each day.2 According to Chordia et al. (2008) , the extent of the predictability of 
returns by lagged OIB is an inverse measure of market efficiency. OIB in the model is 
therefore a proxy for how efficiently each stock is being traded.  
                                                                     (3.5) 
Time dummy variables are used to capture intraday effects of the private information 
diffusion process. Frino et al. (2007) and Alzahrani et al. (2013) document intraday 
                                                     
2 I also compute OIB for each 5-minute period preceding a block trade. The results obtained using the 













patterns in the price impact of block trades. In this chapter, I employ dummy variables 
to capture intraday patterns of price effects. DUM1 equals to one if block trade occurs 
between 8:00 and 9:00, and is otherwise zero. DUM2 equals to one if the block trade 
occurs during 9:00 to 15:30, and is otherwise zero.  DUM3 equals to one if block trade 
occurs during 15:30 to 16:00, and is otherwise zero. The last trading period (16:00 – 
16:30) is not in the regression, as it is the reference group of block trades. 
 
3.2.2.2. The PIN Model 
In order to capture the informed trading elements of stock for each day, I compute the 
daily probabilities of informed trading (PINs) based on the PIN model of Easley et al. 
(1996a) and Easley et al. (1997b). The model as specified is based on the expectation 
that trading between informed traders, liquidity traders and market makers occurs 
repeatedly over numerous trading intervals. As presented in Figure 3.5, trading 
intervals begin with the informed traders acquiring a private signal on a stock’s value 
with a probability of α. Dependent on the arrival of a private signal, bad news will 
arrive with a probability of δ, and good news arrives with a probability of (1 – δ). The 
market makers determine their bid and ask prices, with orders arriving from liquidity 
traders at the arrival rate ε. If there is a new piece of private information, informed 
traders will also trade and their orders will arrive at the rate μ. Hence, informed traders 
will execute a purchase trade should they receive a good news signal and sell if they 
receive a bad news signal. It is important to point out that the setting of different arrival 
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rates for uninformed buyers and sellers does not qualitatively alter estimations of the 















Informed Event occurs 
𝛼 
Informed Event does not occur 1- 𝛼 
Signal low/ Bad news 𝛿 
Signal high/ Good news 1- 𝛿 
Buy Arrival Rate 𝜖b 
Sell Arrival Rate 𝜖s + 𝜇 
Buy Arrival Rate 𝜖b + 𝜇 
Sell Arrival Rate 𝜖s   
Sell Arrival Rate 𝜖s   
Buy Arrival Rate 𝜖b  
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The PIN model allows us to approximate the unobservable distribution of trades 
between informed and uninformed traders through the modelling of purchases and 
sales.3 Thus, the ‘normal level’ of sales and purchases executed within a stock on a 
given day over several intervals is interpreted as an uninformed trade by the model, 
and this information is employed when estimating ε. An unusual volume of purchase 
or sale transactions is interpreted as an information-based trade and employed when 
computing μ. In addition, the frequency of intervals during which ‘abnormal’ levels 
of purchase and sale transactions are executed is used when calculating the values of 
α and δ. These calculations are conducted in a simultaneous fashion by the use of the 
maximum likelihood estimation method. Supposing that the uninformed and informed 
trades arrive as a Poisson distribution, the likelihood function for the PIN model for 
each interval estimated can be expressed as: 
                                            
(3.6)              
 
where B and S respectively represent the total number of purchase and sale transactions 
for each one hour trading period within each trading day. θ = (α, δ, μ, ε) is the 
parameter vector for the structural model. Equation (3.6) corresponds to a mix of 
                                                     



























































distributions in which the possible trades are weighted by the probability of a one hour 
trading period with no news (1 – α), a one hour trading period with good news (α (1 – 
δ)) or a one hour trading period with bad news (αδ). Based on the assumption that this 
process ensues independently across the different trading periods, Easley et al. (1996a) 
and Easley et al. (1997b) compute the parameter vector estimates using maximum 
likelihood estimation. Hence I obtain the parameters for each trading day and for each 
stock in the sample by maximum likelihood estimation. I thereafter follow Easley et 
al. (1996a) and Easley et al. (1997b) to compute PIN as:    
                                                                                                   (3.7) 
I include the daily stock-dependent PIN variable into the regression model (3.4).  
 
3.3. Regression Results and Discussion 
3.3.1. Preliminary Predictive Analysis 
I commence my analysis by first examining the hypothesised relationship between the 
number/proportion of informed trades and the number of block trades executed on the 
same day. This is important in order to confirm my assumption that informed traders 
take advantage of their information by executing block trades. I approximate the 
number of informed trades occurring for each day by manipulating parameters 
obtained through the maximum likelihood estimation of the PIN model. Since α 
corresponds to the probability of information events and arrival rate of informed orders, 







therefore estimate the following regression in order to test the assumption that 
informed traders use block trades as a trading vehicle.  
                               (3.8) 
Table 3.4 shows the statistical results. As expected, the positive and significant 
coefficient of informed trades indicates that with a 1% increase in the number of 
informed trades the number of block trades correspondingly increases 1.11% on the 
same trading day. The adjusted R2 is about 52.18%, which is high for a univariate 
estimation. This is an indication that variation in the estimated number of informed 
trades can be explained by the quantity of block trades. This result is consistent with 
Easley and O'Hara (1987) and Blau et al. (2009), who suggest that informed traders 
prefer block trades to exploit private information. However, this result may be viewed 
to some extent as a contradiction of Barclay and Warner (1993) stealth trading 
hypothesis, which implies that most of cumulative price changes are due to mid-size 
trades. One of the explanations could be that Barclay and Warner (1993) focus on 
trades prior to tender offer events, during which any larger order could easily attract 
other investors’ unwanted attention. Informed traders might therefore be more discrete 
in their exploitation of private information by splitting up large orders. In contrast, 
during uneventful trading periods informed traders might prefer block trades because 
they believe the market can absorb large orders without attracting undue attention. The 
view that stealth trading is mainly prevalent during eventful periods is further 
emphasised by Yang (2009). Yang (2009) reports that there is an increase in the 
implementation of stealth trading from around six to ten days prior to the release of 
quarterly earnings. However, informed traders are likely to aggressively exploit 
private information through the use of larger trades from about five days prior to the 
 )ln(#)ln(# tt tradesInformedtradesBlock
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earnings announcements. Despite the inconsistency in the evidence, theoretical and 
empirical studies generally agree that informed traders are more likely to exploit 




Predictive Analysis Test 
This table shows the results of regressing the natural logarithm of the daily number of block trades 
against the natural logarithm of estimated number of daily informed trades. I use the following model: 
 
The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. *** corresponds to statistical 
significance at the 0.01 level.      
 
 
    
  Coefficient S.E. 
      
  1.11*** 2.83×10-2 
     
Constant 2.47*** 4.98×10-2 
      
Observations 2,007   
R-squared 52.20%   
Adj R-squared 52.18%   
     
 
 
3.3.2. Trading on Information with Block Trades 
Following the establishment of a predictive relationship between informed trading and 
block trades, I now examine the process by which information is compounded in 
instrument prices via block trading. Panels A, B and C of Table 3.5 present the 
estimated parameters from Equation (3.4) for all three price impact measures and for 





block purchases, block sales and all block trades in the sample. For block purchases, 
PIN shows a positive and statistically significant relationship with both permanent and 
temporary price impacts. The PIN Permanent price impact of block purchases is 
0.000294, while the corresponding temporary price impact is 0.000386. The lesser 
permanent price impact coefficient estimate implies that the FTSE 100 stocks are less 
sensitive to informed trades than they are to liquidity trades. Consistent with my 
expectations, the PIN coefficient estimates for block sales are negative and statistically 
significant for both the temporary and permanent price impact regressions. As with 
the block purchases, there is a stronger level of temporary price impact than there is 
for permanent price impact. The negative (positive) statistically significant coefficient 
estimates of the PIN coefficients for the block sales (purchases) appear to confirm the 
information diffusion hypothesis via block trading.  
The absolute value of the PIN coefficient against the permanent price impact of block 
sales is 0.0002, which is smaller than that in block purchases at 0.000294. This level 
of price impact asymmetry is consistent with previous literature (see for example, 
Gemmill, 1996) in which there is an implicit assumption that block purchases are more 
informative than block sales. Conventional explanation for this phenomenon is that, 
generally, buy trades are more likely to be induced by private information than by 
liquidity considerations; the motivation is the opposite for sell trades. However, 
regulations prohibit investors from exploiting negative private information. For 
example, in the UK the Financial Conduct Authority bans investors from short selling 
financial service stocks listed on the LSE. The information diffusion process of block 
purchases will, in all likelihood, be stronger than that of block sales. The estimated 
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PIN coefficient for the permanent price impact of all block trades is not statistically 
significant. This is because the coefficient sign is positive for price impact of block 
purchase and negative for price impact of block sells, while PIN is ranged from zero 
to one. Thus, PIN cannot statistically explain the variation in price impact when the 







Incorporation of Private Information via Block Trading in FTSE 100 stocks 
The relationship between informed trading and block trading is estimated using the following model: 
 
Price impact corresponds to permanent, temporary or total price impact. PIN is the probability of an informed trade. LnSize is the natural logarithm of the number of shares per 
trade; volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day before the block trade takes place; lnTurnover is the natural logarithm of the total stock turnover on 
the trading day prior to the block trade; OIB represents the order imbalance; BAS is the bid-ask spread at the time of the block trade; Market return is the daily FTSE100 return 
on the day of the block trade. Momentum is the cumulative return of the stock in the five days preceding the block trade. DUM1 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 
8:00 and 9:00; DUM2 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 9:00 and 15:30; DUM3 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 15:30 and 16:00. Standard errors 
are presented in parentheses. Panels A, B and C present results for when permanent price impact, temporary price impact and total price impact are employed as dependent 
variables respectively. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
      
  Panel A. Permanent Price Impact   Panel B. Temporary Price Impact   Panel C. Total Price Impact 
  Purchases Sales All Trades   Purchases Sales All Trades   Purchases Sales All Trades 
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
PIN 2.94×10
-4***  -2.00×10-4** 6.81×10-7   3.86×10-4*** -8.33×10-4*** -1.43×10-4   1.13×10-3 6.22×10-4*** 1.99×10-4* 
  (7.74×10
-5) (9.01×10-5) (1.00×10-4)   (4.64×10-5) (7.38×10-5) (1.40×10-4)   (1.14×10-3) (1.01×10-4) (1.19×10-4) 
Ln(size) -1.01×10
-6 1.13×10-5*** 3.94×10-6**   2.31×10-6** 5.88×10-6* -7.07×10-7   3.89×10-5 4.81×10-6 9.41×10-8 
  (1.96×10
-6) (2.1×10-6) (1.57×10-6)   (1.00×10-6) (3.06×10-6) (6.25×10-6)   (4.24×10-5) (3.38×10-6) (3.05×10-6) 
Volatility 3.02×10
-5 1.78×10-4 5.47×10-6   3.26×10-4* 2.41×10-3*** 0.01   0.02 -2.17×10-3*** -8.66×10-3*** 
  (3.33×10
-4) (2.92×10-4) (2.50×10-4)   (1.93×10-4) (7.55×10-4) (3.57×10-3)   (0.02) (7.24×10-4) (1.79×10-3) 
Ln(turnover) 1.31×10
-5 ***  -1.52×10-5*** -1.54×10-6   1.54×10-5*** 2.21×10-5*** -3.8×10-8   5.83×10-5 -3.60×10-5*** -7.93×10-6 
  (6.25×10
-6) (4.13×10-6) (4.55×10-6)   (2.31×10-6) (5.95×10-6) (1.11×10-5)   (6.28×10-5) (6.43×10-6) (7.62×10-6) 
Market Return -8.22×10
-4  ***  -1.16×10-4 -4.72×10-4*   -9.71×10-4*** 5.42×10-3*** 1.30×10-3   7.37×10-3 -5.38×10-3*** -2.49×10-3*** 
  (3.86×10
-4) (3.22×10-4) (2.55×10-4)   (2.01×10-4) (6.57×10-4) (1.58×10-3)   (7.27×10-3) (6.51×10-4) (8.40×10-4) 
Momentum 1.14×10
-5 6.10×10-5*** 2.39×10-5   -5.03×10-5*** 7.71×10-5*** -1.71×10-4   6.38×10-5 -1.51×10-5 6.77×10-5 
  (2.11×10
-5) (1.65×10-5) (1.74×10-5)   (1.18×10-5) (2.48×10-5) (2.09×10-4)   (1.74×10-5) (2.50×10-5) (8.10×10-5) 
OIB -1.03×10
-5 6.12×10-5 6.81×10-5*   -7.47×10-5*** -2.82×10-4*** -4.05×10-4   3.79×10-4 3.38×10-4*** 3.87×10-4*** 
  (7.00×10
-5) (4.12×10-5) (3.89×10-5)   (2.40×10-5) (6.96×10-5) (1.41×10-4)   (3.40×10-4) (7.18×10-5) (8.86×10-5) 
 3112101987654321 ||RelnlnPr DUMDUMDUMOIBBASMomentumturnMarketTurnoverVolatilitySizePINimpactice
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BAS 0.42 ***  -0.199*** 0.12**   -0.42*** 0.96*** 0.41***   0.76*** -1.16*** -0.23*** 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.046)   (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)   (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) 
DUM1 9.66×10
-5 ***  -7.92×10-5*** 7.20×10-6   5.44×10-5*** -2.46×10-4*** -1.46×10-4***   7.59×10-5** 1.66×10-4*** 1.36×10-4*** 
(8:00 - 9:00)  (1.94×10
-5) (1.63×10-5) (1.21×10-5)   (9.29×10-6) (1.71×10-5) (2.96×10-5)   (3.60×10-5) (2.10×10-5) (2.13×10-5) 
DUM2 2.10×10
-5*** -3.13×10-5*** -1.10×10-5**   1.20×10-5* -9.09×10-5*** -1.49×10-5   8.52×10-5 5.99×10-5*** 1.19×10-5 
(9:00 - 15:30) (7.78×10
-6) (6.07×10-6) (4.85×10-6)   (7.31×10-6) (1.41×10-5) (3.06×10-5)   (7.50×10-5) (1.37×10-5) (1.65×10-5) 
DUM3 1.22×10
-5 -3.01×10-5*** -1.19×10-5**   3.42×10-7 -1.44×10-4*** -1.11×10-4***   8.56×10-6 1.13×10-4*** 8.22×10-5*** 
(15:30 - 16:00) (8.96×10
-6) (6.33×10-6) (5.50×10-6)   (8.33×10-6) (1.88×10-5) (2.84×10-5)   (5.39×10-6) (1.79×10-5) (1.69×10-5) 
Constant 5.96×10
-5 -1.99×10-4*** -6.77×10-5**   1.03×10-4*** 6.59×10-4*** 2.36×10-4   -1.78×10-4 -8.45×10-4*** -3.55×10-4*** 
  (5.56×10
-5) (3.93×10-5) (3.42×10-5)   (2.28×10-5) (6.75×10-5) (1.26×10-4)   (1.04×10-4) (6.99×10-5) (8.33×10-5) 
Observations 206,002 246,867 453,012   206,002 246,867 453,012   206,002 246,867 453,012 
R-squared 0.77% 0.34% 0.07%   2.14% 1.40% 0.05%   2.92% 1.89% 0.06% 
Adj R-squared 0.76% 0.34% 0.06%   2.14% 1.39% 0.05%   2.92% 1.89% 0.06% 












Estimated coefficients for other explanatory variables are largely consistent with 
existing literature on the price impact of block trades. I find that size has a positive 
coefficient related to the temporary effect of block purchases, the permanent effect of 
block sales and all block trades. This suggests that volume has a direct relationship 
with inventory costs and that price impact is an increasing (decreasing) function of 
trade size in purchase (sell) block trades (Alzahrani et al., 2013). However, the 
coefficient for the permanent price impact of block purchases is not significant. In 
addition, the size variable exhibits intriguing coefficient behaviour. The positive effect 
of size on permanent impacts indicates that the largest block sales will have smaller 
price impacts compared with small and medium block sales. This could mean that, 
within the largest 1% of trades, relatively small trades are more informative. This 
evidence is in line with Barclay and Warner (1993) findings that informed traders 
prefer to split their largest orders for execution as medium-sized ones. One plausible 
aim of this behaviour is to camouflage informed trades as uninformed smaller trades 
in the order flow. Since there is a consistent general view that large trades imply 
informed trading, trading in smaller sizes affords the opportunity to avoid detection of 
informed large orders. Another aim, related to the first, is that a large trade may not 
necessarily be informed but, since it could be treated as such, a liquidity trader may be 
inclined to execute it as smaller trades in order to avoid paying a premium or offering 
a discount. 
Volatility exhibits a statistically significant positive relationship with the temporary 
effect of block purchases and entire block trades. The positive coefficients of 
temporary price impact of block purchases are in line with literature that states that 
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counterparties will demand higher premium in order to assume higher market risk (see 
Alzahrani et al., 2013, Chan and Lakonishok, 1997, Frino et al., 2007). However, I 
also observe some mild and inexplicable inconsistencies which show that volatility is 
positively related to the temporary price impact of block sales, and negatively related 
with total price impact of both block sales and all block trades. Given the general lack 
of statistical analysis of the purchase block trades’ volatility coefficient estimates; it 
appears that the driver of the all block trades coefficient estimates is the evolution of 
the sale block trades. Turnover has a statistically significant positive effect on the 
temporary and permanent price impact of block purchase, and a negative effect on 
permanent price impact of block sales. These estimates imply that higher liquidity can 
induce a higher permanent price impact in FTSE100 block trades. This result 
contradicts the argument of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996) liquidity effect proposition that traders ask for higher premium 
in order to trade illiquidity stocks. However, my results can be justified as larger block 
trades can alter perception of the market value of stocks (Alzahrani et al., 2013). 
Regardless of liquidity constraints, chasing momentum could generate high turnover 
and, in turn, a price run-up (Chan et al., 1996). I directly examine the effect of 
momentum in this framework and discuss it below.   
Literature suggests that market return should have a positive relationship with price 
impact. However, my estimates show that market return has a negative effect on the 
permanent and temporary price impacts of block purchases. The coefficient estimates 
suggest that there is a reduced price impact for block purchases when market returns 
rise. The positive and statistically significant market return coefficient for the block 
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sales’ temporary price impact is however in line with literature, which suggests a 
reduced price impact for block sales (see Frino et al., 2007). For momentum, 
coefficient estimates for total price impact is negative and statistically significant at 
0.01, level thus implying that a higher recent price run-up will generate a smaller price 
impact for block purchases (Saar, 2001). Chiyachantana et al. (2004) make similar 
inferences based on their analysis; they argue that institutional investors prefer to 
purchase after days of price run-up in order to induce lower price changes. By contrast, 
momentum has positive effects on the permanent and temporary price impact 
measures of block sales, and both coefficient estimates are statistically significant. 
This reversal sign of momentum variable indicates price reversals associated with 
block purchases. Positive momentum coefficient estimates suggest that a stock with a 
momentum trend in its performance is expected to have a lower price impact for block 
sales. This is in line with my observation regarding the turnover estimates above, as 
well as with Saar (2001) prediction. 
Order imbalance coefficient estimates for total price impact and temporary price 
impact of block sales and all block trades are all positive and significant. This is 
because order imbalance measures the daily excess amount of buy orders over sell 
orders, it conveys information to the market makers and traders about the intraday 
variations in the order flow and, ultimately, the perceived value of instruments. Higher 
order imbalance would imply deviation from the norm leading to a perception that the 
market is inefficient. Thus the coefficient values imply that for block sales, during 
pockets of inefficiency, there is reduced price impact and even though not statistically 
significant, the positive block purchase coefficients imply the increasing price impact 
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of total block trades (Chordia et al., 2002a). Bid-ask spread (BAS) is positively related 
to the price impact of block purchases, and negatively related to the price impact of 
block sales, with the exception of the permanent price impact. Consistent with Aitken 
and Frino (1996), results show that when bid-ask spread is wider the price impact is 
greater for both purchase and block sales.  
For intraday effects, dummy variables DUM1 and DUM2 in the permanent price impact 
of block purchases show a positive and significant relationship with price impact. 
However, the coefficient on DUM1 is larger than on DUM2, indicating that the price 
impact is stronger during the first hour (8:00 – 9:00) than during midday trading hours 
(9:00 – 15:30). Similarly, dummy variables DUM1 and DUM2 in the permanent price 
impact of block sales show a negative and significant relationship with price impact. 
Overall, the DUM1 permanent price impact coefficients for both block purchases and 
sales are larger than the DUM1 temporary price impact coefficients. This confirms the 
expectation that information is accumulated overnight and is thus incorporated into 
the prices of stocks during the first hour of trading the next day (see also Ibikunle, 
2015a).  
Our regression model is similar to that of Alzahrani et al. (2013), who study the 
impacts of block trades in the Saudi Stock Market (SSM). They find that permanent 
price impact is generally larger than temporary price impact. Their results reveal that 
most of their independent variables can significantly explain the variations of the 
permanent price impact, implying that independent variables in their model can, 
potentially, be used to predict the movement of price impact of block trades. Therefore, 
they conclude that the SSM is highly sensitive to the informed trades. In contrast, my 
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results are based on a more developed market and a highly liquid sample of FTSE100 
stocks, and largely differ from Alzahrani et al. (2013) in that the temporary price 
impact of block trades is generally more pronounced than the permanent price impact 
of block purchases. I also find price impact asymmetry such that purchase blocks have 
higher information diffusion effects than sale blocks. Additionally, not all of the 
control variables can statistically explain the variation of permanent price impact. 
 
3.3.3. Intraday Patterns 
The dummy variables in the full sample regression imply intraday patterns of price 
impact. To explore this intraday effect of the information diffusion process more 
keenly, I exogenously split the sample into four time intervals: the first trading hour 
(8:00hrs – 9:00hrs), middle of the day (9:00hrs – 15:30hrs), the penultimate thirty 
minutes of trading (15:30hrs – 16:00hrs) and the final thirty minutes of trading 
(16:00hrs – 16:30hrs). Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show the regression results for block 
purchases and sales. Panel A in Table 3.6 shows the regression coefficients of the 
permanent price impact of block purchase. It can be seen that the coefficient of PIN in 
the first trading hour is 0.000599, which is larger than that of the middle of day trading 
hours’ estimate at 0.000396; both estimates are statistically significant at the 0.05 and 
0.01 levels respectively. This indicates that the information diffusion process is 
strongest during the opening hour, despite the fact that the middle trading period 
includes six and half hours of the largest volume trading. The observation is also 
consistent for temporary price impact estimates. These results are in line with Ibikunle 
(2015a), who argues that a substantial fraction of price discovery occurs during the 
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first trading hour because large amount of new information, held back during the 
opening auction, is released into the market early on during the continuous trading 
session of the day. The PIN coefficients for the other trading sub-periods of the day 
are not statistically significant since, as shown by Ibikunle (2015a), more than 97% of 
the efficient price discovery occurs prior to the last half hour of trading for FTSE 100 






Incorporation of Private Information via Purchase Block Trading in FTSE 100 Stocks across Trading Hours 
The relationship between informed trading and purchase block trading across intraday trading intervals is estimated using the following model: 
 ||RelnlnPr 87654321 OIBBASMomentumturnMarketTurnoverVolatilitySizePINimpactice  
Price impact corresponds to permanent, temporary or total price impact. PIN is the probability of an informed trade. LnSize is the natural logarithm of the number of shares per trade; 
volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day before the block trade takes place; lnTurnover is the natural logarithm of the total stock turnover on the trading 
day prior to the block trade; OIB represents the order imbalance; BAS is the bid-ask spread at the time of the block trade; Market return is the daily FTSE100 return on the day of the 
block trade. Momentum is the cumulative return of the stock in the five days preceding the block trade. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Panels A, B and C present results 
for when permanent price impact, temporary price impact and total price impact are employed as dependent variables respectively. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively.    
  Panel A. Permanent Price Impact     Panel B. Temporary Price Impact     Panel C. Total Price Impact   
  
8:00 - 9:00 9:00   - 15: 30 15:30 - 16:00 16:00 - 16:30 
  
8:00 - 9:00 9:00  - 15: 30 
15:30 - 
16:00 
16:00 - 16:30 
  
8:00 - 9:00 9:00 - 15: 30 15:30 - 16:00 
16:00 - 
16:30       
      
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
PIN 
5.99×10-4** 3.96×10-4*** 9.42×10-5 2.37×10-4   3.45×10-4*** 3.03×10-4*** 1.34×10-4 4.25×10-4   2.50×10-4 9.23×10-5*** -4.04×10-5 -1.90×10-4 
  (2.58×10
-4) (3.98×10-5) (1.03×10-4) (2.79×10-4)   (1.15×10-4) (3.08×10-5) (8.43×10-5) (2.97×10-4)   (2.45×10-4) (3.16×10-5) (7.14×10-5) (1.06×10-4) 
Ln(size) -9.95×10
-7 8.7×10-7 -5.09×10-6* 4.00×10-6   5.23×10-6 7.45×10-7 -2.81×10-6 4.00×10-6   -6.30×10-6 1.2×10-7 -2.28×10-6 -1.01×10-7 
  (1.02×10
-5) (1.70×10-6) (2.98×10-6) (3.96×10-6)   (3.68×10-6) (1.49×10-6) (2.44×10-6) (3.92×10-6)   (9.09×10-6) (3.84×10-6) (2.13×10-6) (6.30×10-6) 
Volatility 1.14×10
-3 5.48×10-5 4.65×10-4 6.96×10-4   1.85×10-4 3.05×10-4 5.43×10-4***  4.11×10-4   -1.32×10-3 -2.51×10-4 -7.87×10-5 2.84×10-4 
  (1.93×10
-3) (2.75×10-4) (6.74×10-4) (5.61×10-4)   (8.81×10-4) (2.01×10-4) (4.41×10-5) (4.57×10-4)   (1.67×10-3) (1.93×10-4) (4.03×10-5) (3.19×10-4) 
Ln(turnover) 4.52×10
-5 5.68×10-6** 1.05×10-5 2.01×10-5*   4.03×10-5*** 8.39×10-6*** 8.15×10-6 1.51×10-5   5.30×10-6 -2.72×10-6 2.38×10-6 4.60×10-6 
  (3.04×10
-5) (2.91×10-6) (7.97×10-6) (1.18×10-5)   (6.99×10-6) (1.88×10-6) (5.97×10-6) (1.12×10-5)   (2.94×10-5) (2.11×10-6) (4.00×10-6) (3.70×10-6) 
Market 
Return 
-3.41×10-3* 6.22×10-5 -1.40×10-3 -2.19×10-3***   -2.40×10-3*** -3.41×10-4* 1.91×10-3 -1.61×10--3***   -1.02×10-3 4.03×10-4 5.15×10-4 -5.76×10-4* 
  (1.93×10-3) (2.58×10-4) (1.25×10-3) (6.21×10-4)   (7.17×10-4) (1.88×10-4) (1.18×10-3) (5.45×10-4)   (1.79×10-3) (1.74×10-4) (3.65×10-4) (3.02×10-4) 
Momentum 1.66×10
-4 -4.31×10-5*** 1.86×10-5 1.95×10-5   -1.24×10-4** -4.52×10-5*** -3.44×10-6 1.25×10-6   2.91×10-4*** 2.4×10-6 2.23×10-5 1.83×10-5 
  (1.13×10
-4) (1.62×10-5) (2.57×10-5) (2.47×10-5)   (5.12×10-5) (1.16×10-5) (1.58×10-3) (1.67×10-5)   (3.93×10-5) (9.09×10-6) (1.76×10-5) (1.23×10-5) 
OIB 7.73×10
-4* -1.44×10-4*** -4.91×10-5 -1.55×10-4**   5.22×10-5 -9.76×10-5*** -2.14×10-5 -1.25×10-4**   7.21×10-4* -4.62×10-5** -2.77×10-5 -3.03×10-5 
  (4.22×10
-4) (3.40×10-5) (2.54×10-5) (6.68×10-5)   (1.11×10-3) (2.41×10-5) (5.25×10-5) (6.04×10-5)   (4.07×10-4) (2.35×10-5) (5.38×10-5) (3.26×10-5) 
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BAS 0.54*** 0.24*** 0.368*** 0.24   -0.474*** -0.348*** -0.17*** -0.38*   1.02*** 0.59*** 0.54*** 0.63*** 
  (0.09) (0.02) (0.06) (0.18)   (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.20)   (0.09) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) 
Constant 2.66×10
-4 2.52×10-5 1.65×10-4* 1.74×10-4***   4.12×10-4*** 6.94×10-5*** 9.23×10-5 7.32×10-5   -1.46×10-4 -4.4×10-5** 7.29×10-5 1.01×10-4*** 
  (3.02×10
-4) (2.81×10-5) (9.17×10-5) (6.74×10-5)   (7.91×10-5) (2.85×10-5) (7.18×10-5) (6.08×10-5)   (2.98×10-4) (1.90×10-5) (5.62×10-5) (3.42×10-5) 
Observations 35,490 129,411 15,262 25,839   35,490 129,411 15,262 25,839   35,490 129,411 15,262 25839 
R-squared 0.80% 1.00% 1.09% 0.25%   4.42% 1.88% 0.32% 0.31%   2.56% 7.10% 5.53% 10.06% 
Adj R-
squared 








Incorporation of Private Information via Sale Block Trading in FTSE 100 Stocks across Trading Hours 
The relationship between informed trading and sale block trading across intraday trading intervals is estimated using the following model: 
 
Price impact corresponds to permanent, temporary or total price impact. PIN is the probability of an informed trade. LnSize is the natural logarithm of the number of shares per 
trade; volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day before the block trade takes place; lnTurnover is the natural logarithm of the total stock turnover on 
the trading day prior to the block trade; OIB represents the order imbalance; BAS is the bid-ask spread at the time of the block trade; Market return is the daily FTSE100 return 
on the day of the block trade. Momentum is the cumulative return of the stock in the five days preceding the block trade. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Panels 
A, B and C present results for when permanent price impact, temporary price impact and total price impact are employed as dependent variables respectively. ***, ** and * 
correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively.       
 
                 
  Panel A. Permanent Price Impact     Panel B. Temporary Price Impact     Panel C. Total Price Impact   
  




8:00 - 9:00 9:00   - 15: 30 
15:30 - 
16:00 
16:00 - 16:30 
  
8:00 - 9:00 9:00 -15: 30 15:30 - 16:00 
16:00 - 
16:30 
      
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
PIN -1.15×10-4 2.91×10-3 -2.44×10-4*** -1.09×10-4   -2.00×10-4 5.46×10-3 -1.44×10-3*** -1.78×10-3***   3.12×10-4 3.74×10-3 1.17×10-3*** 1.70×10-3*** 
  (2.87×10-4) (2.44×10-3) (8.41×10-5) (1.28×10-4)   (1.75×10-4) (0.02) (3.83×10-4) (2.97×10-4)   (2.85×10-4) (2.46×10-3) (3.50×10-4) (2.60×10-4) 
Ln(size) 3.18×10-5*** 2.72×10-5 -5.29×10-7 3.8×10-6   1.39×10-5** -1.55×10-3* 2.47×10-5** -5.96×10-5*   1.80×10-5* 8.11×10-5* -2.50×10-5** 4.58×10-5*** 
  (8.69×10-6) (3.79×10-5) (1.00×10-5) (3.57×10-6)   (6.07×10-6) (8.59×10-4) (1.14×10-5) (3.06×10-5)   (9.90×10-6) (4.29×10-5) (1.07×10-5) (1.53×10-5) 
Volatility 3.52×10-3** 3.56 -1.67×10-4 -1.14×10-3   3.13×10-3* 6.78*** -4.16×10-4 1.12×10-2   4.23×10-4 3.43 1.97×10-4 -6.51×10-3 
  (1.47×10-3) (2.51) (7.26×10-4) (9.87×10-4)   (1.84×10-3) (2.24) (1.43×10-3) (0.01)   (1.97×10-3) (2.51) (1.52×10-3) (4.68×10-3) 
Ln(turnover) -3.81×10-5** 1.29×10-3 -4.93×10-6 -8.93×10-6   3.00×10-5** 3.82×10-3* 3.39×10-5 1.38×10-5   -7.60×10-6 1.23×10-3 -3.76×10-5* -2.81×10-5 
  (1.75×10-5) (9.19×10-4) (6.33×10-6) (6.16×10-6)   (1.18×10-5) (2.21×10-3) (2.19×10-5) (3.59×10-5)   (1.88×10-5) (9.22×10-4) (2.03×10-5) (2.92×10-5) 
Market 
Return 
-4.67×10-3*** -9.78×10-2 -1.12×10-4 -1.19×10-3***   3.93×10-3** 0.13 -1.07×10-3 2.26×10-3   -8.47×10-3*** -0.107 8.20×10-4 -1.53×10-3 
  (1.62×10-3) (0.07) (4.87×10-4) (5.44×10-4)   (1.39×10-3) (0.17) (2.24×10-3) (3.71×10-3)   (1.85×10-3) (0.07) (2.10×10-3) (2.24×10-3) 
Momentum 2.44×10-4*** -2.88×10-3 2.08×10-5 2.99×10-5   1.13×10-4** 6.5×10-3 6.47×10-5 -6.18×10-5   1.32×10-4 -2.87×10-3 -4.19×10-5 7.38×10-5 
  (8.18×10-5) (2.06×10-3) (2.80×10-5) (2.68×10-5)   (4.72×10-5) (5.56×10-3) (6.48×10-5) (8.26×10-5)   (6.95×10-4) (2.08×10-3) (6.18×10-5) (4.56×10-5) 
OIB 1.63×10-4 1.08×10-3 1.39×10-4* -1.38×10-4*   2.15×10
-4 -0.04** -2.98×10-4 -1.07×10-3**   -4.26×10-5 1.16×10-2 4.17×10-4 6.27×10-4** 
 ||RelnlnPr 87654321 OIBBASMomentumturnMarketTurnoverVolatilitySizePINimpactice
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  (2.24×10-4) (7.61×10-3) (7.16×10-5) (7.67×10-5)   (2.11×10
-4) (0.02) (2.89×10-4) (5.39×10-4)   (2.70×10-4) (7.60×10-3) (2.66×10-4) (3.03×10-4) 
BAS -0.29** -3.77 -0.24*** -0.144   0.89*** 5.66 1.035*** 1.16***   -1.18*** -5.15** -1.24*** -1.33*** 
  (0.14) (2.62) (0.05) (0.12)   (0.05) (5.34) (0.22) (0.16)   (0.13) (2.61) (0.20) (0.15) 
Constant -7.14×10-4*** 8.59×10-3 -5.05×10-5 -1.31×10-4**   -3.70×10-4*** 0.05* 7.63×10-4*** 1.40×10-3***   -3.38×10-4 7.38×10-3 -7.97×10-4*** -1.44×10-3*** 
  (1.99×10-4) (6.23×10-3) (6.67×10-5) (6.58×10-5)   1.38×10-4 (0.02) (2.33×10-4) (4.17×10-4)   (2.15×10-4) (6.26×10-3) (2.22×10-4) (3.07×10-4) 
Observations 41,492 156,625 18,224 30,476   41,492 156,625 18,224 30,476   41,492 156,625 18,224 30,476 
R-squared 0.40% 0.37% 0.79% 0.22%   4.01% 0.30% 0.47% 0.08%   3.58% 0.34% 0.77% 0.29% 
Adj R-
squared 0.39% 0.36% 0.74% 0.19%   4.00% 0.29% 0.42% 0.05%   3.56% 0.34% 0.73% 0.26% 















Results in Table 3.7 are very intriguing because they suggest that, while information 
diffusion behaviour is strongest during the opening hour for block purchases, block 
sales do not register statistically significant information diffusion effects until the 
trading day is truly well under way. The PIN coefficients are only statistically 
significant for the final two half-hour trading periods of the day. The permanent price 
impact coefficient for the half-hour period between 15:30-16:00 hours is -0.00024 and 
is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. For the temporary price impact, the 
coefficients for the final two half-hour trading periods are -0.0014 and -0.0018 
respectively and both are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The results imply 
that when informed trading activity is highest in the market, arbitrage traders operate 
from neutral positions from where they bid for profit opportunities. According to 
Ibikunle (2015b), informed trading is highest on the LSE during early trading, and 
decreases as the continuous trading session progresses. Thus, with the reduction in the 
arbitrage seeking activities of informed traders comes a reduction in purchase trades. 
The decreases in purchases will allow for increased price impact for block sales, hence 
the larger information diffusion activity of block sales during the latter end of the 
continuous trading day. Overall, this section provides evidence that the diffusion 
process is strong during the opening of the trading session, when trading is most 
vigorous and there is an increased presence of informed traders (Dufour and Engle 
(2000). These results also indicate that a liquid and deep market could well facilitate 




3.3.4. Inter-day patterns (long-lived information) 
I now explore the systematic inter-day variations of the information diffusion process. 
Kyle’s (1985) theoretical model suggests that informed traders do not immediately 
execute trades with all of the information at their disposal; rather, they do so in a 
gradual manner. This implies that information could be slowly incorporated into prices 
of instruments over a time frame longer than the length of the trading day. This 
theoretical position is bolstered by the empirical analysis of Hong et al. (2000). Using 
analyst coverage as a proxy for firm-specific information inflow, Hong et al. (2000) 
find that the momentum trend of stocks is caused by the slow impounding of firm-
specific information into stock prices. The use of analyst following as a proxy for firm-
specific (private) information has been criticised by Vega (2006); in this section, I 
employ a more generally accepted proxy for private information to examine the 
hypothesis that private information in trading could be long-lived. Foster and 
Viswanathan (1993b) also propose a theoretical optimal trading strategy, in which 
informed traders prefer to trade intensively on common information, and trade less on 
their private information. Once common information is fully reflected in the stock 
prices, informed traders then start trading based on private information. This also 
supports the hypothesis that private information is incorporated into stock prices in a 
gradual manner. Based on the foregoing submissions, I hypothesize that informed 
traders will not fully exploit their superior information by the end of an average trading 
day; they will hold on to it and exploit it during the next trading opportunity (day). 
According to Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), informed traders might also try to 
obtain updated private information during non-trading hours. Then, once the market 
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opens, they may trade aggressively based on yesterday’s (re-evaluated) private 
information. I test this hypothesis by employing the following regression model:  
 
        (3.9)                            
where  is the natural logarithm of the number of block trades on 
dayt scaled by the number of block trades on day t-1. It reflects the relative change of 
number of block trades based on the previous trading day. All other variables are as 
previously defined. I note the limitations of my ability to proxy the overnight private 
information on day t-1, and therefore employ the previous day’s PIN as a proxy for 
existing private information prior to the current trading day. 
Table 3.8 presents the regression results from Equation (3.9). Panel A shows the 
regression results for the entire trading day’s block trades, while Panel B is focused 
only on the first hour of the trading day.   The focus on the first hour of trading as an 
extension of the analysis is based on the expectation that overnight private information 
is more likely to be traded upon within the first hour of trading. Most of the PINt-1 
coefficients in Panels A and B are positive and statistically significant. This indicates 
that informed traders adjust their block trade positions on day t relative to dayt-1 based 
on private information gleaned during day t-1. In Panel B, the coefficients of PINt-1 of 
block purchases and sales are larger than the corresponding coefficients of PINt-1 in 
Panel A. This confirms my expectations that informed traders holding long-lived 


































during the first trading hour. This is because the longer they hold on to a set of privately 
acquired information, the more likely it is that they become public before the informed 
traders could benefit from them (see Foster and Viswanathan, 1993b). Further, the 
market is at one of its most liquid (in terms of depth) and volatile intervals during the 
opening period, and therefore informed traders aim to take advantage of this natural 
camouflage to execute informed block trades. All turnover coefficients in both panels 
of Table 3.8 are, statistically, highly significant and positive. This implies that 
informed traders are more willing to adjust their block positions if the stock is very 
liquid during the previous trading day. This is because a liquid market can easily 
absorb block trades without causing large price fluctuations. I also observe that in 
Panel A, market return has statistically significant negative coefficients for purchase 
and sale block trades. A possible explanation for this could be that when the market is 
on the rise, informed traders do not adjust their positions by block trades the following 
day because they may expect a price run-up in their portfolio holdings. Informed 
traders also may not adjust positions by block sales if they have no liquidity motives 














Inter-day relationship between PIN and Block Trades 
This table shows the regression results of the relationship between the inter-day percentage change of 
number of block trades and the probability of an informed trade.  Panel A reports the regression 
coefficient estimates for block trades sample during the entire continuous trading day, while Panel B 
reports the regression coefficient estimates for the one-hour period between 08:00 and 09:00hrs. I use 









) corresponds to the natural logarithm of number of block trades at day t divided by 
the number of block trades at day t-1, it depicts the change of number of block trades based on the 
previous trading day. PIN is the probability of an informed trade. LnSize is the natural logarithm of the 
number of shares per trade; volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day before 
the block trade takes place; lnTurnover is the natural logarithm of the total stock turnover on the trading 
day prior to the block trade; OIB represents the order imbalance; BAS is the bid-ask spread at the time 
of the block trade; Market return is the daily FTSE100 return on the day of the block trade. Momentum 
is the cumulative return of the stock in the five days preceding the block trade. Standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
levels respectively. 
      
  
Panel A. Block Trades during the day 
  Panel B. Block Trades during the first 
trading hour (8:00-9:00)     
  
Block 
Purchases    
Block 
Sales   
All Block 









  Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient 




0.25*   0.23*   0.44***   0.41**   0.25   0.35** 




0.07***   0.07***   0.06***   0.07***   0.04**   0.07*** 




-0.05   -0.05   -0.06   0.01   0.02   -0.04 




0.92   0.36   2.51   0.45   -1.77   -1.16 




0.08   0.06   -0.11   -0.23   -0.45**   -0.22 
 (0.14)   (0.15)   (0.11)   (0.19)   (0.21)   (0.16) 
 
Market Return t-1 
 
-4.84***   -5.15***   0.28   -0.37   2.31   -0.12 
 (1.25)   (1.27)   (1.00)   (1.62)   (1.86)   (1.48) 
Constant 0.54***   0.58***   0.38***   0.55***   0.35   0.60*** 
 (0.15)   (0.15)   (0.10)   (0.21)   (0.23)   (0.19) 
Observations 9,555   9,224   10,071   6,598   5,360   8,306 
R-squared 0.49%   0.51%   0.62%   0.36%   0.23%   0.35% 
Adj R-squared 0.47%   0.44%   0.55%   0.28%   0.14%   0.29% 





3.3.5. Stock opacity and the incorporation of information 
The rate of information compounding for stocks is dependent on the availability of 
information through trading. I therefore expect that stocks with higher level of 
transparency will likely have different rates of information incorporation to those that 
are more opaque. There is an assumption that the more scrutinised a stock is the higher 
the level of its transparency (see for example, Hong et al.’s (2000) use of analyst 
coverage as a proxy for information flow). However, this often criticised proxy (see 
for example, Vega, 2006) reveals nothing about the information impounding process 
through trading. Using the PIN measure as a proxy for levels of stock trading 
transparency, I examine how the information incorporation process varies across 
FTSE 100 stocks with varying levels of transparency. Chung et al. (2005) investigate 
the relationship between informed trading and trade autocorrelation. Consistent with 
Easley et al. (1996b), they show that small stocks are associated with high levels of 
information-based trading. Their results also suggest that a higher probability of 
informed trading leads to a higher level of serial correlation in trade direction. Vega 
(2006) also finds that PIN is negatively correlated with firm size. However, the results 
show that the informed trading variable alone cannot statistically explain the 
magnitude of post-announcement drift. The results suggest that the more information 
(both private and public) investors have about the true value of an asset, the smaller 
the abnormal return drift. This finding is consistent with previous research that small 
firms’ stocks experience greater post-announcement drift than large firms’ stocks, 
since small firms are generally associated with high PINs. This is related to the low 
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level of analyst coverage, large concentration of informed trades, and public news 
surprise.  
Based on the foregoing, I hypothesise that the information diffusion process of high-
PIN stocks is stronger than that of low-PIN stocks, since firms with low financial 
transparency might have more firm-specific information to reveal, and informed trade 
can facilitate more information into price discovery. I split the sample of FTSE 100 
stocks into four portfolios according to the mean value of intraday PIN and estimate 
Equation (3.4) for each portfolio. 
In Table 3.9, Panels A, B and C show the regression results for permanent, temporary 
and total price impacts of purchase block trades across portfolios. Clearly, PIN 
coefficients on permanent price impacts increase with the average PIN value in each 
portfolio. This confirms my expectation that the information diffusion effect is 
strongest for stocks with lower levels of transparency. However, in the case of block 
sales, as shown in Table 3.10, there is little evidence to support my hypothesis. It is 
also related to the fact that block sales are less informative than block purchases, since 
block sales are more likely to be liquidity-induced rather than information-based when 
compared to purchase trades. In this section I find that for those firms with relatively 
low financial transparency, investors and agents who are particularly skilful in 
analysing public news play an important role in revealing information via block 
purchases. This result is in line with Vega’s (2006) finding that return of high PIN 
firms is less sensitive to the same size of surprise news than low PIN firms, because 
the private information should have already been revealed to the market by informed 
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investors across trading periods. Hence, on balance, informed trading plays a positive 












Stock Transparency and Incorporation of Private Information via Purchase Block Trading in FTSE 100 Stocks 
The relationship between informed trading and purchase block trading in FTSE 100 stocks with varying levels of stock transparency is estimated using the following model: 
  3112101987654321 ||Relnln DUMDUMDUMOIBBASMomentumturnMarketTurnoverVolatilitySizePINimpactPirce  
Price impact corresponds to permanent, temporary or total price impact. PIN is the probability of an informed trade. LnSize is the natural logarithm of the number of shares per 
trade; volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day before the block trade takes place; lnTurnover is the natural logarithm of the total stock turnover on 
the trading day prior to the block trade; OIB represents the order imbalance; BAS is the bid-ask spread at the time of the block trade; Market return is the daily FTSE100 return 
on the day of the block trade. Momentum is the cumulative return of the stock in the five days preceding the block trade. DUM1 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 
8:00 and 9:00; DUM2 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 9:00 and 15:30; DUM3 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 15:30 and 16:00. Standard errors 
are presented in parentheses. PIN estimates are used as proxies for stocks’ levels of transparency; on this basis, stocks are partitioned into transparency quartiles/portfolios. The 
highest (lowest) PIN stocks are designated as Portfolio 1 (4) stocks. Panels A, B and C present results for when permanent price impact, temporary price impact and total price 
impact are employed as dependent variables respectively. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
 



















  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
PIN 5.46×10
-4*** 3.65×10-4** 1.84×10-4*** 1.84×10-4*   2.15×10-5 -9.21×10-5 1.95×10-4*** 8.27×10-5   3.32×10-4 4.56×10-4*** 1.13×10-5 4.85×10-5 
  (2.64×10
-4) (1.51×10-4) (6.81×10-5) (1.08×10-4)   (1.52×10-4) (7.08×10-5) (3.07×10-5) (6.43×10-5)   (2.08×10-4) (1.38×10-4) (5.56×10-5) (8.31×10-5) 
Ln(size) 1.43×10
-5 8.46×10-6* -6.16×10-6*** -7.63×10-6*   3.59×10-6 9.99×10-6*** -3.78×10-6*** 6.23×10-6*   1.07×10-5 -1.56×10-6 -2.38×10-6 -1.53×10-5*** 
  (1.27×10
-5) (4.74×10-6) (2.13×10-6) (4.34×10-6)   (6.35×10-6) (2.34×10-6) (1.29×10-6) (3.39×10-7)   (1.17×10-5) (5.71×10-6) (1.59×10-6) (4.18×10-6) 
Volatility -5.62×10
-3* 8.82×10-6 1.46×10-4 5.68×10-4   2.28×10-4 2.34×10-4 2.50×10-4 6.67×10-4*   -5.89×10-3** -2.25×10-4 -1.04×10-4 1.18×10-4 
  (3.39×10
-3) (9.01×10-4) (4.29×10-4) (6.84×10-4)   (1.34×10-3) (5.09×10-4) (2.25×10-4) (4.04×10-4)   (2.82×10-3) (4.69×10-4) (3.71×10-4) (5.36×10-4) 
Ln(turnover) -1.68×10
-5 -3.72×10-5*** 2.61×10-6 2.11×10-5**   -9.5×10-6 -1.59×10-5*** 1.32×10-5*** 2.16×10-5***   -7.35×10-6 -2.07×10-5* -1.05×10-5*** -3.23×10-6 
  (3.47×10
-5) (1.27×10-5) (4.76×10-6) (9.50×10-6)   (1.82×10-5) (6.11×10-6) (1.97×10-6) (6.47×10-6)   (2.69×10-5) (1.17×10-5) (4.10×10-6) (9.97×10-6) 
Market 
Return 
-3.80×10-3* 4.45×10-4 -1.08×10-3*** -5.93×10-4   -2.00×10-3 -7.50×10-4*** -9.32×10-4*** -7.18×10-4*   -1.82×10-3 1.20×10-3 -1.42×10-4 -7.15×10-4 
(2.29×10-3) (1.03×10-3) (3.76×10-4) (6.45×10-4)   (1.25×10-3) (1.87×10-4) (2.09×10-4) (4.35×10-4)   (1.82×10-3) (9.26×10-4) (3.16×10-4) (6.06×10-4) 
Momentum -4.46×10
-6 1.08×10-4*** 2.45×10-5 -2.11×10-5   -6.30×10-5** 6.07×10-6 3.75×10-6 -6.76×10-5***   5.86×10-5 1.01×10-4*** 2.07×10-5 4.88×10-5*** 
  (5.00×10




-4*** 2.37×10-4** -1.09×10-5 -1.77×10-4*   -1.85×10-4* -3.21×10-5 -6.38×10-5** -8.37×10-5*   -6.24×10-4*** 2.69×10-4*** 5.16×10-5 -8.47×10-5 
  (2.16×10
-4) (1.07×10-4) (5.01×10-5) (7.73×10-5)   (9.64×10-5) (5.52×10-5) (2.79×10-5) (4.44×10-5)   (1.87×10-4) (9.41×10-5) (4.48×10-5) (6.85×10-5) 
BAS 0.45** 0.24** 0.49*** 0.488***   -0.39*** -0.55*** -0.54*** -0.38***   0.84*** 0.79*** 1.03*** 0.86*** 
  (0.19) (0.12) (0.09) (0.07)   (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)   (0.15) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 
DUM1 4.65×10
-4*** 1.08×10-4** 3.45×10-5** 8.34×10-5***   1.56×10-4*** 7.58×10-5*** 7.13×10-5*** 4.32×10-5**   3.08×10-4*** 3.26×10-5 -3.63×10-5*** 1.47×10-5 
  (1.15×10
-4) (4.48×10-5) (1.70×10-5) (2.69×10-5)   (4.88×10-5) (1.96×10-5) (7.04×10-6) (1.82×10-5)   (1.04×10-4) (4.78×10-5) (1.55×10-5) (2.73×10-5) 
DUM2 7.12×10
-5** 6.33×10-5*** 4.58×10-6 2.49×10-5***   4.87×10-5** 1.91×10-5** 1.7×10-5*** 1.81×10-5**   2.20×10-5 4.41×10-5*** -1.18×10-5*** 5.89×10-6 
  (2.87×10
-5) (1.12×10-5) (6.41×10-6) (9.30×10-6)   (2.25×10-5) (8.12×10-6) (5.03×10-6) (8.22×10-6)   (1.68×10-5) (8.63×10-6) (3.91×10-6) (6.12×10-6) 
DUM3 1.06×10
-4*** 2.84×10-5** 1.16×10-5 9.87×10-6   6.88×10-5*** 1.14×10-5 3.68×10-6 -1.12×10-5   3.71×10-5** 1.72×10-5* 7.89×10-6 4.32×10-6 
  (3.05×10
-5) (1.37×10-5) (7.84×10-6) (1.11×10-5)   (2.58×10-5) (1.02×10-5) (6.25×10-6) (1.44×10-5)   (1.72×10-5) (9.77×10-6) (5.16×10-6) (5.08×10-6) 
Constant -3.76×10
-4 -5.08×10-4*** 4.33×10-5 2.07×10-4**   -4.89×10-5 1.07×10-5 1.84×10-4 2.36×10-4***   -3.26×10-4 -5.19×10-4*** -1.54×10-4*** -1.89×10-5 
  (3.27×10
-4) (1.46×10-4) (5.44×10-5) (9.81×10-5)   (1.61×10-4) (6.47×10-5) (2.23×10-4) (6.50×10-5)   (2.83×10-4) (1.37×10-4) (5.00×10-5) (9.95×10-5) 
Observations 15,605 35,665 100,467 54,251   15,605 35,665 100,467 54,251   15,605 35,665 100,467 54,251 
R-squared 1.26% 0.31% 0.70% 2.32%   1.53% 3.83% 3.12% 3.75%   3.26% 2.11% 3.24% 8.41% 




















Stock Transparency and Incorporation of Private Information via Sale Block Trading in FTSE 100 Stocks 
The relationship between informed trading and sale block trading in FTSE 100 stocks with varying levels of stock transparency is estimated using the following model: 
  3112101987654321 ||Relnln DUMDUMDUMOIBBASMomentumturnMarketTurnoverVolatilitySizePINimpactPirce  
Price impact corresponds to permanent, temporary or total price impact. PIN is the probability of an informed trade. LnSize is the natural logarithm of the number of shares per 
trade; volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns on the trading day before the block trade takes place; lnTurnover is the natural logarithm of the total stock turnover on 
the trading day prior to the block trade; OIB represents the order imbalance; BAS is the bid-ask spread at the time of the block trade; Market return is the daily FTSE100 return 
on the day of the block trade. Momentum is the cumulative return of the stock in the five days preceding the block trade. DUM1 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 
8:00 and 9:00; DUM2 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 9:00 and 15:30; DUM3 takes the value of 1 if the trade occurs between 15:30 and 16:00. Standard errors 
are presented in parentheses. PIN estimates are used as proxies for stocks’ levels of transparency; on this basis, stocks are partitioned into transparency quartiles/portfolios. The 
highest (lowest) PIN stocks are designated as Portfolio 1 (4) stocks. Panels A, B and C present results for when permanent price impact, temporary price impact and total price 
impact are employed as dependent variables respectively. ***, ** and * correspond to statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively.  
     



















  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
PIN -4.04×10
-5 8.14×10-5 2.71×10-5 9.52×10-5   3.48×10-4 -7.24×10-4*** -7.84×10-4*** 8.60×10-4***   3.87×10-4 7.89×10-4 7.96×10-4*** -7.60×10-4*** 
  (1.97×10
-4) (1.42×10-4) (7.45×10-5) (1.01×10-4)   (2.74×10-4) (2.19×10-4) (1.18×10-4) (1.73×10-4)   (2.84×10-4) (2.30×10-4) (1.28×10-4) (1.71×10-4) 
Ln(size) 1.74×10
-5** 2.93×10-6 1.31×10-5*** -1.33×10-6   1.97×10-5* -1.69×10-6 -6.64×10-8 1.47×10-6   2.07×10-6 4.56×10-6 1.31×10--4*** -2.74×10-6 
  (7.70×10
-6) (5.09×10-6) (2.28×10-6) (4.94×10-6)   (1.07×10-5) (7.30×10-6) (4.37×10-6) (6.15×10-6)   (1.11×10-5) (8.00×10-6) (4.62×10-6) (6.86×10-6) 
Volatility 8.36×10
-4 7.96×10-5 -1.13×10-4 1.12×10-3*   2.20×10-3 -1.54×10-3* 3.14×10-3*** 3.96×10-3***   -1.32×10-3 1.59×10-3** -3.20×10-3*** -2.74×10-3 
  (2.45×10
-3) (6.74×10-4) (3.62×10-4) (6.64×10-4)   (4.90×10-3) (8.30×10-4) (1.09×10-3) (1.79×10-3)   (5.06×10-3) (7.08×10-4) (1.04×10-3) (1.77×10-3) 
Ln(turnover) -4.38×10
-5** 1.36×10-5 -2.27×10-5*** -5.34×10-6   9.52×10-6 4.01×10-5** -1.32×10-5* 1.53×10-4***   -3.45×10-5 -2.60×10-5 -9.32×10-6 -1.55×10-4*** 
  (2.05×10
-5) (1.51×10-5) (4.01×10-6) (1.27×10-5)   (2.85×10-5) (1.83×10-4) (7.49×10-6) (1.44×10-5)   (2.95×10-5) (2.17×10-5) (7.59×10-6) (1.70×10-5) 
Market Return 1.57×10-3 -1.24×10-3 1.56×10-5 -1.93×10-4   6.84×10-3*** 8.30×10-3*** 5.41×10-3*** 2.76×10-3**   5.14×10-3 -9.35×10-2*** -5.23×10-3*** -2.79×10-3** 
(1.62×10-3) (9.86×10-4) (4.06×10-4) (6.09×10-4)   (2.25×10-3) (1.63×10-3) (9.43×10-4) (1.26×10-3)   (2.33×10-3) (1.70×10-3) (9.12×10-4) (1.26×10-3) 
Momentum 5.76×10
-5 4.45×10-5 2.23×10-5 9.19×10-5***   6.25×10-6 1.04×10-4** 1.88×10-5 1.12×10-4**   5.03×10-5 -5.72×10-5 4.36×10-6 -1.98×10-5 
  (3.93×10
-4) (3.71×10-5) (2.12×10-5) (2.85×10-5)   (5.47×10-5) (5.17×10-5) (1.94×10-5) (4.93×10-5)   (5.66×10-5) (5.21×10-5) (2.42×10-5) (5.02×10-5) 
OIB 2.70×10
-3** -7.80×10-5 1.05×10-4** -6.49×10-5   -4.37×10-5 1.71×10-4 -2.58×10-4*** -8.69×10-4***   3.13×10-4 -2.48×10-4 3.58×10-4*** 7.93×10-4*** 
  (1.54×10
-4) (9.52×10-5) (5.26×10-5) (8.44×10-5)   (2.03×10-4) (1.56×10-4) (1.11×10-4) (1.27×10-4)   (2.10×10-4) (1.65×10-4) (1.14×10-4) (1.33×10-5) 
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BAS -0.56*** -0.24*** -0.45*** 0.06   0.81*** 1.03*** 1.27*** 0.93***   -1.36*** -1.27*** -1.71*** -0.86*** 
  (0.04) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13)   (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)   (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
DUM1 8.07×10
-6 -1.75×10-4*** -3.67×10-5*** -1.00×10-4***   1.34×10-5 -4.65×10-5 -4.08×10-4*** -1.32×10-4***   1.34×10-5 -1.29×10-4** 3.67×10-4*** 7.10×10-5* 
  (5.66×10
-5) (3.84×10-5) (1.71×10-5) (3.53×10-5)   (7.89×10-5) (4.44×10-5) (2.36×10-5) (3.47×10-5)   (7.41×10-5) (5.04×10-5) (2.65×10-5) (4.23×10-5) 
DUM2 
2.32×10-5 -4.43×10-5*** -1.68×10-4*** -4.65×10-5***   1.53×10-6*** 2.31×10-5 -1.81×10-4*** 4.83×10-5*   1.21×10-5 -6.66×10-4** 1.64×10-4*** 1.81×10-6 
  (4.45×10
-5) (1.38×10-5) (6.65×10-6) (1.26×10-5)   (5.04×10-5) (3.06×10-5) (2.12×10-5) (2.64×10-5)   (4.98×10-5) (2.85×10-5) (2.06×10-5) (2.48×10-5) 
DUM3 -1.13×10
-5 -3.41×10-5*** -2.38×10-5*** -3.69×10-5***   -1.52×10-4 -1.10×10-6 -2.20×10-4*** -9.66×10-5***   1.40×10-4*** -3.32×10-5 1.93×10-4*** 5.95×10-5* 
  (2.89×10
-5) (1.54×10-5) (8.27×10-6) (1.24×10-5)   (6.25×10-5) (4.25×10-5) (2.77×10-5) (3.68×10-5)   (6.03×10-5) (3.69×10-5) (2.62×10-5) (3.46×10-5) 
Constant 5.24×10
-4** -3.14×10-5 -3.30×10-4*** -1.85×10-4   -3.56×10-4 5.72×10-4*** 3.79×10-4*** 1.38×10-3***   5.33×10-4** -5.29×10-4** -6.98×10-4*** -1.53×10-3*** 
  (2.12×10
-4) (1.57×10-4) (5.53×10-5) (1.25×10-4)   (3.01×10-4) (1.96×10-4) (8.87×10-5) (1.62×10-4)   (2.12×10-4) (2.27×10-4) (8.74×10-5) (1.80×10-4) 
Observations 17,375 38,831 118,872 71,789   17,375 38,831 118,872 71,789   17,375 38,831 118,872 71,789 
R-squared 1.50% 0.43% 0.59% 0.08%   1.64% 1.34% 1.06% 2.46%   3.98% 1.97% 1.62% 2.09% 










3.4. Conclusion   
Previous informed trading studies mainly focus their investigations on corporate 
events and insider trading activities. I expand the trading data to encompass the entire 
regular trading hours on the London Stock Exchange and also to focus on an implicit 
view of informed trading as trading, which is induced by any information not available 
to the general public. My results show that the number of informed trades is positively 
related with the number of block trades. The positive (negative) relation between PIN 
estimates, and the permanent price impact of block purchases (sales), suggests that 
there exists an impounding of private information via block trading on the LSE. My 
main research question relates to how the level of trading opacity in a stock affects the 
incorporation of information through block trading. The evidence I present on the role 
of stock trading transparency on the information incorporation process suggests that 
firms with low trading transparency exhibit stronger effects for private information 
incorporation when compared with those with a high level of trading transparency. 
 
Overall, I support previously held views that informed trading plays a positive role in 
facilitating the price discovery process through trading in the direction of permanent 
price impact for both purchase and sale block trades. This finding is consistent with 
two streams of existing literature: insider trading (see for example John and Lang, 
1991) and high-frequency trading (see for example Brogaard et al., 2014). Further 
contributions made in this chapter include new insights on the intraday and inter-day 
dynamics of the private information incorporation process. First, I show that 
impounding of private information into stock prices on the LSE is mostly aggressively 
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propagated during the first hour of trading. This pattern is consistent with evidence 
from Ibikunle (2015a), as well as with Dufour and Engle (2000), that more informed 
trades are executed during the highly liquid and informational periods (see also 
Chordia et al., 2008). However, despite the seemingly rapid private information usage 
during the trading day, traders also appear to withhold private information longer than 
a trading day window, such that trading positions are adjusted based on a previous 
day’s private information. I document a linear relationship between the lag PIN 
variable and the logarithmic of change of number of block trades, which indicates that 
informed traders adjust their block positions based on historical private information. 
The combination of intraday and inter-day patterns provides empirical support to 
previous theoretical work (see for example Foster and Viswanathan, 1994, Hong et al., 
2000, Hong and Stein, 1999, Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992, Kyle, 1985, Lin and 
Rozeff, 1995) that suggests that informed traders gradually exploit private information 


















Over the past decade, developed markets in Europe and the US have seen an 
unprecedented proliferation of new (high-tech) trading venues. As newer venues 
acquire trading volume at the expense of national stock exchanges, markets become 
even more fragmented at regional and national levels. Observed changes in the 
markets mainly follow recent regulatory shifts in both Europe and the US. The 
enactment of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in 2007, and 
technological advances in trading systems, for example, have led to an unprecedented 
increase in the number of trading venues in Europe. The expansion of the trading field 
in turn has accelerated trading fragmentation, with possible further implications for 
price discovery and market quality. Expectedly, trading fragmentation has raised 
concerns about whether the diversified market landscape could harm price 
transparency in the markets. This concern has basis in the microstructure literature. A 
stream of theoretical literature (see as examples Mendelson, 1987, Cohen et al., 1982, 
Pagano, 1989) suggests that, in order to maximise market quality, all buyers and sellers 
should be congregated in one consolidated market, and all trades in all listed securities 
should occur in a single exchange. This is because operating single national exchanges 
yields lower trading costs when compared to a fragmented marketplace. Furthermore, 
consolidation of the order flow creates economies of scale for liquidity provision. 
Cohen et al. (1982) show that, due to rising bid-ask spreads and price volatility, off-
exchange trading benefits brokers while harming retail investors. The study also 
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suggests that there is a lower probability of order fulfilment in a fragmented market. 
Consistent with the previous studies, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) argue that liquidity 
may suffer from fragmentation due to information asymmetry. Their findings indicate 
that adverse selection costs increase with the number of market listings of an asset. 
Recent studies, however, argue that concerns about the negative impact of trading 
fragmentation may have been largely unfounded. For example, O’Hara and Ye (2011) 
find that market fragmentation in US equity markets has not necessarily led to the loss 
of pricing process quality; their analysis presents the US equity trading venues as a 
single virtual market, with the trading venues serving as multiple entry points. This is 
a reasonable interpretation given that the US market regulation regime guarantees a 
best execution price irrespective of the exchange to which an order is submitted. The 
regime in Europe offers no such guarantee.  
 
In this chapter, I present first order evidence on whether or not market fragmentation 
induces adverse selection costs, reduced transparency and informational inefficiency 
in the aggregate market. Thus, I advance the understanding of the impact of market 
fragmentation on market quality. Firstly, using a sample of FTSE 100 stocks between 
2004 and 2014, I investigate the effect of trading fragmentation on the evolution of 
two market quality measures – adverse selection costs and market transparency. My 
sample allows us to have a complete picture of the global depth available in the market 
as I collect intraday tick data from the four main FTSE 100 stock trading venues – the 
LSE, BATS Europe, Chi-X Europe and Turquoise. The four venues cover more than 
95% of the daily trading volume on FTSE 100 stocks during the period under 
investigation. Secondly, I examine the association between market efficiency and the 
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level of trading fragmentation over the same period. My analysis differs from recent 
papers, which examine the impact of fragmentation on market quality in that I focus 
on transparency and use short-horizon return predictability as an inverse proxy for 
market efficiency – aspects of trading quality – fragmentation nexus yet to be 
investigated in the reported literature. Perhaps more importantly, my empirical design 
allows for measuring aggregate market impact of fragmentation on trading quality 
over a long time period. Similar studies such as Chordia et al. (2008, 2011) underscore 
the need to examine market trends over time. Therefore, I employ the longest data 
time series ever used to investigate the impact of market fragmentation on trading in 
financial markets, allowing us to control for different time trends and trading 
conditions. By comparison, Riordan et al. (2011), Gresse (2017), O'Hara and Ye 
(2011), Spankowski et al. (2012) use 29-day, 4-month, 6-month and 12-month time 
series with stock samples mostly smaller than mine. My analysis is conducted on an 
aggregate market by creating a consolidated order book featuring order flow and 
transactions from the exchanges making up the London market for FTSE 100 stocks. 
Being able to examine the evolution is key to understanding how financial markets 
develop over time and in relation to contemporaneous events. Thus, for the first time, 
I can assess the impact of fragmentation on the aggregate market for trading Europe’s 
highest volume stocks.   
I find a quadratic relationship between fragmentation and adverse selection risk. On 
the one hand, visible fragmentation helps to both reduce adverse selection costs and 
increase market transparency at low levels of fragmentation.  On the other hand, 
however, when fragmentation is high, the implied adverse selection cost and market 
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opacity potentially increase with the level of fragmentation. The negative impact of 
fragmentation on transparency is very limited, since historical levels of fragmentation 
are generally smaller than the turning point calculated in this study. I also find that 
fragmentation can facilitate market efficiency by reducing short-term arbitrage 
opportunities. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that visible fragmentation 
forces liquidity suppliers to disclose trading information and reduce fees (see also 
O'Hara and Ye, 2011, Degryse et al., 2015).4 
Boneva et al. (2015) also examine fragmentation on FTSE 100 stocks but my work 
differs from theirs in three respects. Firstly, they examine the impact of fragmentation 
on market quality measured by volatility, liquidity and volume, whereas I investigate 
its impact on market transparency and adverse selection costs/risk. Secondly, as well 
as other related works on European equity markets’ fragmentation (for instance, 
Riordan et al., 2011, Spankowski et al., 2012, Gresse, 2017), they focus their 
investigation of market quality on the listing market. It should be noted that market 
quality contains several elements, market liquidity, price discovery and pricing 
efficiency. Market transparency is a crucial element of market quality. As defined by 
O’Hara (1995), market transparency is “the ability of market participants to observe 
the information in trading process.” A transparent market tends to be more liquid 
because all investors get equal access to the information and reach an agreement on a 
fair price. By contrast, in an opaque market, traders are less willing to take the liquidity 
because of potential information asymmetry. In this case, market makers ask to be 
                                                     
4 A Securities and Exchange Commission review argues that Degryse et al.’s (2015) sample represents 
a period when market fragmentation had not fully set in in the Dutch mid and large stocks they use. The 
same criticism may hold for the few other papers that investigate market fragmentation with European 
stock samples prior to 2011. 
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compensated by posting a wider spread. Market transparency is an important issue to 
consider under a fragmented trading environment. Since trade-through protection is 
not mandatory across European markets under MiFID I, market access friction gives 
rise to differences in the adverse selection risk faced by liquidity providers. If informed 
traders are more likely than uninformed traders to use “smart routers”, then 
information asymmetry may increase across the European markets.  This is the reason 
why I study market transparency in the MiFID I era. In this chapter I also create a 
consolidated order book for my analysis. The consolidated market environment offers 
a broader view of the market for trading FTSE 100 stocks, and could yield further 
insights. Thirdly, compared with Boneva et al. (2015), who use weekly data of FTSE 
350 from 2008 to 2011, I adopt a much richer dataset. My dataset includes tick-level 
data, and my regression model incorporates stock-day variables of FTSE 100 stocks, 
computed from high-frequency data, over much of the decade from 2004 to 2014. 
Although European market fragmentation is a relatively recent phenomenon, by 
November 2014 more than 150 recently established alternative trading platforms 
known as Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) were in operation around Europe. 
Furthermore, several of these venues successfully challenge the established national 
exchanges for trading market shares, and in 2013 an MTF operator, BATS Chi-X 
Europe (operator of two distinct order books/trading venues – BATS and Chi-X), was 
the largest trading platform for equity trading in Europe. 5  Under MiFID, trading 
                                                     
5 Before 20th May 2013, BATS Chi-X Europe only had a licence to operate MTFs; however, it has 
since been granted Recognised Investment Exchange (RIE) status. BATS Chi-X could now, therefore, 
operate a listing exchange alongside its existing MTF operating business. The data employed in this 
paper covers the period before and after BATS Chi-X was granted RIE status. The trading processes of 
the BATS Chi-X order books/venues employed in this analysis remain essentially the same before and 
after the transition. Enquiries made with BATS Chi-X confirm that their current order books are still 
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volume has become increasingly fragmented, with trades taking place not only on 
primary exchanges and MTFs, but also on various other high tech constructs such as 
Broker Crossing Networks (BCNs) and Systematic Internalisers (SIs). Some of these 
venues are also dark, that is, they offer no pre-trade transparency. This development 
has thus created a very competitive trading environment for platform operators across 
Europe. The competition among trading venues is expected to reduce the power of 
long-established stock exchanges, leading to falling transaction costs and 
enhancement of trading-related technological innovation. The emergence of high-tech 
entrant venues ultimately means that exchange operators now compete in finer inter-
connected markets. 
Competition between trading venues can improve market quality (Foucault and 
Menkveld, 2008). Recent literature has attempted to investigate the impact of 
fragmentation based on empirical evidence from market depth, liquidity and 
transaction costs (for example see O'Hara and Ye, 2011, Boneva et al., 2015, Gresse, 
2017). These papers provide evidence of positive effects of fragmentation on market 
quality. However, with the rise of alternative trading venues, fragmentation also 
increases the costs for monitoring markets in real-time. Such costs relate to acquisition 
and management of the technology required to do so. There is also a significant 
concern that trading fragmentation could be harming market quality by increasing 
                                                     
the same as when BATS Chi-X could only operate MTFs; thus those books are still classic MTFs. 
Furthermore, achieving the RIE status was only expected to advance BATS Chi-X’s fortunes with retail 
investors. As at June 2015, BATS Trading Limited was still listed on the CESR MiFID database as an 
MTF. Robustness analysis conducted in this paper suggests that my results are unaffected by the 
granting of the RIE status to BATS Chi-X Europe. 
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monitoring (search) costs, reducing transparency, and increasing adverse selection risk 
(Madhavan, 1995, Yin, 2005, Hoffmann, 2010). 
Furthermore, since MiFID does not formally mandate linkage between trading venues 
and the release of consolidated quote information on a national basis, orders could be 
permitted to execute at a price that is inferior to the best available price across venues. 
This differs considerably from the rules in the United States under the Regulation 
National Market System (Reg NMS), which mandates exchanges to re-route orders to 
other venues if those offer a better price (trade-throughs). Under MiFID the primary 
exchange is typically accessible to all investors, while simultaneous access to multiple 
venues (including MTFs) would normally require the so-called Smart Order Routing 
System (SORT). SORT is only available to institutional and professional investors. 
Although retail investors may be unable to access multiple venues at once, they are 
still able to trade at individual venues in real time. 
This lack of trade through protections led O'Hara and Ye (2011, p.472) to remark that 
“it is hard to see how a single virtual market can emerge in Europe”. Additionally, 
Ende and Lutat (2010) document a sizeable trading cost under sub-optimal order 
executions due to the absence of a trade-through rule. Possible trading frictions in 
accessing MTFs and other newer venues can give rise to inter-market differences in 
the adverse selection risk faced, and to non-transparency by liquidity providers. If 
informed traders are more likely than uninformed traders to be “smart routers”, 
informed traders could also split orders across venues, routing their trades to venues 
with higher levels of uninformed traders and liquidity, and therefore increase the 
adverse selection cost faced by uninformed traders. The lack of trade-through 
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protection in Europe could therefore be a source of adverse selection risk (Hoffmann, 
2010).  
A further question to ponder is whether trading fragmentation impairs market 
efficiency. In a high-frequency world, informed algorithmic and high-frequency 
traders prefer to trade across high-tech markets (in Europe these are mainly MTF-type 
platforms), presumably because they value the higher speed of execution and try to 
prevent information leakage (Hoffmann, 2010). Informed order flow is conditionally 
and positively autocorrelated and can give an indication of instrument return during 
short-term intervals (Froot et al., 2001). According to Madhavan (1995) and 
Nimalendran and Ray (2014), experienced traders are able to profit from market 
inefficiency and obtain better execution through dynamic trading in fragmented 
markets. Their trading strategies include short-term fundamental information (for 
example, imminent earnings release) and short-term technical analysis (for example 
front-running strategies and short-term momentum strategies). There is a concern that 
these experienced traders can locate potential arbitrage opportunities, since quotes 
across regulated markets and MTFs are not closely linked due to the absence of trade-
through protection. However, MiFID’s transparency regime mandates MTFs to 
disclose trade-related information as close to real time as possible. I hypothesise that 
if this transparency regime does disclose sufficient trading information content, then 
with a high level of trading fragmentation, information on MTFs can spread to other 
venues. In this case, liquidity providers could adjust quotes against informed traders, 
decreasing arbitrage opportunity and short-term profitability for informed traders. 
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Theoretically, this development improves market quality if trading information is 
released in a timely manner. 
Consistent with the foregoing, this study focuses on how trading fragmentation affects 
consolidated market quality for all market participants in related trading venues. 
Specifically, I investigate the impact of fragmentation on measures of market 
transparency and efficiency for FTSE 100 stocks over a ten year period. Included in 
my sample are orders executed on the primary market LSE, as well as those executed 
on the three largest MTFs: BATS, Chi-X and Turquoise. Together, these platforms 
consistently account for more than 90% of trading volume of FTSE 100 stocks. Thus, 
the sample is representative of the London market, since FTSE 100 stocks account for 
more than 80% of capitalisation of the market (see Ibikunle, 2015a). As high entrant 
markets are attracting increasing trading volumes, focus on just the primary exchange 
(in this case, the LSE) cannot provide a full picture of the market.6 I therefore construct 
a ‘global’ order book by concatenating all trades from four venues. Global measures 
are not only relevant to investors who are restricted to trading on the primary exchange, 
but also to professional traders who use Smart Order Routing Technologies (SORTs). 
I first investigate the relationship between visible fragmentation and market 
transparency. Market transparency can be considered as an inverse proxy of the levels 
of adverse selection cost and information asymmetry. Probability of information-
based trading (PIN) (Easley et al., 1996b, Easley et al., 1997a) is employed here to 
                                                     
6 Gomber, P., Pujol, G. & Wranik, A. 2012. Best Execution Implementation and Broker Policies in 
Fragmentated European Equity Markets. International Review of Business Research Papers, 8, 144-




measure adverse selection risk, since they are positively and strongly correlated 
(Chung and Li, 2003). For robustness, I also use the absolute value of 60-second mid-
quote return autocorrelation as another measure of adverse selection risk. Furthermore, 
since past studies indicate that off-exchange trading impacts market quality,7 I also 
test the effects of off-exchange trading on market transparency. I address the likely 
endogeneity of adverse selection by applying the instrumental variable approach (IV). 
My results are robust to different sets of instruments (IVs) and non-IV estimations. 
Our study adds to the existing literature on market quality. A stream of literature shows 
that trading fragmentation benefits market quality through increased liquidity and 
market depth. Foucault and Menkveld (2008) investigate the competition between the 
LSE and Euronext in the Dutch stock market, where before EuroSETS’s entry, trading 
volume in the Dutch market was largely concentrated in NSC, a limit order book 
operated by Euronext. Foucault and Menkveld (2008) find that both the consolidated 
order book and the primary exchange NSC become significantly deeper after 
EuroSETS’s entry. Hengelbrock and Theissen (2009) also examine the entry of 
Turquoise in 2008 in 14 European countries. Their findings suggest quoted bid-ask 
spreads on regulated markets decline following the entry. 
Based on a sample of stocks trading on the LSE and Euronext, Gresse (2017) finds 
that increased competition between trading venues is accompanied by a high liquidity 
provision. Menkveld (2013) examines high-frequency trading activity in Dutch stocks 
on Chi-X. The results indicate that, firstly, high frequency traders benefit from Chi-
                                                     




X’s trading platform in terms of lower trading costs. Secondly, the level of market 
fragmentation is determined by the intensity of HFT, because HFTs are likely to 
spread orders across markets or to supply liquidity for MTFs. Boneva et al. (2015) 
employ a panel regression analysis of a weekly interval dataset in studying the impact 
of fragmentation on the market quality of the LSE. Their market quality metrics 
include volatility, liquidity and market depth. They find lower volatility on the LSE 
when there is order flow competition between MTFs. Their results also suggest that 
visible fragmentation reduces market depth on the LSE, whilst dark trading increases 
the global trading volume. Degryse et al. (2015) also find a positive impact of visible 
fragmentation on consolidated liquidity, but a negative impact on the liquidity of the 
primary exchange. Gresse (2017) tests the impact of fragmentation on local liquidity 
(primary exchange liquidity) and global liquidity of FTSE 100 constituents, CAC 40 
constituents, and medium capitalisation stocks of the SBF 80 index, before and after 
the implementation of MiFID. The results show that the introduction of MiFID could 
be linked to value-adding competition; however, large cap stocks benefit from 
fragmentation more than small cap stocks. Gresse's (2017) study suggests that the 
introduction of MiFID improves market quality on the LSE and for Euronext-listed 
equities through a reduction in transaction costs.  
In contrast to Europe, trading fragmentation is not a new phenomenon in the US 
market. Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), which are similar to European 
MTFs, have been a critical part of the US market infrastructure since the early 1990s, 
and thus the US evidence on fragmented markets is more extensive. Boehmer and 
Boehmer (2003) show evidence of increased liquidity when NYSE started to facilitate 
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trading in ETFs listed on the American Stock Exchange. O'Hara and Ye (2011) also 
show that, although fragmented stocks generate higher short-term volatility, prices 
appear to be more efficient. Furthermore, fragmentation benefits market quality in 
terms of increased liquidity and reduced trading cost. Other studies, however, suggest 
an opposite effect of trading fragmentation. For example, Madhavan (2012) finds that 
the more fragmented stocks were disproportionately affected by the ‘Flash Crash’ of 
6 May 2010. He suggests that both volume fragmentation and quote fragmentation are 
important in explaining the propagation of the crash. Overall, empirical evidence on 
the impact of fragmentation is inconclusive, and mixed across international markets. 
Fragmentation can have both positive and negative effects on market quality, however 
existing studies suggest that the positive effects outweigh the negatives. 
Our study is also related to a stream of literature, which examines adverse selection 
and informed trading across electronic markets. Grammig et al. (2001) and Barclay et 
al. (2003) demonstrate that order flow in electronic markets tends to be more 
informative, presumably because informed traders value the higher speed and low cost 
offered by these venues. Hoffmann (2010) examines a sample of French and German 
stocks trading on both primary markets and the entrant Chi-X. Results suggest that 
Chi-X carries more private information than the primary exchange. The primary 
exchange offers better quotes but also incurs higher transaction fees. These findings 
are consistent with Ibikunle (2015c), who shows that Europe’s largest high-tech 
entrant market, BATS Chi-X Europe, leads LSE in the price discovery process for 
LSE-listed stocks by attracting a greater proportion of informed traders in those stocks. 
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The remainder of this chapter is arranged as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the sample 
selection and descriptive statistics. Section 3 summarises the methodology, and 
Section 4 reports and discusses my findings of fragmentation on adverse selection cost 
and market transparency. Section 5 looks into the effect of fragmentation on market 
efficiency, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
4.2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
4.2.1. Data 
I focus on constituents of FTSE 100 stocks, which are composed of the 100 largest 
British firms listed on the LSE. These firms historically account for about 80% of total 
market capitalisation on the LSE. All FTSE 100 stocks are traded at several venues, 
and my dataset consists of data from the four main venues where these stocks are 
traded – the LSE, BATS Europe, Chi-X Europe and Turquoise. The total trading 
volume from these four trading venues accounted for about 98% of the FTSE 100 lit 
trading value in 2014.  I obtain intraday tick data from the Thomson Reuters Tick 
History (TRTH) database. My sample dataset covers the period from 1 January 2004 
to 30 September 2014. For each year, I only keep the stocks that are consistently part 
of the FTSE 100 index; i.e. those that have not been affected by the FTSE quarterly 
index revisions8. The dataset includes variables such as the Reuters Identification 
                                                     
8 It is very common to filter out the stocks that are dropped from the index composition. For example, Gresse (2015) 
studies how lit and dark fragmentation affects market liquidity. After removing the stocks that are not consistently 
in the index, she has only 51 stocks in the FTSE 100 index. Similarly, Degryrse (2015) applies this filter to maintain 
consistency in the index composition. O’Hara and Ye (2011) filter out sample stocks with low trading activity and 




Code (RIC), date, timestamp, price, volume, bid price, ask price, bid volume and ask 
volume. Each trade is allocated corresponding prevailing best bid and ask quotes. 
Since I only focus on normal trading hours, I delete the opening auction (07:50hrs – 
08:00hrs) and closing auction (16:30hrs – 16:35hrs) periods from the dataset. Cleaning 
and merging of the order book data from the four venues yields a consolidated dataset 
comprising of roughly 1.54 billion trades, with a total trading value worth 14.29 
trillion British Pounds Sterling. While a dataset in excess of 10 years allows us to 
observe the evolution of fragmentation, for most of my analysis, I only employ data 
for periods when data shows that trading fragmentation has fully set into the market. 
Thus, my regression analysis incorporates data for the seven-year period spanning 
2008 to 2014. This time series is the longest used to investigate the impact of 
fragmentation on market quality in the literature.  
 
4.2.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics for the stock characteristics and trading activity. 
The mean value of the effective spread is 0.83 pence; however, there is a huge gap 
between the third and first quartiles of the liquidity proxy. The mean is also much 
higher than the median value. These observations suggest an appreciable level of 
variation across stocks. The daily pound volume and daily trades’ variables also 
display similar levels of variation across the quartiles.  
Table 4.2 reports correlations between the key trading variables employed in my 
empirical analysis. It is not surprising to see that daily pound volume is positively 
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related to the number of transactions and median value of trading size.  Moreover, 
daily pound volume is negatively correlated with volatility, algorithm trading 
activities and effective spread. This is consistent with the argument that liquid stocks 





Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports means, standard deviations, and quartile points (25%, Median, 75%) of variables calculated at the stock-day level. Effective spread equals twice the absolute 
value of the difference between the execution price and prevailing midpoint at execution. Volatility is the intraday standard deviation of trade-by-trade returns. Total Daily 
Pound Volume is the sum value of daily total pound volume traded of stock i on day t. Total Daily Trades is the daily aggregated value of number of trades of stock i on day t, 
while Trade size is the average pound value per trade on day t. The sample comprises the FTSE100 stocks from 1 January 2004 to 30 September 2014 
 
      Mean   Std.dev   Min 25%   Median   75%   Max 
Stock characteristics                         
  Effective spread 0.0083   0.0118   7.61E-05 0.0025   0.0063   0.0115   2.71 
  Algorithm Trading 0.0066   0.0145   0.0000 0.0025   0.0043   0.0072   1.71 
  Volatility   0.0070   0.0891   0.0001 0.0003   0.0004   0.0005   1.68 
                              
Volumes and Trades                         
  Total Pound Volume 2.160E+08   4.210E+08   1.27E+05 1.900E+07   4.000E+07   1.220E+08   2.72E+09 
  Total Trades (Counts) 8428.43   8300.54   26.00 3503.00   5805.00   9966.00   1.43E+05 










Table 4.2. Correlations matrix for independent variables 
This table reports correlations between key trading variables. Log(PoundVolume) is the log of total daily pound-volume traded in stock i; Log(TradeCount) is the log of total 
number of transactions of stock i on day t; Log(Tradesize) is the log of median of daily trade size of stock i on day t; Volatility is the daily standard deviation of the trade-by-
trade return of stock i on day t; EBAS is average effective bid-ask spread of stock i on day t. Finally, Algo controls for the algorithm trading activity, and equals the total number 
of quote changes over pound volume of stock i on day t. P-values are presented in parentheses.  
  Log(Pound Volume) Log(TradeCount) Log(TradeSize) Volatility EBAS Algo 
Log(Pound Volume) 1.000 0.577 0.854 -0.069 -0.014 -0.315 
    (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
              
Log(TradeCount) 0.577 1.000 0.185 0.033 -0.120 -0.230 
  (<.0001)   (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
              
Log(TradeSize) 0.854 0.185 1.000 -0.179 0.049 -0.223 
  (<.0001) (<.0001)   (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
              
Volatility -0.069 0.033 -0.179 1.000 0.001 0.003 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)   (0.767) (0.338) 
              
EBAS -0.014 -0.120 0.049 0.001 1.000 0.005 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.767)   (0.053) 
              
Algo -0.315 -0.230 -0.223 0.003 0.005 1.000 
















LSE CHIX BATS Turquoise
 
Figure 4.1. Percentage share of trading volume by venue 
The figure displays the percentage total monthly trading volume in the primary market, LSE, and the three other trading venues, BATS Europe, Chi-X Europe and Turquoise, 
















Table 4.2 also indicates that the number of trades is positively associated with 
volatility, and negatively associated with the effective spread. Thus when there is a 
higher number of transactions, I would expect to see narrower spreads, leading to a 
higher level of liquidity and a lower level of adverse selection. 
Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of monthly traded pound volume of four trading 
venues since the introduction of MiFID. Clearly, BATS, Chi-X and Turquoise have 
been attracting significant market shares from the LSE since around the start of the 
year 2008.  
In November 2011 the three MTFs attracted a combined market share of 50%, but all 
have since struggled to retain or outperform that threshold over time. Figure 4.2 plots 
the total monthly number of trades across the four trading venues since 2004. Prior to 
the introduction of MiFID the number of trades on the LSE shows an upward trajectory, 
from January 2004 to 2007. Following the introduction of MiFID, the three high-tech 
entrants gradually stymied the rise in aggregate LSE trading figures, although the LSE 
still retains trading dominance. Figure 4.3 shows the effective bid ask spread (EBAS) 
from January 2004 to September 2014. Before the introduction of MTFs, the average 
EBAS tends to be above 0.75 pence. Although there is a spike after the introduction 
of MTF trading, EBAS quickly falls to – and has since remained below – 0.75 pence. 
The declining EBAS suggests that consolidated market liquidity is improving, and 











































































































































































































LSE CHIX BATS Turquoise Pre-MiFID
 
 
Figure 4.2. Total number of trades by venue before and after the implementation of MiFID 
The figure displays the total monthly number of trades across days and stocks before and after the implementation of MiFID from January 2004 to September 2014. The 
















Figure 4.3. Effective bid ask spread by venue 
The figure displays the monthly average effective bid-ask spread across days and stocks before and after the implementation of MiFID from January 2004 to September 2014. 
Effective bid-ask spread equates to twice the absolute value of the difference between the execution price and prevailing midpoint at execution. The average values of 
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4.3. Measures of Information Asymmetry and Fragmentation 
4.3.1. PIN, an inverse proxy for market transparency 
I adopt the private information-based trading (PIN) measure as a proxy of adverse 
selection cost, since the theory that PIN is strongly correlated with adverse selection 
risk and information asymmetry is well documented and established in the literature 
(see for example Chung and Li, 2003, Brown et al., 2009). PIN has been applied as a 
proxy for priced information risk and information asymmetry in both finance and 
accounting literatures (see for example Vega, 2006, Ellul and Pagano, 2006, Duarte et 
al., 2008, Chung and Li, 2003). In a more recent study, Lai et al. (2014) examine PIN 
measures based on a sample of 30,095 firms from 47 countries over a 15-year period. 
They find that PIN is strongly correlated with firm-level private information. 
 
Following existing literature, I therefore employ daily PIN as a measure of daily 
information asymmetry and an inverse proxy of daily levels of market transparency. 
The model as specified is based on the expectation that trading between informed 
traders, liquidity traders and market makers occurs repeatedly throughout the day. 
Trading begins with the informed traders acquiring a private signal on a stock’s value 
with a probability of α. Contingent on the arrival of a private signal, bad news will 
arrive with a probability of δ, and good news arrives with a probability of (1 – δ). The 
market makers compute their bid and ask prices, with orders arriving from liquidity 
traders at the arrival rate ε. Should new private information become available, 
informed traders will join the trading process, with their orders arriving at the rate μ. 
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Informed traders will thus execute a purchase trade if they receive a good news signal, 
and sell if the signal is bad news. It should be noted that the setting of different arrival 
rates for uninformed buyers and sellers does not qualitatively change estimations of 
the probability that an informed trade has been executed (see Easley et al., 2002). 
The PIN model allows us to compute an approximation of the unobservable 
distribution of trades between informed and uninformed traders by modelling 
purchases and sales9. The ‘normal level’ of sales and purchases executed within a 
stock on a given day over several trading cycles is thus interpreted by the model as 
relatively uninformed trading activity, and this information is employed when 
estimating ε. An unusual volume of purchase or sale transactions is interpreted as 
information-based trading, and employed when computing μ. Furthermore, the 
frequency of intervals during which ‘abnormal’ levels of purchases and sales are 
transacted is employed when computing the values of α and δ. These calculations are 
conducted in a simultaneous fashion by the use of the maximum likelihood estimation 
method. Supposing that the uninformed and informed trades arrive as a Poisson 
distribution, the likelihood function for the PIN model for each interval estimated can 













































              (4.01)              
              
                                                     
9 I infer purchase and sales through the running of Lee and Ready’s Lee, C. M. C. & Ready, M. J. 




where B and S respectively represent the total number of purchase and sale transactions 
for each one hour trading period within each trading day. θ = (α, δ, μ, ε) is the 
parameter vector for the structural model. Equation (4.01) represents a system of 
distributions in which the possible trades are weighted by the probability of a one hour 
trading period with no news (1 – α), a one hour trading period with good news (α (1 – 
δ)), or a one hour trading period with bad news (αδ). Based on the assumption that this 
process occurs independently across the different trading periods, Easley et al. (1997a) 
and Easley et al. (1996b) calculate the parameter vector estimates using maximum 
likelihood estimation procedures. Thus I obtain the parameters for each trading day 
and for each stock in the sample by maximum likelihood estimation. PIN is therefore 
computed as: 
                                                                   (4.02)              
 
4.3.2. Absolute value of autocorrelation in mid-quote return 
In a theoretically perfect efficient market, price is unpredictable and thus follows a 
random walk, ensuring that returns are not correlated. However, in a less efficient 
market scenario, private information being gradually incorporated into price leads to 
a deviation from the random walk, and returns are therefore correlated. Using a 
dynamic price formation model, Kyle (1985) shows that informed traders can 
strategically choose optimal trade sizes in order to maximize their expected profits, 
hence the assumption of a gradual incorporation of private information and of 







by correlated returns, can therefore be viewed as a source of adverse selection risk for 
other market participants. I therefore employ the absolute value of 1-minute mid-quote 
return autocorrelation as a proxy of adverse selection risk. The return autocorrelation 
captured occurs as a result of prices being less than fully informationally efficient. The 
autocorrelation in returns could also be due to under- and over-reaction to information, 
as well as to a delayed response to information (Comerton-Forde and Putniņš, 2015). 
By taking the absolute value of the autocorrelation of 1-minute mid-quote returns for 
each stock-day I capture both under- and over-reaction to new information, with larger 
values implying higher degrees of inefficiency, and vice versa.  
 
4.3.3. Measures of Market Fragmentation 
Visible fragmentation proxies are computed for each stock and for each trading day 
by using the reciprocal of the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI). This index is used 
by Foucault and Menkveld (2008), Chlistalla and Lutat (2009), and Degryse et al. 
(2015), and is calculated as one divided by the sum of the squared market shares (in 
daily traded pound volume terms) of the LSE and the other trading venues for the 
FTSE 100 stocks. The reciprocal of the index explicitly shows the level of 
fragmentation in the London market. The index is expressed as follows:10 
                                                     
10 Equation (4.03), which is effectively defined as 1/HHI, serves as a convex transformation of the HHI. 
This can lead to outliers in the independent variable. Hence, I also compute 1-HH1 as a proxy for market 
fragmentation. The results obtained are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained for 1/HHI; thus, for 



















Frag                                                              (4.03)  
where Vk denotes the pound volume traded on markets k, Vj represents the total pound 




is the market share 
of market k in the aggregate market, i.e. all markets under consideration combined.11 
I also test the degree of off-exchange fragmentation, since some studies suggest that 
high-tech entrant markets generate more informed order flows (see for example 
Grammig et al., 2001, Barclay et al., 2003). This proxy illustrates visible daily 
fragmentation by calculating how much volume is traded via off-exchange venues 
each day, i.e. the three venues in the sample other than the LSE. Equation (4.04) is 







                                  (4.04) 
Literature suggests that uninformed traders could be pressured off exchange to 
alternative trading venues by informed traders (see for example Chowdhry and Nanda, 
1991). Thus, the intensification of informed trading activity could imply a migration 
of trading volumes from the main exchange. Both fragmentation proxies are computed 
for each stock and for each trading day. 
                                                     
11 For ease of exposition, I do not report the subscript for time in Equation (4.03). The index is computed 
daily. Since I have four trading venues in my sample, including the listing exchange, the proxy takes 
values between one and four. When trades are concentrated in one trading venue the proxy takes values 
close to one, and when trades are evenly spread across the four venues, this proxy takes values closer 
to four, the upper bound for the index. 
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Table 4.3 reports the descriptive statistics for Frag, FragEX and PIN. The average Frag 
is about 2.3, and the median is 2.38. This shows that, on average, trading activity is 
not concentrated at a single trading venue; i.e. a substantial proportion of trading takes 
place on platforms other than the LSE in the case of FTSE 100 stocks. Furthermore, 
the mean value of FragEX is about 0.39, indicating that about 61% of traded volumes 
are transacted on the listing exchange, the LSE. The average value of PIN is 0.1787, 
meaning that roughly 17.87% of trades are based on private or superior information in 
my sample. The interquartile range for PIN (0.0961) is also less than one standard 
deviation, suggesting that there is a low level of variation across stocks in relation to 
trading transparency. Figure 4.4 presents a time series graph of the level of Frag and 
FragEX since the implementation of MiFID. It is evident that both Frag and FragEX are 
increasing over time. Frag begins its lift from around 1 in April 2008 and has gradually 
risen over time, recording a maximum value of 3.3 in January 2014. A similar trend is 
also observed for FragEX. All these patterns indicate an increasingly high level of 








Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics: Market fragmentation and PIN 
This table reports means, standard deviations, and quartile points (25%, Median, 75%) of variables 
calculated at the stock-day level. Frag is the overall level of visible fragmentation. This index is 
calculated as one divided by the sum of the squared market shares of LSE and the three other venues, 














FragEX is the off-exchange market fragmentation:
volumeTotalvolumeexchangeOffFragEX -/--  
PIN parameters are computed for each stock and time interval by maximising the following likelihood 
function: 
 
where B and S respectively correspond to the total number of buy and sell orders for the day within 
each trading interval. θ = (α, δ, μ, ε) is the parameter vector for the model. α corresponds to the 
probability of an information event, δ is the conditional probability of a low signal of an information 
event, μ is the arrival rate of informed orders, and ε is the arrival rate of uninformed orders. The 
probability that a trade is informed for each stock and within each interval is then computed as: 
 




charaterics Mean   Std.dev   Min   25%   Median   75%   Max 
                              
  Frag 2.3012   0.6181   1.0000   1.9049   2.3814   2.7428   3.8501 
  FragEX 0.3930   0.1599   0.0000   0.3092   0.4256   0.5145   0.9980 































































Figure 4.4. Daily average level of fragmentation and off-exchange fragmentation 
The figure displays the monthly average overall fragmentation and off-exchange fragmentation from January 2008 to September 2014. Overall fragmentation is computed as 
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4.4. Impact of Fragmentation on Market Transparency 
In this section, I analyse the effect of fragmentation on market transparency. 
4.4.1. Stock Day Panel Regressions  












)()(      
 (4.05)                                                            
where PIN is the probability that a trade is informed, and computed as described in 
Section 3.1. PIN is thus an inverse proxy for market transparency. The proxy for 
visible fragmentation is Frag and is computed as described in Section 3.2. Following 
Degryse et al. (2015) and Boneva et al. (2015), I include a quadratic effect Frag2, since 
there could be a trade-off in the benefits and drawbacks of fragmentation. A series of 
control variables is also included. Log(PoundVolume) is the log of total daily pound 
volume traded in stock i. Log(TradeSize) is the log of median of daily trade size for 
stock i.  Log(TradeCount) is the log of total number of transactions in that day for 
stock i. Volatility is the daily standard deviation of trade-by-trade return of stock i. 
This intraday volatility represents the market risk faced by traders. Algo controls for 
the algorithm trading activity on high-entrant markets, and I follow Hendershott et al. 
(2011) to compute a proxy for this as the total number of quote changes divided by 
pound volume over the trading day t. EBAS is the daily mean effective bid-ask spread. 
It is computed as twice the absolute value of the difference between the execution 
price and the quote midpoint for each trade during the day, and the mean is computed 
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for each day. EBAS captures the liquidity and adverse selection costs faced by market 
makers. Following O'Hara and Ye (2011), I also add the variable  price_inverse, which 
corresponds to one divided by the closing price for stock i on day t. Finally, in order 
to minimise the possibility that the instruments pick up any general trends in dark and 
block trading, I also control for a time trend in the instrumental variable regressions. 
Time depicts the time trend expressed as the log of a linear trending variable starting 
at zero and increasing by one for every date in the sample, and is employed in the IV 
regressions only. A similar proxy is applied by Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015).  
 
4.4.2. Instrumental Variable Approach 
Endogeneity is a concern in my stock-day panel regressions. This is because informed 
traders are more likely to want to trade in lit markets, while uninformed traders would 
go on to trade mainly in off-exchange venues (Zhu, 2014). I overcome this issue by 
employing an instrument variable (IV) approach. I use two different sets of 
instruments for robustness. For the first set of fragmentation instrumental variables I 
follow Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015), Degryse et al. (2015), Buti et al. (2011) 
and Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) to construct the level of fragmentation in a stock-day, 
with the average of fragmentation on that day in all other stocks in the corresponding 
average trading volume size quintile. In my case, the two endogenous variables Frag 
and Frag2 are constructed with the average of each variable over all stocks in the same 
stock size quintile. This IV approach meets the requirement for an instrument, as the 
level of fragmentation in each quintile is correlated with the level of fragmentation in 
the instrumented stock, and it is unlikely that a change in informed trading in stock i 
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causes a large level of fragmentation in other stocks within the same quintile. The 
microstructure studies employs this IV method to remove firm-specific reverse 
causality concerns because the level of fragmentation in each stock quintile is 
insensitive to concurrent trading in stock i (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013). Therefore, I 





















ˆˆ                                  (4.08) 
Vector Xi,t contains two instrumental variables. 
tiagrF ,ˆ and tiagrF ,
2ˆ represent the 
instrument values from two auxiliary first stage equations, and the vector Wi,t is a set 
of control variables discussed above. 
te ,1  and ti,  are the error terms from first and 
second stage estimations respectively. The Pearson correlation coefficients between 
two sets of error terms and potentially endogenous variables are 0.14 and 0.17, 
suggesting that the IV method applied here appear to be appropriate. Panel A in Table 
4.4 shows the results of the first stage regression analysis where two endogenous 
variables are regressed against IVs and a set of control variables. Columns (1) and (2) 
report that IVs’ coefficients are statistically significant and hence the IVs are strongly 
correlated with potential potentially endogenous variables. Panel B reports the weak 
IV and one can see that both the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic and the Kleibergen-
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Paap rk Wald F statistic are greater than the critical values from OLS bias12. Therefore, 





















                                                     
12 I also conduct the F-statistics of the null hypothesis that the instruments do not enter the first stage 
regression. The F-statistics for the first and second instrument are 146 and 213 respectively, and 
therefore both reject the null hypothesis of weak instrumental variables. Similar tests have been 
conducted in Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2015). 
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Table 4.4. First stage regression and weak IV test 













IV is constructed with the average of each endogenous variable over all stocks in the same stock size quintile. PINi,t 
is an inverse proxy for market transparency for stock i on day t and is computed as described in Table 4.3. Frag is 
as defined in Table 4.3, Log(PoundVolumei,t) is the natural logarithm of sum of pound volume traded for stock i 
on day t. Log(TradeCounti,t) is the log of total number of transactions for stock i on day t. Volatility is the standard 
deviation of trade-by-trade returns of stock i on day t. Log(TradeSizei,t) is the log of median of daily trade size of 
stock i on day t. Algoi,t equals the total number of quote changes over pound volume of stock i on day t. EBASi,t is 
average effective bid-ask spread of stock i on day t. Price_inverse is one over the closing price for stock i on day 
t. Time is the log of linear trending variables starting at zero and incrementing by one for every date in my sample. 
Instrumental variables (IVs) are obtained for Frag and Frag2; The t-statistics are presented in parentheses *, ** 
and *** correspond to statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. Quintiles are computed on 
the basis of daily pound volume across the sample period from 1 April 2008 to 30 September 2014.  
Panel A. First stage regression 
  (1)   (2) 
VARIABLES Frag   Frag2 
        
IV of Frag 1.808***   5.065*** 
  (94.09)   (55.73) 
IV of Frag2 -0.226***   -0.315*** 
  (-51.15)   (-15.05) 
Log(PoundVolume) -0.083***   -0.292*** 
  (-31.26)   (-24.75) 
Log(TradeCount) 0.058***   0.123*** 
  (25.05)   (11.71) 
Log(TradeSize) 0.148***   0.705*** 
  (68.20)   (72.00) 
Volatility 0.200***   1.001*** 
  (12.42)   (14.00) 
Algo -4.294***   -17.124*** 
  (-14.34)   (-14.15) 
EBAS -0.705**   -3.027** 
  (-1.98)   (-2.00) 
Price_inverse -3.570***   -13.733*** 
  (-9.36)   (-8.16) 
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Time 0.034***   0.059*** 
  (16.99)   (6.49) 
intercept -1.037***   -6.226*** 
  (-46.62)   (-61.57) 
        
Observations 129,241   129,241 
R-squared 80%   76% 
 
Panel B. Weak IV test 
 
Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0000       
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):              1.70E+04 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):           1.30E+04 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size               7.03 
15% maximal IV size              4.58       
20% maximal IV size              3.95       
25% maximal IV size              3.63       
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).  Reproduced by permission.   









4.4.3. Main results 
Table 4.5 reports the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics estimated using the 
five estimation approaches outlined above. Most of the coefficients are statistically 
significant. In addition, the sign and economic magnitude of those coefficients are 
generally consistent across estimations from column (1) to (4), thus it appears that my 
results are robust. The linear factor Frag has negative coefficients and the quadratic 
factor has positive coefficients across all estimation approaches, implying that PIN 
first decreases with Frag and then increases as fragmentation attains levels where 
unimpaired market quality can no longer be sustained. The estimates for Frag 
coefficients range from –0.071 to –0.015, and those of Frag2 range from 0.003 to 0.013. 
All but one of the coefficients for both variables are highly statistically significant, 
suggesting the existence of a non-linear relationship between fragmentation and 
transparency. Figure 4.5 highlights a U-shaped relationship between PIN and Frag 
under the five estimation approaches. The minimum points of PIN range from 2.09 to 
2.5 on Figure 4.5’s panels. This suggests that the optimal level of visible fragmentation 
lies between 2.09 and 2.5. When fragmentation is smaller than this level, the negative 
(positive) relationship between market transparency and fragmentation suggests that 
the competition among trading venues benefits all investors by reducing adverse 
selection costs. However, when fragmentation is larger than the observed ‘optimal’ 
level, the phenomenon appears to harm market transparency without contributing to a 
decrease in implied adverse selection risks. This result adds to the findings in Boneva 
et al. (2015), where visible fragmentation shows a U-shaped relationship with 
volatility, liquidity and volume. Degryse et al. (2015) also report an inverted U-shape 






Table 4.5. Market fragmentation and market transparency 













PINi,t is an inverse proxy for market transparency for stock i on day t and is computed as described in 
Table 4.3. Frag is as defined in Table 4.3, Log(PoundVolumei,t) is the natural logarithm of sum of 
pound volume traded for stock i on day t. Log(TradeCounti,t) is the log of total number of transactions 
for stock i on day t. Volatility is the standard deviation of trade-by-trade returns of stock i on day t. 
Log(TradeSizei,t) is the log of median of daily trade size of stock i on day t. Algoi,t equals the total 
number of quote changes over pound volume of stock i on day t. EBASi,t is average effective bid-ask 
spread of stock i on day t. Price_inverse is one over the closing price for stock i on day t. Time is the 
log of linear trending variables starting at zero and incrementing by one for every date in my sample. 
Instrumental variables (IVs) are obtained for Frag and Frag2; IV is constructed with the average of 
each endogenous variable over all stocks in the same stock size quintile. Frag and Frag2 are then each 
individually regressed on their corresponding cross-sectional stock averages and the other control 
variables in panel least squares frameworks. The t-statistics are presented in parentheses and derived 
from panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 0.1, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. Quintiles are computed on the basis of daily pound volume across the 
sample period from 1 April 2008 to 30 September 2014.  
  
 1 2 3 4 
Frag -0.018***   -0.015***   -0.071***   -0.052***   
  (-4.74)   (-3.69)   (-10.97)   (-5.10)   
Frag2 0.004***   0.003***   0.015***   0.013***   
  (3.80)   (2.92)   (10.70)   (5.49)   
Log(PoundVolume) 0.017***   0.018***   0.004***   0.019***   
  (25.84)   (23.59)   (4.50)   (24.31)   
Log(TradeCount) -0.011***   -0.010***   0.008***   -0.012***   
  (-16.67)   (-13.25)   (7.56)   (-14.93)   
Log(TradeSize) -0.013***   -0.014***   -0.011***   -0.017***   
  (-21.46)   (-21.27)   (-8.08)   (-20.53)   
Volatility 0.026***   -0.002   0.020***   0.020***   
  (5.36)   (-0.27)   (3.80)   (3.99)   
Algo 0.175***   -0.085***   0.186***   0.205***   
  (7.24)   (-3.15)   (6.99)   (7.83)   
EBAS 0.223**   0.139*   0.276**   0.231**   
  (2.32)   (1.87)   (2.24)   (2.31)   
Price_inverse 0.058   0.006   -0.212*   0.053   
  (0.51)   (0.04)   (-1.74)   (0.46)   
Time             -0.001   
              (-0.79)   
intercept 0.097***   0.087***   0.202***   0.138***   
  (14.10)   (8.91)   (20.46)   (12.94)   
Adj_R sqr 0.90%   2.40%   2.64%   0.76%   
Observations 129,241  129,241  129,241  129,241  
Estimation Method OLS   OLS   OLS   2SLS   
Fixed Effects None   Stock   Quarter   None   




An examination of the control variables also yields interesting insights. The positive 
and statistically significant coefficient of Log(PoundVolume) suggests that informed 
trading activity is prominent for heavily traded stocks. In other words, there is a 
positive effect of global market depth on informed trading activity. This finding is 
consistent with those of Foster and Viswanathan (1993b), Engle and Lange (2001), 
and Alzahrani et al. (2013), in that informed traders could flood into the market after 
a semi-private news event. Furthermore, the negative coefficients for Log(TradeCount) 
and Log(TradeSize) suggest that increased order flow improves trading transparency. 
This view is consistent with the argument that market quality improves with improved 
levels of trading liquidity (see for example Tse and Erenburg, 2003, Chordia et al., 
2008). The positive and statistically significant estimate of EBAS is in keeping with 
this view. The positive EBAS coefficients arise also because market makers raise sell 
quotes, and lower buy quotes when confronted with informed trades and high adverse 
selection risk. This result is consistent with Aitken and Frino (1996), Chung et al. 
(2005), and Frino et al. (2007). The positive and statistically significant Volatility 
coefficient values, however, imply that market transparency reduces with higher levels 
of volatility. This is because adverse selection risk is attributable to higher perceived 
risk, and to dispersion of beliefs among traders. The volatility coefficient values are 
consistent with prior research (see for example Chan and Lakonishok, 1997, Frino et 
al., 2007). The positive and significant coefficient of Algo under the one stage OLS, 
quarter-fixed effects and the IV estimations indicates that algorithm trading activity 
on high entrant markets is strongly correlated with informed trading and adverse 
selection risk. Thus, it appears that algorithm traders (ATs) are usually more informed 
than slower traders (see Ibikunle, 2015a). I also find that daily mean EBAS has a 





Figure 4.5. Effects of visible fragmentation on market transparency 
The panels show the implied effect of visible fragmentation on PIN (proxy for market transparency) 
using various estimation approaches. The results are shown for the probability of informed-trading (PIN) 
displayed on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis shows the level of visible fragmentation. The five 
panels include various regression estimation approaches: panel least squares with no fixed effects, panel 
least squares with stock fixed-effects, panel least squares with quarter fixed effects and two-stage least 
squares using IV. PIN is as defined in Table 4.3, Fragmentation is defined in Figure 4.4. The IV used 

























































Table 4.6 reports the panel regression estimates of the relationship between levels of 
fragmentation and absolute value of 1-minute mid-quote autocorrelation. In this table 
the estimated coefficients in column (1) and (2) are absent in the previously considered 
PIN-based results. It appears that the signs observed on the coefficients for Frag and 
Frag2 are dependent on whether the estimation approach explicitly accounts for time. 
Thus, in the estimation with time fixed effects and the IV estimations, which both 
include time trends, the results are consistent with my hypothesis regarding the impact 
of fragmentation on market quality. This split result is probably sensible when one 
considers that autocorrelation in the context of my sample is a function of time. The 
Frag estimates for the time fixed effects and the IV estimates are all statistically 
significant, and are of a higher magnitude for the IV than the time fixed effects (–
0.040). The trend is consistent for the Frag2 estimates at 0.034 for the IV estimation 
approaches and only 0.007 for the time fixed effects estimation. However, the results 
are all consistent with the expectation that there is a trade-off in the benefits and 
drawbacks of visible fragmentation; at higher levels, fragmentation increases adverse 
selection risk. The Log(PoundVolume) coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant across all of the estimation approaches, which is inconsistent with the 
results obtained in the PIN regression analysis in Table 4.5. The negative estimates 
obtained here are more plausible, because one would expect that increasing volume of 
trade allows for the timely incorporation of new information and thus helps to 
eliminate adverse selection risk. This aptly explains the negative and statistically 
significant variables observed for the EBAS variable, which is a proxy for liquidity 
(see Chordia et al., 2008). The same argument could be made for an expectation of 
negative coefficients for the Log(TradeCount) variable; however, the estimates are all 
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positive, implying  adverse selection risk increases with higher numbers of trades 
arriving in the market. This result could be linked to the increased difficulty of 
screening out informed trades by market markers when transaction volumes rise, thus 
causing adverse selection to persist and even increase. This could also explain the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates obtained for the Algo 
variable, since algorithmic trading implies a high volume of transactions. The positive 
and statistically significant Log(TradeSize) coefficients are more in line with the 
market microstructure literature on the trades that move prices (see Easley and O'Hara, 
1987, Chan and Lakonishok, 1993). Larger trade sizes would thus imply informed 
trading which invariably leads to a higher level of adverse selection risk.  The volatility 
estimates are also consistent with the expectation that increased volatility levels 
heighten adverse selection risk (see also Domowitz et al., 2001).   
I now turn to an examination of the effect of my alternate fragmentation measure, off-
exchange fragmentation, on market transparency. The estimation results are presented 
in Table 4.7. Coefficients of FragEX are statistically significant under different 
estimations, except for stock fixed effects estimation approaches. All coefficients are 
negative as expected except in the case of the IV estimation in column (4). This 
inconsistency is also replicated for the FragEX
2 coefficients. Specifically, the 
inconsistencies relate to the stock fixed effects and the IV estimations. When the 
estimation is made with no fixed effects, with time fixed effects, the estimates are 
consistent with my earlier findings which indicate a U-shaped impact curve on adverse 
selection cost. Conversely, under the IV estimation the signs are reversed; the results 
are not statistically significant for the stock fixed effects. Evidence therefore points to 
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both a U-shaped and an inverse U-shaped relationship between FragEX and adverse 
selection costs when my proxy for fragmentation is focused on trading activity off the 
listing exchange. With the exception of the inconsistent sign for FragEX, most of 
control variables yield consistent and statistically significant estimates with Table 






















Table 4.6. Market fragmentation and adverse selection risk 













Autoi,t is the absolute value of 1 – minute mid-quote return autocorrelation, and it is a proxy of adverse 
selection risk for each stock in each day. Frag is as defined in Table 4.3. Log(PoundVolumei,t) is the 
natural logarithm of sum of pound volume traded for stock i on day t. Log(TradeCounti,t) is the log of 
total number of transactions for stock i on day t. Volatility is the standard deviation of trade-by-trade 
returns of stock i on day t. Log(TradeSizei,t) is the log of median of daily trade size of stock i on day t. 
Algoi,t equals the total number of quote changes over pound volume of stock i on day t. EBASi,t is average 
effective bid-ask spread of stock i on day t. Price_inverse is one over the closing price for stock i on 
day t. Time is the log of linear trending variables starting at zero and incrementing by one for every date 
in my sample. Instrumental variables (IVs) are obtained for Frag and Frag2; IV is constructed with the 
average of each endogenous variable over all stocks in the same stock size quintile. Frag and Frag2 are 
then each individually regressed on their corresponding cross-sectional stock averages and the other 
control variables in panel least squares frameworks. The t-statistics are presented in parentheses and 
derived from panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). *, ** and *** correspond to statistical 
significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. Quintiles are computed on the basis of daily pound 
volume across the sample period from 1 April 2008 to 30 September 2014.  
 1 2 3 4 
Frag 0.134***   0.139***   -0.040***   -0.263***   
  (30.57)   (31.47)   (-5.12)   (-23.32)   
Frag2 -0.025***   -0.027***   0.007***   0.034***   
  (-22.98)   (-25.05)   (4.02)   (13.42)   
Log(PoundVolume) -0.018***   -0.016***   -0.002**   -0.062***   
  (-20.63)   (-16.69)   (-2.57)   (-52.60)   
Log(TradeCount) 0.035***   0.050***   0.030***   0.084***   
  (48.11)   (57.76)   (30.84)   (63.46)   
Log(TradeSize) 0.038***   0.036***   -0.027***   0.070***   
  (51.89)   (45.79)   (-13.58)   (67.54)   
Volatility 0.299***   0.217***   0.178***   0.339***   
  (81.98)   (28.73)   (27.59)   (76.73)   
Algo 0.471***   0.269***   0.362***   -0.287***   
  (11.12)   (6.20)   (6.26)   (-7.86)   
EBAS -0.174***   -0.072**   -0.013   -0.239***   
  (-2.83)   (-2.39)   (-0.67)   (-2.62)   
Price_inverse -0.017   -1.195***   -0.532***   -0.746***   
  (-0.10)   (-3.09)   (-3.67)   (-3.97)   
Time             0.093***   
              (60.53)   
intercept -0.362***   -0.513***   0.125***   -0.281***   
  (-34.09)   (-34.62)   (7.32)   (-19.42)   
Adj_R sqr 9.12%   10.90%   38.50%   11.07%   
Observations 129,241  129,241  129,241  129,241  
Estimation Method OLS   OLS   OLS   2SLS   
Fixed Effects None   Stock   Quarter   None   





Table 4.7. Off-exchange market fragmentation and market transparency 













PINi,t is an inverse proxy for market transparency for stock i on day t and is computed as described in 
Table 4.3. FragEX is as defined in Table 4.3. Log(PoundVolumei,t) is the natural logarithm of sum of 
pound volume traded for stock i on day t. Log(TradeCounti,t) is the log of total number of transactions 
for stock i on day t. Volatility is the standard deviation of trade-by-trade returns of stock i on day t. 
Log(TradeSizei,t) is the log of median of daily trade size of stock i on day t. Algoi,t equals the total 
number of quote changes over pound volume of stock i on day t. EBASi,t is average effective bid-ask 
spread of stock i on day t. Price_inverse is one over the closing price for stock i on day t. Time is the 
log of linear trending variables starting at zero and incrementing by one for every date in my sample. 
Instrumental variables (IVs) are obtained for Frag and Frag2; IV is constructed with the average of 
each endogenous variable over all stocks in the same stock size quintile. Frag and Frag2 are then each 
individually regressed on their corresponding cross-sectional stock averages and the other control 
variables in panel least squares frameworks. The t-statistics are presented in parentheses and derived 
from panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 0.1, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. Quintiles are computed on the basis of daily pound volume across the 
sample period from 1 April 2008 to 30 September 2014. 
  
 1 2 3 4 
FragEX -0.020***   -0.010   -0.160***   0.292***   
  (-2.59)   (-1.22)   (-10.37)   (10.05)   
FragEX2 0.002   -0.011   0.177***   -0.436***   
  (0.21)   (-0.95)   (9.32)   (-10.72)   
Log(PoundVolume) 0.017***   0.017***   0.004***   0.017***   
  (24.83)   (22.73)   (4.37)   (20.85)   
Log(TradeCount) -0.010***   -0.009***   0.008***   -0.012***   
  (-15.86)   (-12.12)   (7.69)   (-14.47)   
Log(TradeSize) -0.012***   -0.013***   -0.011***   -0.009***   
  (-21.12)   (-20.79)   (-7.89)   (-12.23)   
Volatility 0.035***   0.010   -0.014*   0.162***   
  (5.62)   (1.30)   (-1.93)   (12.48)   
Algo 0.168***   -0.097***   0.178***   0.136***   
  (6.99)   (-3.52)   (6.73)   (5.42)   
EBAS 0.220**   0.135*   0.278**   0.204**   
  (2.31)   (1.86)   (2.27)   (2.15)   
Price_inverse 0.053   0.004   -0.209*   0.012   
  (0.47)   (0.02)   (-1.71)   (0.10)   
Time             -0.008***   
              (-7.59)   
intercept 0.080***   0.069***   0.144***   0.073***   
  (15.57)   (8.33)   (18.28)   (13.27)   
Adj_R sqr 0.91%   2.40%   2.64%   0.12%   
Observations 129,241  129,241  129,241  129,241  
Estimation Method OLS   OLS   OLS   2SLS   
Fixed Effects None   Stock   Quarter   None   
IV None   None   None   Yes   
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Table 4.8 shows the regression estimates of the relationship between autocorrelation 
of 1-minute mid-quote returns and off-exchange fragmentation, FragEX. As in Table 
4.8, the FragEX and FragEX
2 coefficients do not show consistent results across different 
types of regressions, despite all estimates being statistically significant.  Coefficients 
show that there is an inverse U-shaped curve under OLS and stock fixed effects. When 
quarter fixed effects and the IV estimation are imposed, this relationship becomes U-
shaped. Again, as in Tables 4.5 and 4.7, most of the other estimated coefficients in 
Table 4.8 are consistent with the results in Table 4.6. It therefore appears that the issue 
with the results here is due to my measure of market fragmentation, which focuses on 
the aggregate pound volume of transactions executed off the main/listing/incumbent 
exchange, the LSE. At best this measure encapsulates the loss of market share by the 
listing exchange, rather than giving a robust view of the state of fragmentation in the 
market. The results in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 are thus presented to demonstrate the 













Table 4.8. Off-exchange market fragmentation and adverse selection risk 













Autoi,t is the absolute value of 1-minute mid-quote returns autocorrelation, and it is a proxy of adverse 
selection risk for each stock in each day. FragEX is as defined in Table 4.3. Log(PoundVolumei,t) is the 
natural logarithm of sum of pound volume traded for stock i on day t. Log(TradeCounti,t) is the log of 
total number of transactions for stock i on day t. Volatility is the standard deviation of trade-by-trade 
returns of stock i on day t. Log(TradeSizei,t) is the log of median of daily trade size of stock i on day t. 
Algoi,t equals the total number of quote changes over pound volume of stock i on day t. EBASi,t is average 
effective bid-ask spread of stock i on day t. Price_inverse is one over the closing price for stock i on 
day t. Time is the log of linear trending variables starting at zero and incrementing by one for every date 
in my sample. Instrumental variables (IVs) are obtained for Frag and Frag2; IV is constructed with the 
average of each endogenous variable over all stocks in the same stock size quintile. Frag and Frag2 are 
then each individually regressed on their corresponding cross-sectional stock averages and the other 
control variables in panel least squares frameworks. The t-statistics are presented in parentheses and 
derived from panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). *, ** and *** correspond to statistical 
significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. Quintiles are computed on the basis of daily pound 
volume across the sample period from 1 April 2008 to 30 September 2014. 
  
 1 2 3 4 
FragEX 0.277***   0.273***   -0.119***   -3.720*** 
  (33.26)   (32.66)   (-6.59)   (-63.05) 
FragEX2 -0.255***   -0.285***   0.082***   4.808*** 
  (-17.66)   (-19.67)   (3.79)   (58.50) 
Log(PoundVolume) -0.017***   -0.016***   -0.003***   -0.058*** 
  (-20.81)   (-17.10)   (-3.42)   (-44.47) 
Log(TradeCount) 0.035***   0.050***   0.031***   0.096*** 
  (47.21)   (56.42)   (31.79)   (61.40) 
Log(TradeSize) 0.037***   0.034***   -0.026***   0.028*** 
  (54.54)   (46.75)   (-13.22)   (23.55) 
Volatility 0.325***   0.261***   0.182***   -0.941*** 
  (50.39)   (28.86)   (22.53)   (-36.27) 
Algo 0.429***   0.221***   0.337***   0.312*** 
  (10.81)   (5.40)   (5.99)   (4.40) 
EBAS -0.180***   -0.086**   -0.017   -0.036 
  (-2.85)   (-2.42)   (-0.91)   (-0.50) 
Price_inverse -0.090   -1.302***   -0.572***   -0.134 
  (-0.50)   (-3.36)   (-3.92)   (-0.68) 
Time             0.165*** 
              (71.23) 
intercept -0.250***   -0.387***   0.096***   -0.373*** 
  (-26.59)   (-27.86)   (5.83)   (-30.72) 
Adj_R sqr 0.90%   10.82%   38.60%   0.01% 
Observations 129,241  129,241  129,241  129,241 
Estimation Method OLS   OLS   OLS   2SLS 
Fixed Effects None   Stock   Quarter   None 




4.5. Fragmentation and Market Efficiency 
4.5.1. Predictive Regressions 
Thus far I have found a U-shaped relationship between visible fragmentation and 
adverse selection costs. Although visible fragmentation helps to reduce adverse 
selection risk when fragmentation is below a certain level, empirical evidence in this 
chapter suggests that implied adverse selection risk could potentially increase with 
visible fragmentation. It is therefore fair to assume that disconnected quotes across 
trading venues can create arbitrage opportunities. Even the most efficient markets do 
not necessarily reflect all available information at every point of the day (see Fama, 
1970, Hillmer and Yu, 1979, Patell and Wolfson, 1984, Chordia et al., 2008). 
Experienced traders may be able to locate potential arbitrage opportunities, since 
quotes across regulated markets and MTFs are not closely linked due to the absence 
of a mandatory exchange trade-through protection. To test this hypothesis, I examine 
the relationship between visible fragmentation and market efficiency. I use the short 
horizon order imbalance and return predictability regression modelling approach of 
Chordia et al. (2008), who investigate market efficiency by employing simple stock 
level regression of five-minute mid-quote returns on lagged five-minute order 
imbalances. For my order imbalance measure, I use a pound-based metric, which 
encapsulates the economic significance of order imbalance. Equation (4.09) expresses 
the computation of this measure, where £BUY and £SELL equal the 5-minute interval 
pound volume of buy and sell trades respectively; this is computed for each stock 
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separately13.  I thereafter employ the values in my estimation of Equation (4.10) below. 
In Equation (4.10), returni,t corresponds to the 5-minute return for stock i during 5-











                                                             (4.09)     
  FRAGOIBOIBreturn tititi *1,21,1,                                      (4.10) 
The fragmentation dummy, Frag, takes the value 1.0 when either of my fragmentation 
proxies are one standard deviation above the average value for the trading days over 
(-15, +15), and zero otherwise 14 . Coefficient of β
1
is expected to be statistically 
significant and positive since research suggests that short-term order imbalance 
contains information about future return (Chordia et al., 2005). Moreover, I should 
expect to see a negative value for β
2
, which would imply that order flow competition 
among the four venues in my sample reduces arbitrage opportunity, and thus market 
fragmentation enhances market efficiency by reducing short-term return predictability.  
  
4.5.2. Results  
Table 4.9 presents estimated model results for both fragmentation proxies; Panel A 
shows the results for Frag as the interaction dummy in Equation (4.10), while Panel 
                                                     
13 Direction of trade is inferred using the Lee, C. M. C. & Ready, M. J. 1991b. Inferring Trade Direction 
from Intraday Data. The Journal of Finance, 46, 733-746. algorithm. 
14 The model is estimated using both market fragmentation proxies and results are presented for both. 
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B shows the results for FragEX.  Firstly, the coefficients on the lagged order imbalance 
variable are all statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that, in a 
consolidated market, order flow still contains information about short horizon asset 
returns, in this case, five minutes. The coefficient (t-statistic) of the interaction variable 
OIB£*Frag is -0.001 (-4.17). This implies that, when the level of visible fragmentation 
is high, order flow competition across trading venues will facilitate market efficiency 
by reducing short horizon return predictability. I also find that the coefficient (t-
statistic) of interaction variable OIB£* FragEX is -0.0002 (-2.01), implying that with 
more order flow migrating to MTFs, the London market generally becomes more 
efficient. I also include the daily dummy variable Frag into the regression model and 
the results are illustrated in Panel D, E and F. It can be observed that with dummy 
variable added the results are still consistent in that high level of fragmentation reduce 
short-term predictability power. Thus, this evidence indicates that visible market 
fragmentation and off-exchange fragmentation do not impair market efficiency. 
Instead, order flow competition between trading venues facilitates market efficiency 
by reducing short-term arbitrage opportunities. This finding is consistent with 
Storkenmaier and Wagener (2011), who show that quotes across primary exchanges 
and MTFs are closely linked because competition forces can integrate the 
disconnected trading venues. 
Our view of the positive influence of fragmentation on market efficiency is slightly 
nuanced. The British economy is one of the largest in the world, and until the 
introduction of MiFID spurred a significant growth of new trading venues for UK 
stocks, the LSE was virtually the only venue in which to trade UK stocks. Therefore, 
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it is quite possible that the advent of new venues has led to the execution of orders that 
otherwise would not have been satisfied by the trading environment on the LSE. This 
could be due to a number of factors, including the capacity for order execution by 
market makers and broker-dealers, or indeed deterrence brought about by the effective 
monopoly previously enjoyed by the LSE. If unexpressed liquidity and information 
order requirements of participants are held back by these factors, price discovery will 
be affected, leading to a reduction in market efficiency. Thus, consistent with my 
findings, increased opportunities for order execution (indicated by market 








Table 4.9. Market quality test: short-term predictive test 
Predictive regressions of five-minute returns on lagged order imbalance (OIB£t-1), and lagged order imbalance interacted with a dummy variable for fragmentation. OIB£t is 
measured as the total pound value of buy trades less the total pound volume of sell trades, divided by the total pound volume of all trades during five-minute trading interval t. 
The fragmentation dummy, Frag, is 1.0 when the daily level of fragmentation is at least one standard deviation above the average level of fragmentation for the surrounding 
days over (-15, +15), otherwise zero. Panel A presents the results for estimation using a fragmentation dummy based on overall level of fragmentation, and Panel B uses a 
fragmentation dummy based on only off-exchange fragmentation as a proportion of all trading. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels 
respectively. 
 
  Panel A     Panel B     Panel C 
  Coefficient t-stats     Coefficient t-stats     Coefficient t-stats 
OIB£t-1 1.52×10-3*** 17.17   OIB£ 1.39×10-3*** 14.00   OIB£t-1 1.20×10
-3*** 19.85 
OIB£t-1*Frag -4.46×10-4*** -4.17   OIB£*FragEX -2.22×10-4*** -2.01   OIB£t-1*(1-HHI) -2.62×10
-5 -0.15 
Constant -3.21×10-5*** -1.38   Constant -3.19×10-5*** -1.37   Constant -6.42×10
-5*** -2.30 
 
  Panel D     Panel E     Panel F 
  Coefficient t-stats     Coefficient t-stats     Coefficient t-stats 























The Markets in Financial Instrument Directive (MiFID) ended the quasi-monopoly of 
primary exchanges across Europe, leading to the introduction of more than one 
hundred new trading venues, such as MTFs. Since their introduction to the European 
market nomenclature in November 2007, MTFs have successfully pried away large 
shares of the European trading volumes from national exchanges across European 
equity markets. In contrast to the Reg. NMS in the US equity market, MiFID does not 
impose a formal linkage between trading venues, nor establish a single data 
consolidator for trade-related information. This lack of integration in trading rightly 
raises concerns about trading transparency in the European equity market. In this 
chapter, I study the impact of competition for visible order flow on market 
transparency and market efficiency under a consolidated market environment. A 
significant difference between my analysis and previous studies is that I conduct my 
tests on an aggregate market by creating a consolidated order book featuring order 
flow and transactions from the exchanges making up the London market for FTSE 100 
stocks. Thus, for the first time, I can assess the impact of fragmentation on the 
aggregate market for trading Europe’s highest trading stocks.  
I obtain visible high-frequency order book data for the 100 largest UK stocks listed on 
the LSE and traded at three other recently introduced major venues: BATS Europe, 
Chi-X Europe and Turquoise. The data obtained covers a ten-year period ending in 
2014. In order to investigate the impact of fragmentation on global market quality and 
trading efficiency, I create a single consolidated virtual market by concatenating data 
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from these four venues. Specifically, I employ probability of informed trading (PIN) 
and 1-minute mid-quote returns autocorrelation as proxies for adverse selection costs 
and risk, respectively. PIN is also used as an inverse proxy for market transparency. 
Results obtained suggest the existence of a quadratic/u-shape relationship between 
fragmentation and adverse selection risk. Thus, visible fragmentation helps to reduce 
adverse selection costs and increase market transparency in the aggregate market 
environment when fragmentation is relatively lower. When fragmentation is higher, 
however, implied adverse selection costs and market opacity potentially increase with 
fragmentation. The negative impact of fragmentation on market transparency is, 
however, very limited, since historical fragmentation is generally smaller than the 
upper limit of an optimal range suggested by my analysis. This quadratic relationship 
is consistent with the existing literature relating market quality measures with market 
fragmentation (see for example Degryse et al., 2015, Boneva et al., 2015). 
I also make further contributions to the literature by investigating the impact of market 
fragmentation on market efficiency; I adapt Chordia et al.’s (2008) return 
predictability model to test whether fragmentation reduces short horizon return 
predictability. I find that fragmentation facilitates market efficiency by eliminating 
short horizon return predictability and reducing arbitrage opportunities. My results are 
in line with Storkenmaier and Wagener (2011) and Menkveld (2013), who suggest 
that order flow competition across trading venues could act as a linkage necessary to 
minimise arbitrage opportunities. 
The findings in this chapter have important implications for the debate surrounding 
trading fragmentation in European equity markets. By showing that competition 
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between trading venues can improve aggregate market quality, the argument could be 
advanced that, despite the lack of a mandated consolidated tape under MiFID, order 
flow competition effectively acts as a linkage variable. Therefore, market 
fragmentation should be viewed as a value-creating competition phenomenon that 





















5. Commonality in Lit and Dark liquidity 
 
5.1. Introduction: 
The last decade has seen an unprecedented proliferation of new trading places. For 
example, in Europe, riding on the back of the implementation of the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in 2007, more than 100 new trading venues 
have been established over the last decade. The entrant venues are mostly high tech 
Multilateral Trading Facilities, enabled by MiFID rules.  Many trading venues, 
including the more established national exchanges, rely on existing MiFID waivers to 
operate dark order books in addition to the standard and more transparent lit (visible) 
limit order book. The main advantage of dark order books (or dark pools) over 
traditional lit markets is the ability to execute large orders anonymously and with 
minimum price impact, since pre-trade transparency is waived for orders submitted to 
such platforms. However, recent studies suggest average trade sizes in some European 
dark pools are comparable to those in the lit market (see for example Ibikunle et al., 
2017). The lure of trading with no pre-trade transparency has led to a significant 
growth in the proportion of dark trading across the developed markets. According to 
Degryse et al. (2015), approximately 30% to 40% of all orders in the United States 
and European Blue chip stocks are executed in the dark. Despite the growing 
popularity of dark pools among a section of market participants, mainly institutional 
traders, the operation of dark pools has generally been subject to debate and 
controversy due to their lack of pre-trade transparency. Industry and academic 
contributors have raised concerns that dark pool trading may tarnish the credibility of 
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primary equity markets, and politicians are increasingly wading into the debate. In a 
letter from US Senator Kaufman to SEC Chair Schapiro, the Senator notes a need to 
“examine whether too much order flow is being shielded from the lit markets by dark 
venues”.  
In Europe, regulators are seeking to place greater restrictions on dark pool trading. 
Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) II proposes the introduction of an 
8% cap on the total value of dark trading across all venues. This restriction is 
scheduled for implementation at the start of 2018, having been delayed by a year. 
Despite the growing importance of dark venues, very limited finance research offers 
insight into dark pool liquidity and its impact on market quality. The existing literature 
shows mixed results regarding the impact of dark trades on market liquidity. For 
example, Buti et al. (2011) find no supporting evidence that dark pool trading can 
harm market liquidity. Based on high-frequency data, Brugler (2015) shows that dark 
trading leads to improved liquidity on the primary exchange. However, Nimalendran 
and Ray (2014) investigate trading data from one of the 32 US dark venues and find 
that dark trading is associated with increased price impact and price impact on quoting 
exchanges. Degryse et al. (2015), using a European sample of stocks, show that dark 
trading has a detrimental effect on market liquidity.  
This chapter examines the dynamics of the liquidity-creation effect in both lit and dark 
venues by employing a liquidity commonality model. Previous research on liquidity 
commonality (see for example Chordia et al., 2000, Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001, 
Huberman and Halka, 2001) show that the liquidity levels of individual stocks co-vary 
with overall market liquidity. One likely explanation for this phenomenon is market 
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makers’ inventory management. This is because market makers are likely to respond 
to shifting market prices and order flow by altering their exposure across various assets. 
This is not the only possible reason for liquidity commonality, as the literature also 
suggests that the level of commonality between a stock and the wider market may 
depend on market structure (see for example Brockman and Chung, 2008). However, 
there has to been no examination of the liquidity commonality in a market fragmented 
along dark and lit lines. Thus, I present a first order analysis of liquidity commonality 
between stocks and the wider market in a market fragmented along dark and lit trading 
lines.  I compare and contrast the liquidity commonality between lit and dark venues 
under different market conditions, over the four-year period from 1st June 2010 to 30th 
September 2014. This is also the first study to characterise the interactions between 
dark and lit liquidity in relation to the wider market. Indeed, I pose entirely new 
questions concerning how dark trading is shaping trading in financial markets.  
Specifically, four distinct questions are posed. Firstly, when compared with lit venues, 
do dark pools have larger or smaller co-movement with market-wide liquidity? 
Secondly, if such relationship exists, does the observed co-movement improve the 
market liquidity or does it drain liquidity from the overall market; i.e. do dark pools 
play a complementary role to lit venues, especially in periods of liquidity constraints 
or do they exacerbate the constraints? Thirdly, what factors drive co-movement in dark 
and lit liquidity? Finally, since both Ye (2011) and Zhu (2014) suggest the possibility 
that informed traders may use dark venues in order to reduce their transactions costs 
and maximise their information-based profits, I investigate whether variations in dark 
pool liquidity could be linked with informed trading activities.  
148 
 
The findings are fourfold. First, I find that the degree of dark venues’ liquidity 
commonality with the wider market is larger than that of lit venues, indicating that 
liquidity effects in dark pools is more pronounced. Further analysis suggests that dark 
liquidity commonality with the wider market is linked to increasing levels of liquidity 
in the wider market rather than a decreasing trend. This implies that, when market-
wide liquidity starts to increase, dark venues proportionally contribute more liquidity 
than lit venues. Secondly, results suggest that when limit order spread increases and 
limit order queue builds up  traders are incentivised to route their trades to dark venues. 
This is an indication of the complementary role played by dark venues in the aggregate 
market, facilitating trades that otherwise could not be easily executed at lit venues. I 
also show that informed trading and algorithm trading (AT) reduce liquidity-creation 
effects in both lit and dark venues. This finding is consistent with the related literature 
(for example see Zhu, 2014, Comerton-Forde and Putniņš, 2015) in that when an 
informed event occurs informed traders are likely to gravitate to the same side of the 
market and trade in the same direction, thereby facing a lower execution probability 
in the dark than in the lit venue. Hence, lit venues attract traders that are more informed 
and informed order flows. Finally, I show that the stocks with lower levels of informed 
trading activity and higher volatility generate stronger liquidity commonality effects 
in both lit and dark venues.  
Overall, this chapter extends the recent empirical literature on dark trading on the one-
hand and liquidity commonality in the wider microstructure literature on the other. 
The overall analysis is timely and has implications for dark pool regulation, given the 
increasingly intense regulatory constraints being considered for dark pools around the 
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world, especially in the EU. Taken together, the results suggest that dark trading poses 
little threat to the market liquidity, rather it provides an opportunity for executing 
orders that otherwise might not have been executed, thereby creating additional 
liquidity in the aggregate market. The reminder of this chapter is structured as follows: 
in Section 2, I present a summary of the related literature, section 3 discusses the data, 
liquidity measures and descriptive statistics, section 4 motivates the methodological 
approach used in the chapter, section 5 presents and discusses the results, while section 
6 concludes.  
5.2. Related Literature 
Early contributions to the literature model investors’ ability and preference for trading 
in dark pools (or with hidden orders, such as icebergs or trading in upstairs markets) 
and what effects that might have on market quality. Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) 
show that lower trading cost is the key determinant of dark pools’ competitiveness. 
Given this, their model suggests that informed traders prefer to use dark pools in order 
to minimise trading costs. Boulatov and George (2013) examine hidden versus 
displayed liquidity in the primary market. They show that hiding liquidity-providing 
orders leads to more aggressive competition among informed traders in providing 
liquidity, thus improving price discovery. Buti et al. (2016) model the interaction 
between dark pools and limit order book (LOB); they find that although order flow 
migrates from the LOB to dark pools, the overall market trading volume increases. Ye 
(2011) and Zhu (2014), in addition to examining the trading strategies of informed and 
liquidity traders in the presence of dark pools, explicitly investigate the impact of dark 
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orders on price discovery on the primary exchange. Ye (2011) considers an informed 
trader who splits orders between a lit exchange and a dark pool, and finds that dark 
trading reduces price discovery. However, Zhu (2014) finds that informed traders are 
more likely than uninformed traders to cluster on one side of the market and therefore 
informed traders face lower execution probability in dark pools than uninformed 
traders. As a result, informed traders gravitate toward the primary (lit) exchange, while 
uninformed traders are more likely to trade in the dark venue. Zhu (2014) contends 
that this self-selection improves price discovery in the lit exchange due to reduced 
uninformed/noise trades there. Ye (2011) and Zhu (2014) draw different conclusions 
due to different assumptions on dark venue accessibility. Ye’s (2011) model does not 
allow uninformed traders to choose between competing venues, assuming that they 
trade perpetually on the (lit) primary exchange and hence the role of uninformed 
traders in dark pools is missing from the model. In contrast, Zhu (2014) model allows 
for self-selection of trading venues by both informed and uninformed traders. 
Other papers employ various empirical frameworks to identify how dark trading 
affects price discovery, liquidity, market transparency, volatility and overall market 
quality. Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) examine the impact of dark trading on 
price discovery by using a sample of Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) stocks. Their 
results indicate that at low levels (less than 10%) dark trading does not harm price 
discovery. Ibikunle et al. (2016), employing a sample of FTSE350 stocks, finds that 
moderate levels of dark trading are beneficial to the aggregate market through the 
improvement of overall market transparency and trading noise reduction. They also 
show that the benefits of dark trading peak when dark trading value attains 15% of the 
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overall market volume. Foley and Putniņš (2016), based on an analysis of a Canadian 
sample of stocks, also find that lower levels of dark trading improves price efficiency.  
Several empirical papers investigate the impact of dark pool trading activity on market 
liquidity. Kwan et al. (2015) study the impact of Reg NMS Rule 612, which stipulates 
a decrease in minimum pricing increment from $0.01 to $0.0001 when stock prices 
fall below $1.00. They show that when the spread is constrained and limit order queue 
builds up, traders prefer to use dark venues in order to lower their trading costs and 
increase execution probability. Buti et al. (2011) also show that dark pool trades are 
positively related to daily volume and market depth and negatively related to market 
volatility and order imbalance. He and Lepone (2014) examine ASX data and find that 
dark pool volume is higher when quoted spread at the best bid and ask is wider and 
the limit order queue is longer, as well as when order imbalance, volatility and adverse 
selection are lower. They do not find evidence of dark trading harming market quality. 
Similarly, Brugler (2015) estimates the contemporaneous relationship between dark 
trading and market depth on the primary exchange (LSE) by employing two months-
worth of a proprietary trading dataset. The results show that dark trading improves 
market liquidity at a high frequency level. However, Nimalendran and Ray (2014), 
using data from one of the 32 US dark venues, find conflicting results that dark trading 
is associated with increased price impact on primary exchanges. 
Consistent with Nimalendran and Ray (2014), Degryse et al. (2015), analysing trading 
data for 51 Dutch stocks, find that dark venues attract uninformed order flows and that 
dark trades are associated with high bid ask spread. Foley and Putniņš’s (2016)  
experiment exploit a mandatory minimum price improvement in dark pools introduced 
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by the Toronto Stock Exchange. They classify all dark trades into ‘one-sided’ (at 
midpoint) and ‘two-sided’ (at either side of the midpoint) dark trades and show that 
two-sided dark trading is beneficial to both liquidity and informational efficiency. 
However, they do not find evidence consistent with  midpoint dark trading having a 
significant effect on market quality. This finding stands in sharp contrast to Ibikunle 
et al. (2016), who show that in the London market, overall market quality is enhanced 
by low levels of midpoint dark trading.  
 
5.3. Data and Methodology 
5.3.1. Data 
The data consists of the constituents of the FTSE100 index from 1st June 2010 to 30 
September 2014; the FTSE100 includes the 100 largest firms listed on the LSE and 
they account for more than 80% of the exchange’s total market capitalisation. My data 
consists of one primary exchange LSE and the three largest MTFs operating in Europe: 
BATS Europe, Chi-X Europe and Turquoise. The three latter venues operate both lit 
and dark order books. I obtain intraday tick data from the Thomson Reuters Tick 
History (TRTH) database. TRTH provides time and sales tick data, which includes 
variables such as the Reuters Identification Code (RIC), date, timestamp, price, 
volume, bid price, ask price, bid volume and ask volume, as well as qualifiers 
indicating whether a trade is executed in the dark or not. I allocate each trade a pair of 
corresponding prevailing best bid and ask quotes. Since dark orders are only 
entertained during normal trading hours, I delete the opening auction (7:50hrs – 
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8:00hrs) and closing auction (16:30hrs – 16:35hrs) periods from the dataset. In 
addition to the TRTH, I also obtain daily lit and dark trading data from the Market 
Quality Dashboard (MQD) database managed by the Capital Markets Cooperative 
Research Centre, Sydney.15 Finally, I merge the order book level data for the four 
trading venues in order to create a single ‘global’ order book for the London market. 
Dataset cleaning and merging of the order book data from the four venues yield a 
consolidated dataset containing 638 million transactions valued at 3.08 trillion British 
Pounds Sterling executed in 95 stocks over the sample period.  
5.3.2. Methodology 
5.3.2.1. Main liquidity measures 
Liquidity is an important component of the cost of trading and its measures could be 
multi-dimensional. Microstructure literature usually employs the bid-ask spread as a 
proxy for liquidity. However, given that dark pools in my dataset do not document the 
spread since they execute orders using the LSE midpoint for reference, I employ other 
measures of liquidity. Specifically, five measures aimed at capturing liquidity for lit 
and dark venues, as well as for the aggregate market are identified. The first two 
measures are theAmihud (2002) and Florackis et al. (2011) illiquidity ratios; these are 
inverse proxies of liquidity. In less liquid markets, a given level of volume of shares 
traded will give rise to a greater price response than in more liquid markets. The 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio is therefore defined as the ratio of the absolute return 
                                                     
15 In order to ensure comparability, I ascertain that variables occurring in both datasets are sufficient 




to volume of shares traded. The Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio is well-established in 
the microstructure literature and has been extensively used to capture systematic 
liquidity risk and commonality in liquidity among stocks (see as examples Kamara et 
al., 2008, Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008). Marshall et al. (2012) also examine a range of 
liquidity proxies and show that the Amihud ratio performs well in liquidity 
commonality tests. Thus, for each stock in each day, I compute the Amihud ratio for 
lit and dark venues and for the aggregate market as shown in Equations (5.01), (5.02) 







































                                                            (5.03)  
However, I also note that trading volume is likely to be greater for economically larger 
instruments, thus potentially creating a large firm bias. Therefore, for robustness, I 
also use the Florackis et al. (2011) illiquidity ratio, in which volume in the Amihud 
(2002) ratio is replaced by the turnover ratio. Similar to Amihud ratio, Florackis ratio 
is an illiquidity ratio and measures the level of price impact. Florackis ratio modifies 
Amihud’s ratio by substituting the volume with turnover ratio.  Florackis et al. (2011) 
suggest that the trading volume of each stock in Amihud ratio is positively related to 
market capitalisation and therefore leading to size bias. The Florackis ratio does not 
suffer from size bias as stock turnover rate is unlikely to be correlated with stock size.   
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For each stock in each day, I compute the Florackis ratio for lit and dark venues and 











































                                      (5.06) 
Other liquidity proxies employed include volume of shares traded, number of 
transactions/executed orders and pound volume, which represent the market depth 
dimension of liquidity. Through these variables, I are able to compare the variations 
in trading liquidity in lit and dark venues since they are positively linked with market 
liquidity. 
5.3.2.2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Figure 5.1 plots the trading value series for both the lit and dark venues in 
the London market for the four-year period ending September 2014; all values are in 
pounds. The cumulative growth in dark trades appears consistent with the trading 
value for the lit throughout the time series, and for most of the period under 
consideration the dark trades’ growth rate appears larger than that of the aggregate lit 
venues. Hence, the evidence here is that an increasing proportion of trades are now 
executed in the dark. Panel B, which plots the dark trading values as percentages of 
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the total market trading value, shows that dark trade values continue to grow as a 
proportion of total market values. However, the average percentage of dark trading 
does not exceed 12% during my sample period16. Panel C suggests that the average 
trading size in overall lit and dark values appear to be in lockstep throughout the four-
year period. Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics for key variables. This table shows 
that lit venues have larger Amihud and Florackis ratio than dark venues. This implies 
that trading generates a larger impact in lit markets than dark venues. One way of 
interpreting this estimate is that lit venues are less liquid when compared to dark 
venues. However, a more apt interpretation is that lit venues attract more informed 
trades than dark venues, hence the larger price impact generated. Furthermore, given 
that the dark pools I examine use prices from lit venues as reference prices, it is 
unlikely that trading in dark venues contribute significantly enough to price discovery 
for those trades to generate larger impacts than lit venues’ trades.   
 
                                                     
16 There might be a shift in the dark volume at the beginning of 2013. I will run the analysis year by year to show 





Figure 5.1: Trading values 
Panel A plots the lit and dark pound trading values for 95 FTSE 100 stocks trading simultaneously on the four main London ‘City’ exchanges/trading venues; these are the 
London Stock Exchange, BATS, Chi-X and Turquoise between 1st June 2010 to 30th September 2014. Panel B plots the pound values for dark as percentages of total market 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
This table reports means, standard deviations, and quartile points (25%, Median, 75%) for 95 FTSE 
100 stocks trading simultaneously on the four main London ‘City’ exchanges/trading venues; these are 
the London Stock Exchange, BATS, Chi-X and Turquoise.  The sample period covers 1st June 2010 
and 30th September 2014. Dark and Lit Amihud are the Amihud ratio for lit and dark venus. These 
measures write as follows: 



























Lit and dark Florackis ratio is the Florackis ratio for lit and dark venues. These measures write as 
follows:  



























PIN is the Easley et al. (1996, 1997) probability of informed trading measure computed from the 
parameters yielded by maximising the following likelihood function: 
 
where B and S respectively correspond to the total number of buy and sell orders for the day within 
each trading interval. θ = (α, δ, μ, ε) is the parameter vector for the model. α corresponds to the 
probability of an information event, δ is the conditional probability of a low signal of an information 
event, μ is the arrival rate of informed orders, and ε is the arrival rate of uninformed orders. The 
probability that a trade is informed for each stock and within each interval is then computed as: 
 
ALGO is as a proxy for algorithmic trading and is measured as the ratio of messages to trades. 
  Percentile     
  25% 50% 75% 95% mean std 
Dark Amihud 1.65E-08 5.85E-08 1.90E-07 1.18E-06 6.43E-07 
3.5477E-
05 
              
Lit Amihud 9.15E-10 2.96E-09 8.35E-09 3.43E-08 8.78E-09 7.87E-08 
              
Dark Florackis 2.51E-05 7.97E-05 2.29E-04 1.11E-03 8.12E-04 1.64E-02 
              
Lit Flora 
Florackis 0.0005 0.0014 0.0033 0.0129 0.0097 0.1170 
              
Dark Volume 47.37 127.90 343.84 1827.19 492.34 1602.55 






























































Lit Volume 990.11 2296.05 5387.60 29880.06 7542.54 20538.06 
              
Number of dark 
trade 111 223 439 1125 354.98 416.17 
              
Number of lit 
trades 2985 4931 8826 22330 7356.47 7108.83 
              
Dark £volume 
(‘000) 442.22 1088.66 2552.05 7740.52 2162.46 3296.88 
              
Lit £volume 
(‘000) 9176.38 18629.70 41946.64 124107.97 34906.91 44986.42 
              
PIN 0.16 0.22 0.32 0.52 0.25 0.13 
              
ALGO 26.17 38.79 69.35 334.88 99.71 311.93 
       
 
5.3.2.3. The baseline model 
Following Chordia et al.’s (2000), I model the systematic liquidity factors in lit and 
dark venues by estimating the following time-series regression model.  
titMtMtMti DLDLDLDL ,1,31,2,11,                                      (5.07)                                                               
Specifically, daily percentage changes in liquidity for an individual stock are regressed 
against market measures of liquidity. In Equation (5.07),  DLi,t is, for stock i, the 
percentage change  from trading day t-1 to dayt in liquidity as proxied by several 
variables (including Amihud ratio, 
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Florackis ratio, volume of shares traded, number of trades and pound volume). The 
volume of shares traded, transaction numbers and pound volume are naturally 
considered as measures of trading activity rather than traditional measures of liquidity. 
However, given their high levels of correlation with liquidity variables, I adopt them 
in this chapter variously as both liquidity proxies and trading activity measures.  DLi,t  
will be tested as lit liquidity and dark liquidity respectively. DLM,t, DLM,t-1 and DLM,t+1 
are the concurrent, one-day lag and lead of percentage change in a cross-sectional 
equally weighted market liquidity proxies of my sample stocks. 17  I examine 
percentage changes rather than levels for two reasons: firstly, my interest is 
fundamentally in discovering whether liquidity co-moves, and secondly, time series 
of liquidity levels are more likely to be plagued by econometric problems. I define the 
coefficient 
1  as the elasticity of liquidity commonality (ELC) as each estimated 
coefficient in regression Equation (5.07) represents the averaged percentage change in 
liquidity of each stock given 1% in market liquidity. ELC also measures the co-movent 
of trading venues’ liquidity with market-wide liquidity. I run the regression for both 
lit and dark venues and obtain the sizes of ELC in lit and dark venues as indicators of 
which venue exhibit more pronounced co-movement with market-wide liquidity. 
 
 
                                                     
17 In order to reduce the outliers, I follow Korajczyk, R. A. & Sadka, R. 2008. Pricing the commonality 
across alternative measures of liquidity. Journal of Financial Economics, 87, 45-72. to ‘winsorize’ the 




5.3.2.4. What drives dark pool trading activities 
The next step is to examine what drives dark pool liquidity. Previous studies postulate 
that trades in dark pools and upstairs markets are trades that otherwise might not have 
easily occurred in traditional lit venues (see for examples Smith et al., 2001, Jain et 
al., 2003, He and Lepone, 2014, Kwan et al., 2015). Following the existing literature, 
I argue that, dark pools liquidity is aided by the liquidity constraints in lit venues and 
thus work as complementary venues to lit venues. Thus, when spreads are wider in lit 
markets and the queue for order execution is lengthy, traders, especially the 
uninformed kind, are incentivised to migrate to dark pools where they can trade at the 
midpoint, ensuring  minimum or no price impact. In order to examine this intuition, I 
design the following model (8) and (9), which captures the relationship between dark 
venues’ share of trading, spread market depth and  order queue index in lit markets. 
titMtMtMti DBASDBASDBASDL ,1,31,2,11,   
                                  (5.08) 
titMtMtMti DQueueDQueueDQueueDL ,1,31,2,11,   
                                (5.09) 
In Equation (5.08), DLi,t is, for stock i, the percentage change from trading dayt-1 to 
dayt market share variables including volume of shares traded, number of trades and 
pound volume. DBASM,t, DBASM,t-1 and DBASM,t+1 are the concurrent, one-day lag and 
lead of percentage change in a cross-sectional equally weighted effective bid ask 
spread of my sample stocks as observed in lit venues. Effective spread equals twice 
the absolute value of the difference between transaction price and the corresponding 
best bid and ask quotes midpoint at the transaction time.  
In Equation (5.09), the relationship between order queue and dark trading activities is 
further examined. Following Kwan et al. (2015) and He and Lepone (2014), I use the 
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market depth at the best bid and ask price as an index of order queue. However, this 
index is adjusted by message-to-trade-ratio. The reason for including a message-to-
trade-ratio adjusted market depth is to minimise the impact of high frequency traders 
and algorithm traders (ATs), who typically place and cancel bids and offers at high 
speed. This order queue proxy is calculated as total pound volume of orders submitted 
at the best bid and ask prices divided by the message to trade ratio (ALGO)  in the 
market. DQueueM,t, DQueueM,t-1 and DQueueM,t+1 are the concurrent, one-day lag and 
lead of percentage change in a cross-sectional equally weighted  market queue index 
of my sample stocks. Estimates from Equations (5.08) and (5.09) offer insights into 
the impact of liquidity constraints in lit venues on dark pool trading share of trading.  
 
5.3.2.5. Extended Model with Informed trading Factors 
Several theoretical papers (see as examples Ye, 2011, Zhu, 2014, Nimalendran and 
Ray, 2014) examine trading strategies of informed and liquidity traders in the presence 
of dark pools and the impact of dark trading on price discovery in primary exchanges, 
under differing conditions. Specifically, the assumptions used in their models’ 
development mainly differ in terms of uninformed traders’ ability to access dark pools. 
However, all of  these studies assume that informed traders may use dark pools in 
order to reduce their transactions costs and maximise profits from their use of private 
information (Nimalendran and Ray, 2014). Despite a consensus on the theoretical 
validity of informed traders accessing dark pools, the impact of informed trading on 
dark venues’ liquidity is still an open empirical question. Therefore the analysis in this 
study is extended to examine this question. In order to study the impact of informed 
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trading on lit and dark liquidity, Equation (5.07) is extended to include two informed 
trading proxies as shown in Equations (5.12) and (5.13). The first proxy is the 
probability of informed trading (PIN) as computed for the aggregate market.  PIN can 
be used to proxy the proportion of the unobservable informed trades across normal 
trading hours (see for example Easley et al., 1996a, 1996b, 1997a). The PIN model 
allows us to compute an approximation of the unobservable distribution of trades 
between informed and uninformed traders by modelling purchases and sales.18 Hence, 
the ‘normal level’ of sales and purchases executed within a stock on a given day over 
several trading cycles is interpreted as relatively uninformed trading activity by the 
model, and this information is employed when estimating ε. An unusual volume of 
purchase or sale transactions is interpreted as information-based trading and used to 
compute μ. Furthermore, the frequency of intervals during which ‘abnormal’ levels of 
purchases and sales are transacted is employed when computing the values of α and δ. 
These calculations are conducted in a simultaneous fashion using maximum likelihood 
estimation. Suppose the arrival of uninformed and informed traders in the market 
follow a Poisson distribution, the likelihood function for the PIN model for each 



















































                           
(5.10)              
                                                     
18 I infer purchase and sales by running the Lee and Ready Lee, C. M. C. & Ready, M. J. 1991b. 




where B and S respectively represent the total number of purchase and sale transactions 
for each one hour trading period within each trading day. θ = (α, δ, μ, ε) is the 
parameter vector for the structural model. Equation (5.10) represents a system of 
distributions in which the possible trades are weighted by the probability of a one hour 
trading period with no news (1 – α), a one hour trading period with good news (α (1 – 
δ)) or a one hour trading period with bad news (αδ). Based on the assumption that this 
process occurs independently across the different trading periods, Easley et al. (1997a) 
and Easley et al. (1996b) calculate the parameter vector estimates using maximum 
likelihood estimation procedure. Thus, I  obtain the parameters for each trading day 
and for each stock in the sample by maximum likelihood estimation. Following Easley 
et al. (1996b) and Easley et al. (1997a), PIN is then computed as: 
                                                                    (5.11) 
PIN, as computed, technically only proxies informed trading in the lit venues. 
However, the measure is arguably a direct proxy for informed trading in the overall 
market rather than in lit venues alone. This is because, as earlier stated, the dark pools 
included in the sample are midpoint order books; hence, they source execution prices 
from the lit venue by executing orders against the midpoint or within the spread as 
posted on lit platforms. This implies that the posted orders at the lit venues effectively 
relate directly to the dark venues as well. However, for completeness, I employ a 
second proxy for informed trading. The second informed trading proxy is the ratio of 
messages to trades (ALGO) across all trading venues. This is a typical measure for 
AT/HFT activity, since ATs/HFTs apply advanced computer power to extract superior 







regarding shifts in underlying value of instruments faster than most of the rest of the 
market. Their ability of being able to decipher new information earlier than most other 
market participants therefore implies that they could be considered as informed traders. 
This view is consistent with the finding that HFTs can anticipate buying and selling 
pressure over short horizons (see Hirschey, 2013). Two regression models are run 
regression in order to avoid a potential multicollinearity problem; thus, PIN and 
ALGO are used as substitutes in an extension of Equation (5.07). 
titMtMtMtMtMtMti PINPINPINDLDLDLDL ,1,61,5,41,31,2,11,   
         
(5.12) 
titMtMtMtMtMtMti ALGOALGOALGODLDLDLDL ,1,61,5,41,31,2,11,   




5.3.2.6. Drivers of elasticity of liquidity commonality 
Finally, I turn to investigating the drivers of dark liquidity commonality by 
estimating the following regression model:
tjtititititititi InfoVOLAPVCOUNTMKTPRICEECL ,,6,5,4,3,2,11,  
    
(5.14)           
where  ELC is the stock-quarter estimated coefficient, 
1 , for stock i from Equation 
(5.07).  PRICEi is the log of quarterly average share price of stock i, COUNTi is the 
log of quarterly averaged number of transaction of stock i, PVi is the log of quarterly 
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averaged pound volume traded of of stock i, VOLAi is quarterly return volatility for 
stock i, Infoi is the quarterly average of either of two informed trading proxies, PIN or 
ALGO.  
 
5.4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
This section discusses the results obtained from executing the methodological 
approaches presented in the preceding section.  
5.4.1. Liquidity commonality in lit and dark venues 
Table 5.2 reports the regression results for lit and dark venues. Panels A and B indicate 
that market-wide liquidity is contemporaneously linked with both lit and dark liquidity; 
however there is a difference in the order of magnitude. In Panel A, the elasticity of 
liquidity commonality suggests that a 0.01 change in market liquidity tMDL ,  induces a 
contemporaneous average percentage change in individual stock liquidity at lit venues 
ranging from 0.608% to 1.85%, depending on the liquidity proxy, all coefficient 
estimates for lit venues are significantly different from zero at 0.01 level. The average 
concurrent coefficients are close to those in Chordia et al.’s (2000) study, which ranges 
from 0.28% to 1.37%. The coefficients for 1, tMDL  and 1, tMDL  are smaller (in 
absolute values), indicating a rapid adjustment in lit liquidity commonality, as 1, tMDL  
and 1, tMDL are designed to capture any lagged adjustment in commonality. Panel B 
reports the results for dark liquidity commonality. Results show that individual stock 
liquidity in dark venues are positively related with market-wide liquidity since all 
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concurrent coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level of 
statistical significance. The concurrent coefficients of dark liquidity commonality 
range from 1.225% to 2.407%. depending on the liquidity proxy. Since ELC 
coefficients of dark venues are larger than the corresponding lit venues ones, 
individual stocks traded in dark venues appear to exhibit a higher level of liquidity 
commonality than when they are traded in lit venues. Thus, dark venues have a greater 
elasticity of liquidity commonality than lit venues. In other words, when market-wide 
liquidity evolves, dark venues have a larger reaction to market-wide liquidity than lit 
venues. It should be noted that Amihud and Florackis ratios are inverse proxies of 
liquidity; hence, when the market starts to gain (lose) liquidity, these two ratios 
decrease (increase). The other three varibles are positively related with trading 
liquidity. Furthermore, Panel C demonstrates the difference between the liquidity 
changes. This result suggests that the daily change in market liquidity generates a 
significant impact on the difference between daily changes in lit and dark liquidity; 
when market liquidity starts to rise (deplete), dark liquidity has a more pronounced 
increase (decrease) than lit liquidity and the difference between lit and dark venues 
also increases (decreases). This indicates the important role of the dark venue in 
facilitating liquidity to the market.  
Panels A, B, C, D and E in Table 5.3 show the baseline regression results in each year. 
One can see that the coefficients of DLm,t  in dark venues are larger than those in lit 
venues in each panel. This implies that in each year19 dark venues consistently exehibit 
a more pronounced liquidity commonality than lit venues. 
                                                     
19 Hence the shift in trading volume does not undermine my results in this chapter. 
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Thus far, I have shown that dark venues have larger liquidity comovement with market 
liquidity than lit venues. This indicates that dark pools can have two effects on the 
market; they can help inject liquidity into the market as well as drain liquidity from 
the market. In order to investigate which case holds, I decompose my liquidity proxies 
into two parts; i.e. when market-wide liquidity increases and when market-wide 
liquidity decreases  Panel A and B in Table 5.4 show the regression results when 
market-wide liquidity increases and decreases respectively. When market-wide 
liquidity is increasing the ELC coefficients in lit and dark venues are greater than the 
corresponding coefficients for when market-wide liquidity is decreasing. This 
indicates that, during the sample period, both lit and dark venues are more likely to 
contribute liquidity to the aggregate market rather than drain it. This is unsurprising 
given the general tightening of the spread over the past decade in the UK equity market. 
I further compute a simple ratio of ELC of dark venues to the ELC of lit venues. Since 
the ratios are all greater than one in both Panels A and B, the result implies that, 
compared with lit venues, dark venues inject (drain) more liquidity to (from) market 
when market-wide liquidity is increasing (decreasing). Panel A’s ratios range from 
1.08 to 2.12 with a mean value of 1.63 and Panel B’s multipliers range from 1.22 to 






Table 5.2. Baseline results: liquidity commonality in lit and dark venues 
This table shows estimated coefficients results for the following stock day panel regression model: 
titMtMtMti DLDLDLDL ,1,31,2,11,     
DLi,t is, for stock i, the percentage change (D) from trading dayt-1 to dayt in liquidity variables,including Amihud ratio, Florackis ratio, volume of shares, number 
of trades and pound volume, for both lit and dark venues. DLi,t  will be tested as lit liquiditydark liquidity  respectively. Lit and dark Amihud ratio, lit and dark 
Florackis ratio are computed as described in Table 5.1. DLM,t, DLM,t-1 and DLM,t+1 are the concurrent, one-day lag and lead of percentage change in a cross-
sectional equally weighted liquidity proxies including Amihud ratio, Florackis ratio, volume of shares, number of trades and pound volume . The t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. The sample period covers 1st June 2010 
to 30th September 2014.   
            
    Panel A. Lit venues   








DLM,t 1.850*** 0.608*** 0.933*** 1.154*** 1.088*** 
  (26.98) (21.16) (110.60) (133.31) (125.04) 
DLM,t-1 -0.120*** -0.094*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (-2.63) (-7.04) (-5.21) (-4.71) (-4.01) 
DLM,t+1 -0.043 -0.036** 0.015** -0.001 0.013** 
  (-0.93) (-2.25) (2.51) (-0.21) (2.01) 
Constant 1.585*** 2.275*** 0.078*** 0.064*** 0.071*** 
  (73.68) (69.60) (18.57) (17.27) (20.74) 
            
R-squared 2.51% 1.78% 22.77% 28.68% 26.84% 
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    Panel B. Dark venues   
VARIABLES Amihud Florackis 
Volume 
Number of trades 
Pound 
Volume Of shares 
DLm,t 2.407*** 1.225*** 1.700*** 1.860*** 2.070*** 
  (19.50) (18.25) (36.68) (47.33) (39.62) 
DLm,t-1 0.222** -0.034 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (2.49) (-0.97) (-16.07) (-18.39) (-17.03) 
DLm,t+1 -0.198** 0.016 0.188*** 0.150*** 0.273*** 
  (-2.18) (0.48) (5.76) (5.46) (7.71) 
Constant 2.826*** 4.283*** 0.970*** 0.687*** 0.923*** 
  (74.18) (62.25) (42.15) (41.51) (47.40) 
            
R-squared 1.26% 1.35% 3.74% 6.12% 4.51% 
 
    Panel C. Difference (DLdark-DLlit)   
VARIABLES Amihud Florackis 
Volume 
Number of trades Pound Volume 
Of shares 
DLm,t -0.559*** -0.668*** 0.767*** 0.707*** 0.984*** 
  (-4.56) (11.62) (17.76) (19.53) (20.06) 
DLm,t-1 -0.33*** -0.061** -3.95E-10*** -0.000000308*** -7.85E-13*** 
  (-3.67) (1.88) (-15.97) (-18.51) (-17.19) 
DLm,t+1 0.175** -0.062** 0.174*** 0.151*** 0.260*** 
  (1.9) (-1.90) (5.61) (5.89) (7.74) 
Constant -1.217*** -1.97*** 0.891*** 0.622*** 0.852*** 
  (-31.2) -(30.45) (40.93) (40.06) (46.01) 
            
R-squared 0.08% 0.42% 1.20% 1.53% 1.47% 
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Table 5.3. Baseline results in each year 
This table shows estimated coefficients results for the following stock day panel regression model: 
titMtMtMti DLDLDLDL ,1,31,2,11,     
DLi,t is, for stock i, the percentage change (D) from trading dayt-1 to dayt in liquidity variables,including Amihud ratio, Florackis ratio, volume of shares, number 
of trades and pound volume, for both lit and dark venues. DLi,t  will be tested as lit liquiditydark liquidity  respectively. Lit and dark Amihud ratio, lit and dark 
Florackis ratio are computed as described in Table 5.1. DLM,t, DLM,t-1 and DLM,t+1 are the concurrent, one-day lag and lead of percentage change in a cross-
sectional equally weighted liquidity proxies including Amihud ratio, Florackis ratio, volume of shares, number of trades and pound volume . The t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. The sample period covers 1st June 2010 
to 30th September 2014.   
 
    Panel A.  Baseline result in 2010   
    Lit venues     Dark  venues   
VARIABLES Amihud Florackis 





Volume Number of 
trades 
Pound 
Volume Of shares Of shares 
DLm,t 2.12*** 0.39*** 0.97*** 1.13*** 1.08*** 3.39*** 0.47*** 2.05*** 2.13*** 2.35*** 
  (15.17) (11.47) (50.8) (56.64) (52.91) (11.87) (5.9) (16.15) (21.19) (17.13) 
DLm,t-1 0.10 -0.10*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.04 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 
  (0.73) (-3.23) (0.25) (0.54) (0.29) (0.63) (0.6) (-1.85) (-1.99) (-1.23) 
DLm,t+1 0.27*** -0.041 -0.01 -0.03* -0.02 0.13 -0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.03 
  (2.27) (-1.24) (-0.99) (-1.8) (-1.51) (0.55) (-0.77) (0.72) (-0.19) (0.28) 
Constant 1.42*** 2.20*** 0.05*** 0.03* 0.05** 3.23*** 4.92*** 1.17*** 0.81*** 1.12*** 






    Panel B.  Baseline result in 2011   
    Lit venues     Dark  venues   
VARIABLES Amihud Florackis 





Volume Number of 
trades 
Pound 
Volume Of shares Of shares 
DLm,t 2.03*** 0.45*** 0.96*** 1.15*** 1.11*** 2.29*** 1.01*** 2.01*** 2.07*** 2.46*** 
  (17.51) (14.6) (67.27) (77.61) (72.96) (10.41) (13.41) (21.77) (28.88) (24.42) 
DLm,t-1 -0.21** -0.07** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.18 -0.23*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
  (-2.23) (-2.62) (-4.28) (-3.56) (-3.53) (-1.01) (-3.5) (-5.67) (-4.97) -(5.55) 
DLm,t+1 -0.11 -0.06** -0.00 -0.02** 0.01 -0.46** -0.14** 0.20*** 0.26*** 0.39*** 
  (-1.17) (-2.07) (-0.48) (-1.85) (0.82) (-2.48) (-2.12) (2.27) (3.82) (4.15) 
Constant 1.58*** 2.16*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 3.21*** 4.74*** 1.20*** 0.76*** 1.26*** 
  (31.3) (29.93) (9.05) (7.98) (7.81) (33.41) (27.34) (16.07) (14.39) (14.46) 
    Panel C.  Baseline result in 2012   
    Lit venues     Dark  venues   
VARIABLES Amihud Florackis 





Volume Number of 
trades 
Pound 
Volume Of shares Of shares 
DLm,t 1.82*** 0.49*** 1.01*** 1.20*** 1.13*** 2.59*** 1.14*** 2.16*** 2.16*** 2.47*** 
  (16.01) (12.26) (72.58) (77.43) (72.54) (13.55) (13.11) (30.62) (33.71) (30.38) 
DLm,t-1 -0.17* -0.04 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00* 0.54*** 0.01 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 
  (-1.66) (-1.26) (-1.7) (-2.93) (-1.67) (3.1) (0.23) (-0.75) (-0.75) (-0.87) 
DLm,t+1 0.07 -0.05* 0.02* 0.00 0.00 -0.18 -0.12 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.24*** 
  (0.74) (-1.64) (1.64) (0.44) (0.27) (-1.09) (-1.58) (2.82) (2.77) (3.38) 
Constant 1.52*** 2.21*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 2.55*** 4.13*** 0.61*** 0.45*** 0.64*** 
  (33.27) (32.08) (6.59) (6.5) (5.51) (33.32) (27.61) (10.71) (8.03) (8.18) 
    Panel D.  Baseline result in 2013   
    Lit venues     Dark  venues   
VARIABLES Amihud Florackis 





Volume Number of 
trades 
Pound 
Volume Of shares Of shares 
DLm,t 1.44*** 1.23*** 0.80 1.14*** 0.99*** 1.38*** 3.39*** 1.06*** 1.51*** 1.27*** 
  (13.2) (23.92) (50.2) (54.25) (54.89) (7.54) (31.04) (14.03) (19.81) (14.41) 
DLm,t-1 -0.10 -0.08* -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.74*** 0.1145257 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
  (-1.06) (-1.85) (-8.48) (-5.97) (-7.77) (4.37) (1.12) (-7.56) (-5.27) (-8.78) 
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DLm,t+1 -0.08 0.23*** 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.37** 0.70*** 0.16** 0.09 0.16** 
  (-0.83) (4.15) (0.32) (-1.46) (-0.87) (-2.27) (6.02) (2.44) (1.49) (2.08) 
Constant 1.54 2.09*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 2.56*** 3.44*** 1.17*** 0.75*** 1.40*** 
  (35.06) (30.56) (11.25) (7.97) (10.21) (34.77) (23.79) (13.47) (9.21) (13.78) 
    Panel E.  Baseline result in 2014   
    Lit venues     Dark  venues   
VARIABLES Amihud Florackis 





Volume Number of 
trades 
Pound 
Volume Of shares Of shares 
DLm,t 1.50*** 1.39*** 0.80*** 1.03*** 0.97*** 1.79*** 1.89*** 1.20*** 1.33*** 1.40*** 
  (9.57) (12.3) (40.98) (50.06) (44.63) (7.29) (8.58) (14.06) (17.81) (14.4) 
DLm,t-1 0.02 -0.05 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.74*** -0.24 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
  (0.19) (-0.54) (-1.39) (-0.08) (-0.29) (-3.38) (-1.19) (-3.38) (-2.43) (-3.05) 
DLm,t+1 -0.13 -0.10 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.14 0.32* 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 
  (-0.97) (-0.99) (0.61) (0.8) (1.32) (-0.68) (1.64) (3.26) (3.5) (3.25) 
Constant 1.66*** 2.34*** 0.08*** 0.04** 0.06*** 2.55*** 4.01*** 0.80*** 0.52*** 0.82*** 
  (32.28) (30.89) (4.4) (2.00) (2.79) (31.86) (27.19) (9.14) (6.33) (7.83) 











Table 5.4. Asymmetry in liquidity commonality in lit and dark venues under different market conditions 
This table shows estimated coefficients results for the following stock day panel regression model: 
titMtMtMti DLDLDLDL ,1,31,2,11,   
 
DLi,t is, for stock i, the percentage change (D) from trading dayt-1 to dayt  in liquidity variables (including Amihud ratio, Florackis ratio, trading volume, Number 
of trades and pound volume for both lit and dark venues). DLi,t  will be tested as lit liquidity, dark liquidity and market-wide liquidity respectively. Lit and dark 
Amihud ratio, Lit and dark Florackis ratio are computed as described in Table 5.1. DLM,t, DLM,t-1 and DLM,t+1 are the concurrent, one-day lag and lead of 
percentage change in a cross-sectional equally weighted liquidity proxies, including Amihud ratio, Florackis ratio, volume of shares, number of trades and 
pound volume. Panel A reports the results for when market liquidity improves(when Amihud and Florackis ratio decrease, and when volume of shares, number 
of trades and pound volume increases); Panel B reports the results when market liquidity deteriorates (when Amihud and Florackis ratio increase, and when 
volume of shares, number of trades and pound volume decrease). The ELC Ratio is the ratio of  the ELC coefficient of dark liquidity to the corresponding lit 
ELC coefficient. The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. The 
sample period covers 1st June 2010 to 30th September 2014. 
   Panel A. When market liquidity improves       















Of shares Of shares 
DLM,t 2.121*** 1.436*** 1.020*** 1.305*** 1.205*** 2.438*** 1.554*** 2.096*** 2.267*** 2.550*** 
  (13.39) (9.05) (60.80) (75.88) (71.03) (7.44) (4.85) (22.59) (27.98) (24.31) 
DLM,t-1 -0.180*** -0.008 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.282*** 0.099** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (-3.39) (-0.52) (-11.54) (-4.64) (-6.35) (2.74) (2.56) (-17.63) (-15.76) (-17.79) 
DLM,t+1 0.063 0.015 0.096*** 0.001 0.025** -0.297*** 0.044 0.368*** 0.203*** 0.379*** 
  (1.18) (0.88) (8.96) (0.05) (2.14) (-2.71) (1.21) (6.67) (3.88) (5.83) 
Constant 1.667*** 2.279*** 0.106*** 0.041*** 0.060*** 2.822*** 3.926*** 1.131*** 0.710*** 1.016*** 
  (37.42) (32.12) (13.92) (6.14) (9.56) (34.09) (26.92) (28.88) (24.33) (29.55) 
ELC Ratio           1.15 1.08 2.05 1.74 2.12 
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Of shares Of shares 
DLM,t 1.853*** 0.503*** 0.945*** 1.066*** 1.015*** 2.389*** 1.058*** 1.207*** 1.490*** 1.239*** 
  (17.59) (14.36) (65.50) (70.01) (68.98) (12.63) (13.01) (14.39) (21.95) (14.27) 
DLM,t-1 0.047 
-
0.130*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.179 -0.334*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.49) (-2.67) (5.10) (-0.16) (1.18) (1.01) (-3.17) (-4.94) (-8.51) (-5.01) 
DLM,t+1 -0.207** 0.018 -0.043*** -0.027*** -0.017** -0.005 0.161 -0.004 0.028 0.035 
  (-2.38) (0.38) (-6.10) (-3.67) (-2.38) (-0.03) (1.60) (-0.09) (0.89) (0.83) 
Constant 1.564*** 2.642*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 2.866*** 4.856*** 0.723*** 0.553*** 0.660*** 
  (34.16) (44.02) (9.16) (9.61) (11.78) (35.23) (37.57) (23.94) (23.97) (24.65) 
ELC Ratio            1.29 2.10 1.28 1.40 1.22 





5.4.2. What drives dark pool trading activities 
The next step is to test the argument that dark pools may work as complementary 
venues to traditional (lit) exchanges, especially in the event of worsening liquidity and 
long limit order queues in lit markets. This is because, such conditions may incentivise 
traders to migrate to dark pools where they can trade at or within the midpoint with 
relatively minimal price impact. The estimates from these tests are presented in Table 
5.5.  
Panel A shows the estimated relationship between market-wide liquidity and trading 
activity in lit and dark venues. In the lit market, a 1% change in market-wide spread 
induces approximately 0.3% contemporaneous average percentage change in 
individual stock trading activity; all the estimates are statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. Thus, as liquidity declines in the wider market, there is a marked but 
unsubstantial increase in trading activity in an average individual stock. In comparison, 
the increase in trading activity in the dark venues is at least twice, and in some cases, 
thrice, the magnitude seen in the lit venues. Specifically, in dark pools, a 1% change 
in market-wide limit order spread induces a contemporaneous change in individual 
stock trading activity ranging from 0.7% to 0.9%; all coefficients are statistically 
significant at 0.01 level. This indicates that dark venues are likely to be more attractive 
than lit venues when liquidity constraints take hold in the aggregate market. This 
gravitation towards the dark side of the market implies that traders can optimally trade 
off the execution uncertainty, occasioned by market-wide liquidity constraints, and 
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mid-quote price movement in dark pools against increased transaction costs in the 
limit order book (Buti et al., 2011, He and Lepone, 2014). Increase in transaction costs 

























Table 5.5. What drive dark pool trading activity 
This table shows estimated coefficients results for the market mechanism test in the following 
stock day panel regression model: 
titMtMtMti DBASDBASDBASDL ,1,31,2,11,   
 
titMtMtMti DQueueDQueueDQueueDL ,1,31,2,11,   
 
DLi,t is, for stock i, the percentage change (D) from trading dayt-1 to dayt  in liquidity 
variables ,including  volume of shares, number of trades and pound volume for both lit and 
dark venues. DLj,t  will be tested as lit liquidity, dark liquidity and market-wide liquidity 
respectively.. DBASM,t, DBASM,t-1 and DBASM,t+1 represent the concurrent, one-day lag and 
lead of the percentage change in a cross-sectional equally weighted effective bid-ask spread 
of my sample stocks. DQueueM,t, DQueueM,t-1 and DQueueM,t+1 represent the concurrent, one-
day lag and lead of the percentage change of the message-to-trade ratio adjusted order queue; 
this is calculated as the market depth at the best bid and ask divided by message-to-trade ratio. 
The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** correspond to statistical 
significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. The sample period covers 1st June 2010 
to 30th September 2014.   
 
 
   
Panel A. Effective Spread 
    
   Lit venues    Dark venues   















DBASM,t 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 
  (7.28) (9.34) (7.4) (5.04) (5.53 (5.07) 
DBASM,t-1 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001* 0.00 
  (-4.70) (-6.84) (-4.44) (-0.43) (-1.91) (-0.38) 
DBASM,t+1 -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.023*** -0.038 -0.018 -0.038 
  (-4.46) (-4.17) (-4.71) (-1.60) (-1.19) (-1.61) 
Constant 0.079*** 0.063*** 0.079*** 0.692*** 0.449*** 0.692*** 
  (48.76) (44.66) (48.84) (87.88) (85.19) (87.91) 
              
R-squared 0.16% 0.26% 0.02% 0.07% 0.09% 0.07% 
     
  
 



















     Panel B.  Order Queue   
   Lit venues    Dark venues   















DQueueM,t 0.239*** 0.208*** 0.241*** 1.018*** 0.666*** 1.025*** 
  (36.62) (36.41) (36.25) (24.39) (27.04) (24.54) 
DQueueM,t-1 0.00 -0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.53) (-0.22) (0.56) (-4.64) (-4.85) (-4.67) 
DQueueM,t+1 -0.065*** -0.061*** -0.065*** -0.042*** -0.056*** -0.043*** 
  (-22.10) (-23.48) (-22.15) (-2.83) (-6.44) (-2.91) 
Constant 0.072*** 0.061*** 0.072*** 0.815*** 0.533*** 0.816*** 
  -12.67 (12.24) (12.70) (24.48) (24.75) (24.53) 
              













When the spread widens, the high savings arising from trading at the midpoint attracts 
traders to move their orders from lit markets to dark pools. This point is also consistent 
with Madhavan and Cheng (1997) and Smith et al. (2001) who study the role of 
upstairs market. Similar to dark pools, upstairs markets allow traders to execute large 
institutional client orders without pre-trade transparency. However, some upstairs 
markets do have market makers to intermediate trades and upstairs transactions will 
incur price impact subsequently. Madhavan and Cheng (1997) show that upstairs 
markets enable transactions that would not otherwise occur in the downstairs market. 
The key differences between the upstairs markets of old and the modern midpoint dark 
pool, which I study is that execution prices in the latter are constrained within the 
downstairs market spread and dark pools are not usually subject to trading 
intermediation as it conceptually affords complete opacity of trading intentions. 
Nevertheless, the similarities in the functions of the upstairs markets and dark pools 
are striking. For example, Smith et al. (2001) show that upstairs markets play a 
complementary role to the downstairs, because trades are more likely to be executed 
upstairs when the spread on the downstairs limit order book widens. The estimates as 
obtained in Table 5.5 suggest that the modern midpoint dark pool performs a similar 
function, but perhaps even more important is that participation in dark pools is not 
limited to large institutional traders as is the case for upstairs market. Thus  dark pools 
absorbs those trades that would not be easily executed otherwise, in a similar manner 
to the upstairs market  (see as examples Madhavan and Cheng, 1997, Gresse, 2006).   
Panel B in Table 5.5 reports the impact of limit order queue on lit and dark trading 
activities. With a 1% increase in limit order queue, individual stock trading activities 
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in lit and dark markets will contemporaneously increase from 0.21% to 0.24% and 
0.67% to 1.02% respectively, depending on the trading activity proxy. It can be 
observed that dark venues are likely to be more attractive than lit venues when the 
order queue in lit venues starts to lengthen. This is consistent with queue jumping 
hypothesis suggested by Kwan et al. (2015). When order queue builds up, new traders 
will have to join the queue and wait for their orders to be executed. As a result, the 
risk of non-execution of newer orders increases. In this case, dark venues become more 
attractive than lit ones as dark pools may offer liquidity traders the ability to bypass 
the limit order queues and also allow for faster execution with minimum price impact.  
Thus, I find that when the spread widens or the order queue lengthens traders may take 
advantage of the dark venues due to its potentially faster execution and propensity for 
lower price impact. This implies that dark pools act as complementary trading 
mechanisms to the traditional lit stock exchanges. 
 
5.4.3. Liquidity and informed trading activities 
Next the association between liquidity commonality and informed trading activity is 
considered. Theoretical studies (see for examples Hendershott and Mendelson, 2000, 
Ye, 2011, Zhu, 2014, Buti et al., 2016)  (see as examples Hendershott and Mendelson, 
2000, Ye, 2011, Zhu, 2014, Buti et al., 2016)base their modelling on differing 
assumptions regarding the accessibility of dark pools to uninformed traders. However, 
all studies agree that informed traders may aim to execute their orders in dark pools in 
order to reduce their transactions costs and maximise profits from their information 
(Nimalendran and Ray, 2014). This issue is empirically examined by extending the 
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baseline model to include informed trading proxies related to the dark pools in my 
sample.20 The probability of informed trading (PIN) is used here to proxy informed 
trading activity in the aggregate market. For completeness, I also include the ratio of 
messages in the market to trade (ALGO) in order to capture AT activity from the 
aggregate market. In order to avoid potential multi-collinearity issues, the base-line 
regression is executed with these two variables separately.  
Table 5.6 shows the regression results based on PIN, which shows that in lit venues, 
the daily changes in market-wide PIN has a positive and significant impact on daily 
change in the illiquidity proxies, Amihud and Florackis ratios and negative impact on 
the more traditional trading activity variables of volume of shares traded, trading 
frequency and pound volume factors. The coefficients imply an inverse relationship 
between liquidity commonality and informed trading. This result is inconsistent with 
Chordia et al. (2000) who hypothesise that informed trading could result in liquidity 
commonality because simultaneous holding of superior information could result in 
correlated demand for liquidity by informed traders. However my result is consistent 
with Chung et al. (2005) in that market makers post wider spreads and smaller depths 
for stocks with higher probability of information-based trading in order to account for 
higher levels of  adverse selection risks when informed trading activity rises. 
Furthermore, the coefficients of dark liquidity show that informed trading activities in 
lit venues also have a negative impact on dark liquidity commonality and coomonality 
in relation to the trading activity variables of volume of shares traded, transaction 
numbers and pound volume. Most importantly, the coefficients of dark liquidity and 
                                                     
20 This method is similar to Chung, K. H. & Chuwonganant, C. 2014. Uncertainty, market structure, and 
liquidity. Journal of Financial Economics, 113, 476-499. who add Chicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE) 
Market Volatility Index (VIX) into liquidity commonality test. 
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trading activity commonality are all larger than corresponding ones in lit venues, 
indicating that informed trading activity in the aggregate market has a larger impact 
on dark liquidity than lit liquidity. The values for the dark venues are 1.14, 2.78, – 
0.37, –0.18 and –0.33 for Amihud, Florackis, volume of shares traded , transaction 
numbers and pound volume respectively. This is unsurprsing and consistent with the 
self-selection hypothesis (see Zhu, 2014; Comerton-Forde and Putnins, 2015), which 
implies that informed traders gravitate towards lit venues while uninformed traders 
are attracted to the dark trading structure. My results imply that while informed trading 
reduces trading activity in lit markets, it does so to a much larger extent in dark venues.  
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Table 5.6. Liquidity commonality and informed trading  
Panel A and B in Table 5.4 shows estimated coefficients results for the following stock day panel regression model: 
titMtMtMtMtMtMti PINPINPINDLDLDLDL ,1,61,5,41,31,2,11,   
                     
titMtMtMtMtMtMti ALGOALGOALGODLDLDLDL ,1,61,5,41,31,2,11,   
 
DLI,t is, for stock i, the percentage change (D) from trading dayt-1 to dayt in liquidity variables ,including Amihud ratio, Florackis ratio, volume of shares, number 
of trades and pound volume for both lit and dark venues. DLi,t  will be tested as lit liquidity, dark liquidity and market-wide liquidity respectively. Lit and dark 
Amihud ratio, Lit and dark Florackis ratio are computed as described in Table 5.1. DLM,t, DLM,t-1 and DLM,t+1 are the concurrent, one-day lag and lead of the 
percentage change in a cross-sectional equally weighted liquidity proxies of my sample stocks. DPINM,t, DPINM,t-1 and DPINM,t+1 are the concurrent, one-day 
lag and lead of percentage change in a cross-sectional equally weighted PIN of the sample stocks. PIN measure is computed as outlined in Table 5.1. DALGOM,t, 
DALGOM,t-1 and DALGOM,t+1 are the concurrent, one-day lag and lead of percentage change in a cross-sectional equally weighted liquidity proxies of the sample 
stocks. ALGO is as a proxy for algorithmic trading and is measured as the ratio of messages to trades.The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
correspond to statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. The sample period covers 1st June 2010 to 30th September 2014.  
Panel A. PIN 



















DLM,t 1.853*** 0.512*** 0.901*** 1.117*** 1.052*** 2.331*** 1.081*** 1.541*** 1.710*** 1.876*** 
  (26.64) (18.96) (106.63) (128.48) (120.74) (18.50) (16.51) (35.03) (45.53) (38.06) 
DLM,t-1 -0.093* -0.102*** 0.017*** -0.002 0.010 0.106 -0.063* 0.201*** 0.148*** 0.265*** 
  (-1.96) (-7.32) (2.70) (-0.37) (1.63) (1.18) (-1.80) (6.07) (5.33) (7.48) 
DLM,t+1 -0.044 -0.043*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.228** 0.015 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (-0.93) (-2.69) (-3.65) (-3.29) (-2.77) (-2.51) (0.45) (-14.53) (-17.08) (-15.66) 
DPINM,t 0.454** 1.604*** -0.053*** -0.006 -0.026* 1.135*** 2.784*** -0.368*** -0.181*** -0.325*** 
  (2.02) (5.06) (-3.47) (-0.45) (-1.74) (2.86) (4.14) (-4.50) (-3.37) (-4.01) 
DPINmMt-1 0.165 0.877*** -0.012 0.015 0.017 1.681*** 3.037*** -0.121* -0.025 -0.073 
  (0.89) (3.31) (-0.89) (1.34) (1.32) (4.95) (5.06) (-1.68) (-0.53) (-1.01) 
DPINM,t+1 0.217 -1.031*** -0.084*** -0.033*** -0.052*** -0.049 -0.885 -0.252*** -0.187*** -0.198*** 
  (1.13) (-3.91) (-6.38) (-2.98) (-4.05) (-0.15) (-1.50) (-3.46) (-3.98) (-2.73) 
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Constant 1.572*** 2.281*** 0.072*** 0.059*** 0.066*** 2.806*** 4.223*** 0.934*** 0.667*** 0.897*** 
  (71.26) (69.07) (16.80) (15.44) (19.05) (72.15) (61.16) (40.64) (39.98) (45.89) 
                      
R-squared 2.53% 1.51% 21.32% 26.93% 25.25% 1.34% 1.21% 3.08% 5.20% 3.72% 




































Panel B. ALGO 



















DLM,t 1.827*** 0.585*** 0.885*** 1.086*** 1.030*** 2.379*** 1.177*** 1.557*** 1.690*** 1.898*** 
  (26.82) (20.94) (77.58) (75.99) (79.95) (19.39) (17.85) (30.54) (35.52) (32.35) 
DLM,t-1 -0.122*** -0.083*** 0.017** 0.007 0.015* 0.246*** 0.004 0.187*** 0.162*** 0.270*** 
  (-2.68) (-6.22) (2.38) (0.80) (1.90) (2.77) (0.12) (5.40) (5.36) (7.10) 
DLM,t+1 -0.052 -0.021 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.237*** 0.023 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (-1.12) (-1.30) (-7.32) (-6.59) (-6.14) (-2.59) (0.68) (-17.12) (-19.23) (-18.03) 
DAlgoM,t 0.351*** -2.295*** -0.393*** -0.361*** -0.386*** 1.608*** -7.377*** -1.161*** -0.900*** -1.146*** 
  (4.00) (-5.58) (-5.39) (-5.31) (-5.38) (4.52) (-5.02) (-5.36) (-5.36) (-5.35) 
DAlgoM,t-1 0.167*** 0.820*** 0.084*** 0.087*** 0.084*** 0.226 1.672*** 0.434*** 0.325*** 0.434*** 
  (2.86) (4.03) (3.43) (3.66) (3.49) (1.57) (2.86) (3.98) (4.11) (4.01) 
DAlgoM,t+1 -0.241*** 0.156 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.077*** -0.425*** 0.321 0.181*** 0.168*** 0.185*** 
  (-3.83) (1.34) (3.57) (3.69) (3.59) (-3.49) (0.91) (2.90) (3.25) (2.96) 
Constant 1.575*** 2.340*** 0.098*** 0.082*** 0.089*** 2.764*** 4.541*** 1.019*** 0.726*** 0.970*** 
  (69.38) (52.46) (12.72) (10.73) (12.22) (62.25) (36.10) (33.34) (30.50) (34.51) 
                      




The results in Panel B, based on an alternate informed trading proxy, ALGO, is 
consistent with the trend in Panel A. AT activity exerts a negative influence on 
liquidity in both lit and dark venues. Also as in the case for PIN, ALGO has a larger 
negative impact on dark liquidity than on lit liquidity. Together, both PIN and ALGO 
have an overall stronger negative impact on dark venues than lit venues, indicating 
that when informed trading activities increases, lit venues’ liquidity is less affected 
than dark venues. This finding is consistent with Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2015) 
and Zhu (2014) that lit venues are more attractive to informed traders whereas dark 
pools are more attractive to uninformed traders because informed traders are likely to 
gravitate on the same side of the dark venues and when information event occurs these 
informed trades face low execution probabilities. As a result, informed trading 
activities reduce the two-sideness of the dark pools as well as dark liquidity.  
 
5.4.4. Determinants of elasticity of liquidity commonality 
In conclusion, I examine the elasticity of liquidity commonality (ELC). My approach 
is consistent with the earlier analysis presented in the preceding sections. First, I run 
stock quarter analysis for my baseline regression Equation (5.07), collect the ELC, 
measured as the coefficients of 
1 , and run ELC against quarterly averaged stock 
attributes. Panel A in Table 5.7 shows the results with PIN as informed trading proxy 
in lit venues. When liquidity is measured by Amihud and Florackis ratios, PIN has 
negative impact on ELC, suggesting that stocks with low levels of informed trading 
have stronger liquidity correlations with the wider market. Thus, informed trading in 
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an individual stock reduces its liquidity commonality with the wider market. Based on 
the volume of shares traded , trading frequency and pound volume coefficient 
estimates, I do not observe that informed trading exerts statistically significant impact 
on trading activity. In the last column, I show the estimates for the overall lit ELC, 
which equals to the sum of the
1 from the baseline models under five different 
liquidity proxies. The last column shows that informed trading activity reduces the 
level of liquidity commonality in lit markets when all measures of liquidity are 
considered in unison, and that volatility tends to increase the level of liquidity 
commonality. Overall, this section of the results suggests that stocks with low level of 
informed trading and high level of volatility generate the strongest liquidity 
commonality with the wider market.  
Panel B in Table 5.7 shows the results of dark venues. First, when liquidity is proxied 
by the Florackis ratio and trading frequency, PIN exerts a negative and statistically 
significant impact on liquidity commonality. Further, when liquidity is proxied by 
Amihud ratio, volume of shares traded, trading frequency and pound volume, volatility 
tends to have positive and statistically significant impact on liquidity commonality. 
The last column suggests that the liquidity commonality in dark venues tends to shrink 
with increases in informed trading activity. The reduction in liquidity commonality 
when a stock is traded in the dark is on a magnitude almost three times higher than 






Table 5.7. Stock attributes and elasticity of liquidity commonality 
The table reports regression coefficient estimates using a stock-quarter panel. I first run regression for each quarter and collect elasticity of liquidity commonality 
(ELC), coefficient of
1 , from baseline regression in model (5). Then, I treat ELC as dependent variables in the following regression: 
titititititititi PINVOLAPVCOUNTMKTPRICEECL ,,6,5,4,3,2,11,  
 
PRICEi is the log of quarterly average share price of stock i, COUNTi is the log of quarterly averaged number of transaction of stock i, PVi is the log of quarterly 
averaged pound volume traded of of stock i, VOLAi is quarterly volatility of return of stock i. PINi is quarterly averaged probability of informed trading of stock 
i. PIN measure computed as outlined in Table 5.1. 












PIN -4.582* -4.502*** -0.406 0.077 0.308 -9.105*** 
  (-1.84) (-3.10) (-0.90) (0.20) (0.83) (-2.80) 
Price 0.076 -0.010 -0.072*** 0.007 -0.010 -0.008 
  (0.80) (-0.18) (-5.58) (0.57) (-0.82) (-0.07) 
MKT 0.123 -0.256*** 0.015 0.019 0.028 -0.072 
  (1.20) (-3.64) (0.84) (1.09) (1.54) (-0.49) 
Count -0.600 0.776*** -0.015 0.084 0.003 0.250 
  (-1.14) (3.32) (-0.22) (1.42) (0.05) (0.38) 
Pound Volume 0.135 -0.187 0.091* -0.034 0.052 0.057 
  (0.34) (-0.96) (1.71) (-0.68) (1.01) (0.11) 
Volatility 1.088*** -0.500*** 0.173*** 0.085** 0.125*** 0.971*** 
  (3.68) (-3.54) (4.23) (2.08) (2.94) (2.69) 
Constant 8.234** 2.325 0.442 1.231*** 0.117 12.350*** 
  (2.25) (1.24) (0.90) (2.62) (0.25) (2.62) 
              














Pound Volume Overall_Dark 
  
PIN -4.582 -7.911*** -5.111 -3.670** -4.527 -25.801** 
  (-0.85) (-2.64) (-1.58) (-2.01) (-1.21) (-2.41) 
Price 0.198 0.207** -0.117 -0.087 -0.046 0.154 
  (1.47) (1.96) (-1.28) (-1.51) (-0.41) (0.51) 
MKT 0.488*** -0.652*** -0.075 0.076 0.027 -0.136 
  (3.02) (-4.27) (-0.86) (1.19) (0.29) (-0.45) 
Count -0.542 0.873* -0.607 -0.754** -0.914 -1.944 
  (-0.81) (1.89) (-1.02) (-2.33) (-1.17) (-1.09) 
Pound Volume -0.651 0.141 0.723* 0.468* 0.844* 1.524 
  (-1.20) (0.37) (1.77) (1.95) (1.67) (1.17) 
Volatility 1.458*** -0.637** 0.667*** 0.625*** 0.937*** 3.051*** 
  (3.07) (-2.32) (2.77) (3.52) (3.61) (3.51) 
Constant 17.610*** 2.766 -1.073 1.428 -2.100 18.630 
  (3.28) (0.73) (-0.27) (0.62) (-0.44) (1.51) 
              




This chapter presents the first set of evidence aimed at informing the understanding of 
the commonality dynamics between dark pool liquidity and market-wide liquidity. 
Liquidity comovement of FTSE100 stocks are compared and contrasted in lit and dark 
venues from June 2010 to September 2014. By employing established liquidity 
commonality model, I find that, compared with lit venues, dark venues have stronger 
liquidity commonality. Moreover, this stronger liquidity commonality in dark venues 
is sourced from increasing trend of the market. My findings suggest that dark venues 
inject liquidity to the market rather than drain liquidity from the market and, compared 
with lit venues, dark venues contribute more liquidity to the market. This is because 
dark venues can facilitate trades that otherwise cannot be easily executed in lit venues 
in the case of limit order spread widens and order queue bulks up. This finding is 
consistent with He and Lepone (2014) and Kwan et al. (2015). I further test whether 
dark liquidity commonality is fuelled by informed trading activities. However, the 
results suggest that informed trading and AT actually reduce both lit and dark liquidity. 
Compared with lit liquidity, informed trading and AT generates stronger negative 
impact on dark pool liquidity. This finding is in line with Zhu (2014) that informed 
investors face low execution probabilities in crossing networks and dark pools because 
informed trader typically trade at the same side of the dark pools. My last major 
finding is that stocks with low level of informed trading and high volatility yield 




This evidence indicates that dark trading in my sample potentially contributes liquidity 
to the market. This is consistent with Buti et al. (2011), He and Lepone (2014) and 
Brugler (2015) that dark pool trading seems do not have detrimental impact on market 
liquidity. Obviously, more theoretical and empirical research is need to uncover the 
dark pool liquidity mechanism in global equity market. I hope my analysis can help 
policy makers and academics to draw important implication and implement evidence-














6. Summary  
The beginning of this thesis argues that technology has transformed the financial 
markets over the past few decades. The recent advance in market structure has 
received significant attention from regulators, academics, investors and other market 
participants, with some wondering whether the innovations have outpaced the 
regulatory structure designed to foster market integrity. However, not much attention 
has been paid to technological iteration in Europe’s largest equity market, the London 
equity market, comprising the LSE and several other fast-growing trading platforms. 
This thesis conducts microstructure analysis to identify the impact of the evolving 
market structure on market quality.  
6.1. Summary of findings 
6.1.1. Informed trading and the Price Impact of Block Trades 
The first empirical study in Chapter 3 investigates the connection between block trades 
and informed trading on the LSE under a high-frequency trading environment on an 
intraday and inter-day basis. This contributes to the literature on the informativeness 
of block trades and how their execution relates to the incorporation of information into 
stock prices. My sample data include FTSE100 stocks from 1st October 2012 to 30th 
September 2013. I define block trades as the largest 1% of the trades in each stock. To 
obtain the level of informed trading activity, tick data is used to estimate PIN variables.  
This chapter reveals three major findings. First, by expanding observations of block 
trades to normal trading hours, I show that informed trades are positively related to 
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the number of block trades and information can quickly diffuse into stock price 
through block trades on the LSE. Second, the results indicate that the impounding of 
information into stock prices is stronger in the first trading hour than at other times 
during the normal trading day. Moreover, informed trading at day t-1 can still affect 
informed traders’ block transaction at day t. These results are consistent with the 
theoretical frameworks of Kyle (1985), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster and 
Viswanathan (1994) and Hong and Stein (1999) that suggest that private information 
is gradually incorporated into asset prices because informed traders gradually exploit 
private information across trading days. Third, since PIN is correlated with firm-level 
financial transparency  (Vega, 2006), I stratify sample stocks into four portfolios based 
on the mean value of their daily PIN and show that the information incorporation 
process can vary across stocks with different levels of financial transparency. This 
finding shows that the larger the level of informed trading in a stock, the higher the 
permanent price impact of block trades. This implies a positive role of informed 
trading in facilitating the price discovery process as informed traders aid the price 
discovery process for less transparent stocks.  
6.1.2. Aggregate market fragmentation, adverse selection and market 
efficiency 
This chapter aims to investigate the visible market fragmentation introduced by MiFID 
in 2007. MiFID allows MTFs to compete for order flow, resulting in increasingly 
fragmented trading volume. Note that MiFID does not formally mandate a linkage 
between trading venues and the release of consolidated quote information on a national 
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basis; orders are permitted to execute at a price that is inferior to the best available 
price across venues. This differs considerably from the rules in the United States under 
the Reg NMS, which mandates that exchanges re-route orders to other venues if those 
venues offer a better price (trade-throughs). Under MiFID, the primary exchange is 
typically accessible to all investors, while simultaneous access to multiple venues 
(including MTFs) normally requires the smart order routing technology. SORT is only 
available to institutional and professional investors. Although retail investors may be 
unable to access multiple venues at once, they are still able to trade at individual 
venues in real time. The trading fragmentation has raised concerns about whether the 
diversified market landscape can harm price transparency in the markets. In this 
chapter, I disentangle the effect of trading fragmentation by studying the impact of 
competition for visible order flow on market transparency and market efficiency under 
a consolidated market environment.  
First, the study examines the relationship between trading fragmentation and market 
transparency. PIN variables and the one-minute mid-quote returns autocorrelation are 
employed as proxies for adverse selection costs and risk, respectively. PIN and 
autocorrelations of intraday return capture informed trading activity and therefore are 
inverse proxies for market transparency. Results suggest the existence of a 
quadratic/U-shaped relationship between fragmentation and adverse selection risk. 
Thus, visible fragmentation helps to reduce adverse selection costs and increase 
market transparency in the aggregate market environment when fragmentation is 
relatively lower. However, when fragmentation is higher, implied adverse selection 
costs and market opacity potentially increase with fragmentation.   
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The impact of market fragmentation on market efficiency is also investigated by 
adapting Chordia et al.'s (2008) return predictability model to test whether 
fragmentation reduces short-horizon return predictability. The study finds that 
fragmentation facilitates market efficiency by eliminating short-horizon return 
predictability and reducing arbitrage opportunities. This finding is in line with 
Storkenmaier and Wagener (2011) and Menkveld (2013), who suggest that order flow 
competition across trading venues can act as a linkage necessary to minimise arbitrage 
opportunities.  
This chapter has important implications for the debate surrounding trading 
fragmentation in European equity markets. Empirical evidence shows that market 
fragmentation should be viewed as a value-creating competition phenomenon that 
benefits market transparency and price efficiency. 
 
6.1.3. Liquidity commonality in lit and dark venues 
This chapter expands the research scope to the dark pool, a less transparent trading 
venue that does not provide pre-trade transparency. In Europe, regulators have taken 
the opportunity offered by MiFID II to implement an 8% cap on the total value of dark 
trading across all venues. This restriction is scheduled for implementation at the 
beginning of 2018.  
This chapter presents a study of the dynamics of the liquidity-creation effect in both 
lit and dark venues by employing a liquidity commonality model. Previous research 
in liquidity commonality (see for example Chordia et al., 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 
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2001; Huberman and Halka, 2001) shows that the liquidity levels of individual stocks 
co-vary with the market-wide liquidity. One explanation for this phenomenon is 
market makers’ inventory management; market makers are likely to respond to 
shifting market prices and order flow by altering their exposure across various assets. 
The application of liquidity commonality model reveals that, compared with lit venues, 
dark venues inject liquidity into the market rather than drain liquidity from the market. 
This is because dark venues can facilitate trades that otherwise cannot be easily 
executed in lit venues if the limit order spread widens and the order queue bulks up.  
This study also tests whether dark liquidity commonality is fuelled by informed 
trading activities. However, the results suggest that informed trading and AT actually 
reduce both lit and dark liquidity. Compared with lit liquidity, informed trading and 
AT have a stronger negative impact on dark pool liquidity. This finding is consistent 
with Zhu’s (2014) finding that informed investors face low execution probabilities in 
crossing networks and dark pools because informed traders are likely to be clustered 
on the same side of the dark order book. The last major finding is that stocks with a 
low level of informed trading and high volatility yield greater liquidity commonality. 
The evidence indicates that midpoint dark pool trading has no detrimental impact on 
market liquidity. 
6.2. Suggestions for Future Research  
The studies described in this thesis have examined the impact of recent technological 
advances on the London equity market. My studies deliver the view that the evolution 
of the market structure benefits the market participants. However, the constantly 
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changing market landscape leaves some issues that are not covered in this thesis, for 
example, the intraday analysis of dark pool trading behaviour. Since most trades in 
dark pools are based on a computerised algorithm and can be executed within a 
fraction of a millisecond, the high-frequency relationships between dark pool trading 
and market quality are of direct importance to regulators tasked with promoting 
financial stability. For example, institutional investors and intraday traders tend to 
trade heavily when the market is opening and close their positions when the market is 
closing. Future research can focus on how institutional investors utilise dark pools on 
an intraday basis and compare the effects of dark trading during the opening and 
closing to the rest of the day.  
Furthermore, the midpoint dark pool also raises concerns about potential market 
manipulation. Foley and Putniņš (2016) point out that the midpoint dark trading may 
reveal information about trading intentions. For example, market participants can 
predict the direction of trade by submitting a bait/probing order to the midpoint dark 
pool. The execution time and direction of the bait order can reveal information about 
forthcoming trades. More empirical studies can investigate the impact of the potential 
market manipulation of dark pools.  
Finally, with the Australian and Canadian authorities having already devised measures 
to regulate dark pool trading, it is now Europe’s turn to regulate dark pool trading 
activity. It may seem surprising that MiFID II will implement a one-size-fits-all and 
inflexible 8% dark volume cap on all stocks. Future researchers might conduct a 
natural experiment to analyse the effects of dark volume cap, answering the questions 
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